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This dissertation addresses three topics on applied microeconomics. First, we
investigate issues of market power and tax incidence in the U.S brewing industry.
Since alcohol consumption can be addictive, we derive a structural econometric
model of addiction from a dynamic oligopoly game. This model identifies the
degree of market power in a dynamic setting and allows us to test the hypothesis
that federal tax incidence differs from state excise tax. Results indicate that beer
producers have a modest market power and an increase in federal excise tax is more
effective to reduce consumption than state excise taxes.
Second, we estimate the effect of sulfur dioxide(S02) emissions regulations on
the productivity growth and opportunity cost of 261 phase I generating units. The
Clean Air Act Amendment(CAAA) of 1990 required units to reduce emissions to
2.5 pounds per mrnBTU fuel input in the phase I period(1995-99). We calculate
Luenberger productivity indicators using directional technology distance function
for 209 units in 1990-1999. There is more potential to reduce pure technical
inefficiency since it is the main source of inefficiency in phase I period.
Productivity declined, hut it i not significantly different from the productivity
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 growth of pre-phase I. So environmental policy is successful to reduce SO2 
emission without sacrificing productivity growth. Opportunity cost declined, but 
the opportunity cost of scrubber and "other" strategy increase. 
Third, we estimate the regulatory effect on strategy choice of 257 phase I units 
using multinomial logit model. We assume behavioral cost is a function of shadow 
input prices, output, SO2 emissions and regulatory variables. Results suggest 
regulation significantly affect choices. Units located in high-sulfur coal states are 
more likely to choose scrubber, allowance or "other" strategy through shadow 
capital price  effect. Allowance trade and sales restriction negatively affect 
allowance, scrubber or fuel switch strategy. Non-private units are more likely to 
choose allowance strategy while private units are likely to choose less uncertain 
scrubber and fuel switch. Units subject to stringent local regulation are more likely 
to choose "other" strategy and scrubber and units with substitution/compensation 
boilers are more likely to choose allowance and "other" strategies. Essays on Applied Microeconomics 
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 Essays on Applied Microeconomics 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis consistes of three essays. The effective tax policy to reduce the 
excessive beer consumption is analyzed in the first essay. Actual sales tax rates on 
beer have declined dramatically over time and are currently well below optimal 
rates. So the excessive beer consumption derived from inappropriate tax imposes 
substantial negative externalities on society. Beer industry is characterized by 
imperfect structure and addictive consumption. So dynamic model  is used to 
analyze the oligopoly pricing behavior and excise tax incidence in the U.S. 
brewing industry. Primary goal is to determine whether or not the incidence of 
state and federal taxes differ to reduce the excessive beer consumption. Two-stage 
simultaneous equation model is used to estimate beer consumption equation and 
industry supply relation equation for beer industry in 1953-1995. 
In the second essay, the extent to which sulfur dioxide(S02) emissions 
regulations affect the productivity growth of phase I electric generating units in 
1990-99 period is analyzed. The The Clean Air Act Ammendment(CAAA) of 
1990 required phase I generating units to reduce sulfur dioxide(S02) emissions 
to 2.5 pounds of SO2 emission per million BTU of fuel input during the phase I 
period(1995-1999). All units chose one compliance strategy to reduce sulfur 
dioxide(S02) emissions. Since the target level of sulfur dioxide(S02) emissions 
reductions was achieved in the first year of phase I period, it seems that the US 
environmental policy was successful to achieve the policy goal. Directional 2 
technology distance function with directional vector of one(gy= 1, g,=- 1, g,=- 1) 
is used to estimate Luenberger productivity indicator for 209 phase I generating 
units in 1990-99. The effect of the  SO2 emissions regulations on productivity 
growth, the opportunity cost of SO2 emissions regulation and the effect of SO2 
emissions regulation on productivity growth potential are estimated. 
The regulatory effect on the choice of compliance strategy is estimated in the 
third essay. The Clean Air Act Amendments(CAAA) of 1990 introduced market-
based emission reduction system. It is expected that the phase I generating units 
will achieve the least-cost compliance strategy. There were several types of 
regulation  that may affect  the  sulfur  dioxide(S02)  emissions  reduction 
compliance strategy choice. If the regulatory variables affect the strategy choice, 
then the least-cost to reduce emission will not be achieved. The generating unit 
level's data is used since emission regulation was applied to each generating unit. 
Multinomial logit model is used to estimate the regulatory effect on the 
compliance strategy choice. Multinomial logit model is appropriate model since 
all phase I generating units choce one strategy among several available strategies. 3 
2. EXCISE TAXES AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN THE U.S 
BREWING INDUSTRY 
2.1  Introduction 
Identification of market power and estimation of the tax incidence in imperfectly 
competitive markets are fundamental issues in the fields of industrial organization 
and public economics. Since taxes and market power affect consumption, these 
issues are especially policy relevant in markets where substantial externalities are 
present.  In the market for alcoholic beverages, for example, it is generally 
accepted that excessive consumption imposes substantial negative externalities on 
society.  In the U.S. brewing industry alone, recent estimates indicate that the 
external costs of drunk driving and health care were approximately 19.9 billion 
dollars or $3.31 per gallon of beer [Kenkel (1996)]. This estimate of the external 
costs of beer drinking is considerably above the current excise tax rate of about 
$0.83 per gallon. 
Most of the recent empirical work on tax incidence in imperfectly competitive 
markets where externalities are present have been confined to the market for 
cigarettes.  Several studies find evidence that cigarette firms have significant 
market power in the U.S. and Europe [Barnett et al. (1995), Tremblay and 
Tremblay (1995a), Delipalla and O'Donnell (2001), and Fan et al. (2001)].  In 
addition. Barnett et al. (1995) find that the tax burden on U.S. consumers is 
greater for federal than for state excise taxes on cigarettes. A likely explanation 4 
for this result is the presence of bootlegging. That is, since some consumers may 
be able to avoid a state tax increase by shopping in a neighboring state that has a 
lower tax rate, it will be difficult for retailers to pass along all of a state tax 
increase to consumers. In addition, if bootlegging is more costly across federal 
than state boundaries, then the consumer tax burden will be greater for a federal 
than for a (single) state tax increase. In any case, this is an interesting result that 
should motivate further investigation and verification. 
Previous research on the market for alcoholic beverages has focused on issues of 
market power and optimal sales or excise tax rates.  Regarding taxes, recent 
estimates indicate that the optimal sales tax on alcoholic beverages is between 40 
and 100 percent [Phelps (1988), Pogue and Sgontz (1989), and Kenkel (1996)1.1 
Actual tax rates have declined dramatically over time and are currently well 
below these optimal rates, however. Kenkel reports that the average tax rate for 
alcoholic beverages in the U.S. was over 50 percent of the market price (net of 
taxes) in 1954 and declined to below 25 percent during the  1990s.2  Figure 1 
illustrates that in spite of a 100 percent increase in the federal excise tax rate on 
beer in 1992, the current real rate is substantially below that of the 1 950s. When 
Kenkel generates the 100 percent estimate but also finds that the optimal tax rate would be much
lower if consumers were better informed about the health risks of alcohol consumption and if the
penalty for drunk driving were increased. 
2 Of course, industry leaders claim that these taxes are excessive and support legislation to reduce
taxes on alcoholic beverages. For example, the beer industry supports a bill before the House of
Representative (HR 1305) to cut beer excise taxes in half
[www.rollbackthebeertax.org/legislation/]. 5 
viewed as an average sales tax, total excise taxes on beer were about 55 percent of 
the market price in 1954 but are only about 28 percent in 1997 [Tremblay 
(2002)].  The little research that has been done on market power has been 
confined to the U.S. brewing industry. Most recently, Greer (1998) argues that 
the brewing industry is oligopolistic, and Tremblay and Tremblay (1995b) find 
empirical support for the hypothesis that beer producers have market power. To 
date, however, the issue of tax incidence has not been empirically investigated for 
alcohol markets. 
In this paper, we use a dynamic model to analyze the oligopoly pricing behavior 
and excise tax incidence in the U.S. brewing industry. Previous empirical studies 
of tax incidence in imperfectly competitive markets ignore dynamic effects, 
which is inappropriate for markets for cigarettes and alcohol where addiction is 
important.  Our primary goal is to determine whether or not the Barnett et al. 
(1995) result, that the incidence of state and federal taxes differ, holds for another 
industry. The brewing industry is an ideal candidate for such a study because an 
excise tax can be an effective policy instrument to mitigate the negative 
exernalities associated with alcohol consumption. In addition, beer consumption 
is of vital concern, since it accounts for about 88 percent of all alcoholic beverage 
consumption in the U.S.  [Modern Brewery Age (1993, 1-2)].  Our empirical 
results confirm that beer is addictive and that the Barnett et al. result holds for the 
U.S. brewing industry. 6 
2.2 The Theoretical and Empirical Model 
Because the consumption of alcoholic beverages can be habit forming and/or 
addictive, a brewing company's problem is a dynamic one.  That is,  sales 
decisions today affect not only current profits but also the level of addiction, 
demand, and profits in future periods. To model the firm's problem, consider a 
market with n firms that compete in discrete time periods. The inverse market 
demand for beer in period t, p(Q, v',, z,), is a function of current consumption, Q, 
the degree of habit or addiction,  ,  and a vector of other exogenous variables, Zt. 
With addiction, an increase in Q leads to an increase in ço,+j and, therefore, 
market demand in the next period. Firm i's unit costs in period t,  C1(W, x,, Ti), are 
a function of a vector of input prices, w1, the quantity of a fixed input, x1, and a 
control variable for the state of technology, T,.  In this case, firm i's problem in 
time period t = 0 is to choose the level of output (q,,) in each period that 
maximizes its discounted stream of current and future (after-tax) profits,  no 
More formally, the firm's problem is to choose the output level in each period 
that maximizes the following: 
t[pt(Qt,  t, zt) q  ct (wt, xt, T)q  (tft + t  )qt]  (1)
tO 
subject to the constraints on the structure of the dynamic updating rule regarding 
addiction, on the initial value of addiction, and on output feasibility. In terms of 7 
notation,  is the discount factor (O  < 1), t  is the federal excise tax rate, and 
is the average state excise tax rate. 
Assuming a solution exists, the problem can be described for any time period k 
(O<k< cc) by a Bellman equation.3  This is based on the notion of a value function, 
defined as V = sup H for period t. Given this notation, the Bellman equation for 
this problem in period k  is: 
Vk = max [pk(Qk, (Pk, Zk) qk Ck (Wk, Xk, Tk)qk  (t + tsk )q + Vk+1 ]  (2) 
subject to the constraints described above. Note that this notation implies that the 
firm has selected the optimal output levels from period  k+1 on. Because of the 
presence of addiction, however, an output change in period  k will affect the 
optimal path of output in future periods. Thus, when choosing the optimal output 
level in period k, the Bellman equation demonstrates that the firm must trade off 
today's net returns with the present value of future net returns  (Vk+I).  This is 
illustrated in the first order condition for this problem: 
aVk+l [pkOqkck(wk,xk,Tk)(tf+Tk)]  + =  (3) 
8 q
ik 
where 0 is an index of market power. The bracketed term is the standard first-
order condition to the firm's static problem in the absence of addiction. With 
addiction, however, greater production today affects the firm's competitive 
See Novshek (1993) for a discussion of dynamic programming techniques and several
economics applications. environment in both current and future periods. The impact on future periods is 
described by the last term on the left-hand side of equation (3). 
This general structure encompasses several important oligopoly games.  For 
example, if firms play a finitely-repeated simultaneous move game where output 
is the strategic variable, then the Cournot-Nash outcome in each period is a 
mutual best reply for each firm.  In this case, 0 = tp /  Q. Alternatively, if 
firms play a finitely-repeated simultaneous move game where price is the 
strategic variable, then a Bertrand-Nash outcome in each period is a mutual best 
reply for each firm. In this setting, 0 = 0. Finally, if all n firms play an infinitely 
repeated game and identify a trigger strategy that effectively supports collusion, 
then a collusive outcome is the mutual best reply for each firm, which occurs 
when 0 = n(- Pt /  Qi). 
Following Bresnahan (1989), one can rewrite equation (3) in aggregate form. 
After rearranging terms, this generates the subsequent dynamic version of the 
industry supply relation.4 
Pt = ct(wt, x, T)  + tft + tS + 0 Qt  (4)
t=1  aq 
This approach implicitly assumes that marginal cost is the same for all firms and that the market
power parameter is either a constant or a measure of average industry conduct. In the next
section, we find that market power parameter appears to be stable. See Bresnahan (1989),
Genesove and Mullin (1998), and Corts (1999) for further discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses of the new empirical industrial organization approach. 9 
where Q is industry output.  This synthesizes the new empirical industrial 
organization approach to modeling oligopoly markets with Pindyck's (1985) 
approach to modeling a dynamic monopoly market. As in the static case, exerted 
market power increases with 0. 
The empirical model consists of a system of equations describing the market 
demand function and the industry supply relation. Like Barnett et al. (1995) and 
Fan et al. (2001) for cigarettes, we assume a linear market demand function. 
Q  =  a0 + a1 Pt + a2 p  + a3 ptwhls + a4 Inc + a5 Qt-i + a6 Dem + 8t,D  (5) 
where pC  is the price of cola, 
whls is the price of whiskey, Inc is disposable 
income, and  ED is an additive error term.5 Because marketing experts find that 
the primary beer drinking population is between 18 and 44 years old [Beer 
Industry Update (1992)], a demographics variable (Dem) is included in the 
demand function. It is defined as the proportion of the total population in this age 
group, and market demand should increase with this  variable.  Lagged 
consumption controls for habit or addiction by letting (Pt = Qt-i.  This assumes a 
partial adjustment or myopic model of addiction.6 
Although Tremblay (1985) finds that advertising has a significant impact on the firm demand for
beer, there is no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that advertising affects the market
demand for beer [Lee and Tremblay (1992), Nelson (1999), and Coulson et al. (2001)]. This is
consistent with markets that are covered, as in Tremblay and Martins-Filho (2001) and Tremblay
and Polasky (forthcoming). As a result, advertising is excluded from the demand function.
Empirical results from a model that includes advertising in demand are discussed in the next
section. 
6 Unfortunately, a rational addiction model is not identified with time-series data when price and
output are endogenous [Chaloupka (1991)]. In any case, Akerlof (1991) provides an excellent 10 
Because of its flexibility and ease of calculation, we use a variation of the 
Generalized Leontief functional form to describe the marginal cost function 
[Diewert (1974)].  Following Tremblay (1987), Elyasian and Mehdian (1993), 
and Kerkvliet et al. (1998), costs are assumed to be a function of two variable 
input prices (labor and materials), one fixed input (capital), and a time trend to 
control for technological change (I).  This generates the following restricted 
marginal cost function: 
Ct= t3i wt'+ 2wtm+3(wtlwtm)2+34Kt+f35Tt  (6) 
where w" is the price of labor, wm is price of materials, and K is the quantity of 
capital. 
Identification of the industry supply relation requires additional structure on the 
dynamic effects described in the first order condition.  Following Roberts and 
Samuelson (1988) and Jarmin (1994), aggregate dynamic effects that occur in 
future periods are represented by a constant,  Xo.7  Given this assumption and 
equations (4) and (6) above, the dynamic industry supply relation can be written 
as: 
PH3 iwt' +I32wtm+133(wtl wtm 
)1
'2+[34Kt+t35Tt +X+X1'rft+X2tSt+OQt+ct,s  (7) 
defense of the myopic addiction model. See Greene (1997, pp. 798-799) for a description of this
model. 
One needs to be cautious when interpreting the sign of this constant term, as it may control for
more than just dynamic effects. For example, it could also capture optimization errors made by
firms in the industry or a constant term associated with market power or the marginal cost
function. 11 
where s is an additive error term. If bootlegging is more likely across state than 
national boundaries, making it more difficult for beer producers to pass along 
state than national excise taxes to consumers, then Xj >  > 0. 12 
2.3 Regression and Simulation Results 
The market demand equation (5) and the industry supply relation (7) are 
estimated using two-stage least  squares.8  The data consist of 43 annual 
observations at the industry level from 1953-1995.  Table 1 provides a list of 
variables, their mean values, and their standard deviations. A description of the 
data and their sources can be found in the Data Appendix. 
The empirical results are reported in Table 2. Regarding demand, the parameter 
estimates have the expected signs and all are significant except for the parameter 
associated with the price of whiskey. Demand has a negative slope, cola and 
whiskey are substitutes for beer, and beer is a normal good. In addition, current 
demand increases with a greater population of young adults and for higher levels 
of past consumption.  This latter result provides empirical support for the 
presence of addiction and for the dynamic representation of the intertemporal link 
in the demand function. Elasticity estimates evaluated at the sample means of 
each variable are provided in Table 3.  In general, these elasticity estimates are 
within the ranges found in previous studies.9 
On the supply side of the market, all of the parameter estimates have the 
expected signs and all are significantly different from zero except the parameter 
8 We tested and corrected for first-order autocorrelation in the supply relation. No autocorrelation
was detected in the demand equation. 
In a review of six previous studies of the demand for beer, Tremblay (2002) finds that the price
elasticity of demand ranges from -0.142 to -0.889, the cross-price elasticity for whiskey ranges
from 0.140 to 0.285, and the income elasticity ranges from -0.545 to 0.760. 13 
on the state excise tax variable. The results indicate that technology has changed 
over time, a result that is consistent with Tremblay (1987) and Kerkvliet et al. 
(1998).  Although the market power parameter is positive and significant, its 
value is close to zero, suggesting that the degree of exerted market power in 
brewing is modest.  This result is consistent with the work of Tremblay and 
Tremblay (1995a) and the fact that accounting profit rates are low in brewing 
relative to the manufacturing sector as a whole.'°  Finally, we find that federal 
excise taxes have a greater impact on the supply price than state excise taxes, a 
result consistent with that of Barnett et al. (1995) for cigarettes. 
In order to better understand the effect of federal and state excise taxes, we use 
the parameter estimates of the model to simulate the impact of a one dollar 
increase in the federal and the state excise tax rates per (31 gallon) barrel. Table 4 
presents the short- and long-term effects of these simulated tax increases when all 
exogenous variables are held constant at their mean values.  The results 
demonstrate that the equilibrium price of beer rises more for a federal than a state 
tax increase.  Thus, consumers bear a greater tax burden when excise taxes are 
increased at the federal level.'  Again, this can occur if there is greater 
0 For example, Brewers Almanac (1998, 33) reports that the average profit-to-sales ratio is 2.723 
percent for brewing and 4.823 percent for all manufacturing during the  1960-1994 time period. 
This result is possible because states have very different tax rates and change their rates at
different times. In 1997, for example, the average state tax rate was $7.84 per barrel, while North
Carolina set its tax rate at $15.00 per barrel and Wyoming set its tax rate at $0.62 per barrel. One
would expect the tax incidence to be the same for a dollar increase in the federal tax rate and a
dollar increase in the tax rate of every state. 14 
bootlegging across state than federal boundaries.  These results also have 
important implications for optimal tax policy, as they demonstrate that federal 
taxes are more successful at reducing beer consumption. This and the work of 
Bamett et al. (1995) indicate that excise taxes designed to mitigate the effect of 
negative externalities should focus on federal over individual state and local tax 
increases. 
To further test the validity of these results, four alternative specifications are 
explored.  The first specification includes advertising in the demand function. 
Next, because industry experts claimed that the wage and price controls imposed 
by the federal government from 1973-74 narrowed price-cost margins in brewing 
[Fortune (1975)], a dummy variable for this effect is included in the supply 
relation. A third specification includes both advertising in demand and the price-
control dummy variable in supply. Finally, Tremblay (2002) argues that because 
of rising concentration in brewing during the 1980s, a trigger strategy may have 
successfully supported collusion during this period. As a result, the market power 
parameter is allowed to vary for different regimes (with various breaks in the 
1980s). The empirical results reveal that advertising and the price-control dummy 
variable have insignificant effects and that the market power parameter is 
relatively constant over time. More importantly, the parameter estimates of the 
other variables (along with their levels of significance) and the conclusions from 
our original model are robust to these alternative specifications. 15 
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we investigate issues of market power and tax incidence in the 
U.S. brewing industry. Because the consumption of alcoholic beverages may be 
addictive, we derive a structural econometric model of addiction from a dynamic 
oligopoly game. Industry data are used to estimate a dynamic demand function 
and supply relation.  This model is capable of identifying the degree of market 
power in a dynamic setting and allows us to compare the tax incidence of federal 
and state excise taxes. 
Our estimation results for both the demand function and the supply relation are 
well- behaved and consistent with previous literature. We find empirical support 
for addiction, which justifies the dynamic specification of our model. In addition, 
our results confirm the presence of a modest degree of market power in brewing. 
Finally, consistent with the results of Barnett et al. (1995) for cigarettes, we find 
that an increase in federal excise taxes causes a greater increase in price and a 
greater decrease in consumption than the same increase in average state excise 
taxes.  This implies that an optimal tax policy that is designed to mitigate the 
impact of negative externalities should focus on raising federal rather than 
individual state and local tax rates. 16 
2.5 Data Appendix 
The data consist of 43 annual observations from 1953 through  1995. 
Measurement procedures and data sources for the demand variables are as 
follows. Beer consumption is measured in 31 gallon barrels and is obtained from 
Brewers Almanac (various issues).  Consistent with marketing evidence [Beer 
Industry Update (1992)], the demographics variable is defined as the proportion 
of the total population in the 18-44 year old age group.  This variable helps 
control for changes in demographics.  Population figures come from the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census. The prices of beer, whiskey, and non-alcoholic drinks are 
measured by price indexes (equaling 100 in 1982) from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  Disposable income is obtained from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Current Population Reports.  Advertising expenditures are obtained from 
Brewers Almanac (various years). 
On the supply side, the price of labor is defined as total production wages per 
barrel in the brewing industry, obtained from Brewers Almanac (various issues). 
The price of materials is defined as the cost per barrel of materials from Brewers 
Almanac (various issues).  Capital is measured as the total brewing capacity, 
obtained from Brewers Digest, Buyers Guide and Brewers Directory (various 
issues). Federal and average state beer taxes per barrel are obtained from Brewers 
Almanac (various issues). 17 
All money figures in our regression analysis are in 1982 dollars.  Consumer 
goods are deflated by the Consumer Price hdex, and producer goods are deflated 
by the Producer Price Index. Both indexes are obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 18 
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2.7 Tables of Estimation Result 
Table 1 
Description of the Variables and Data for the U.S. Brewing Industry
(1953-1995) 
Variable  Description(units)  Mean(std .Dev.) 
Q 
p 
Quantity of beer consumed(thousands of 31-gallon barrels) 
Index of the price of beer(equals 100 in 1982) 
140,650 
(41,965) 
121.38 
pcoIa 
pwhis 
Index of the price of cola(1 0 in 1982) 
Index of the price of whisky(1 00 in 1982) 
(20.39) 
90.8 
(10.73) 
151 .63 
(49.15) 
Inc  Disposable income(billions of dollars)  1,973 
(740) 
Dem  Proportion of the population between 18 and 44 years old  0.387 
w'  Price of labor(wages per barrel in thousands of dollars) 
(0.034) 
30.15 
Price of materials(costs per barrel in thousands of dollars) 
(8 59) 
0.036 
K  Beer industry capacity(millions of barrels) 
(0.003) 
174.69 
(41 .47) 
T  Time trend(1953=1)  22.0 
(12.56) 
If  Federal excise tax rate(dollars per barrel)  20.1 
(8.92) 
Average state excise tax rate(dollars per barrel)  9.31 
(1.79) 
All dollar values are measured in real terms (1982 dollars). 22 
Table 2 
U.S. Brewing Industry Demand Function and Supply Relation Parameter

Estimates
 
Variable  Deman Function 
Parameter Estimate  t-statistic 
Supply Relation 
Parameter Estimate  t-statistic 
lntercept(x 10-s) 
p (x 102) 
8.529 
-3.871 
b 
0.218 
2.68 
pcoIa 
(x 10.2)  2.955 
a 
3.791 
pwhis(x 102)  0.141  0.129 
Inc  6.058 
b 
2.226 
Q-1 
Dem(x 10) 
0.638 
a 
11.579 
5.309 
1.988 
Intercept(x  10.2)  1.040 
a 
16.186 
w' 
a 
4.295 
wm(x1O2)  32.315a  4.100 
WIWm(X 102)  2.213a  4.240 
K  -0.074 
b 
2.514 
T  1.1g3a  8.230 
tf  1.070a  8.419 
Q(x103) 
0.306 
0160b 
0.722 
2.565 
Adjusted  R2  0.998  0.994 
F  3223.9 
a 
908.9 
a 
All dollar values are in 1982-84 dollars. 
aSiificant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
bSignificat
CSuifit 
at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test).
at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test). 23 
Table 3 
Own-Price, Cross-Price, and Income Elasticity Estimates 
Variable  Elasticity Estimates 
Short Run  Long Run 
Price of Beer  -0.298  -0.745 
Price of Cola  0.191  0.478 
PriceofWhisky  0.015  0.038 
Income  0.085  0.213 
Table 4 
Simulation Effects of a Dollar Increase in the Federal and State Tax Rates 
Per Barrel on Equilibrium Price and Consumption Levels 
Federal Tax Increase  State Tax Increase 
Short Run  LonQ Run  Short Run  Lono Run 
Changes Due to a Dollar Tax Increase: 
Consumption(Thousand Barrels) 
Price 
-390.2 
0.8038 
-976.8 
0.8039 
-111.4 
0.2295 
-279.0 
0.2296 
Elasticity Estimates 
Consumption  -0.0497  -0.1244  -0.0066  -0.0164 
Price  0.1669  0.1670  0.0221  0.0221 N 
45 
Figure 2.1 Federal, State, and Total Excise Tax Rates($/bbl) 
40 
30 
Rfederal tax rate 
state tax rate 
total tax rate 
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3. PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE AND THE SO2 EMISSION REGULATION
 
EFFECT OF PHASE I ELECTRIC UNITS 
3.1  Introduction 
The Clean Air Act Ammendment(CAAA) of 1990 required 261 generating units 
to reduce sulfur dioxide(S02) emissions to 2.5 pounds of SO2 emission per million 
BTU of fuel input during the phase I period(1995-1999). In addition, the CAAA 
required most fossil fuel fired electricity generating units to reduce SO2 emissions 
to the level of 1.2 pounds per million BTU of fuel input in the phase II 
period(starting in 2000). As a result, phase I units had to adopt SO2 emission 
reduction compliance strategies to reduce SO2 emissions during the phase I 
period. 
In 1995, the first year of CAAA 1990, 52%(136 units) of the total 261 units 
reported switching their fuel from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal(fuel-switch 
strategy) as their SO2 emission reduction compliance method. Those units 
accounted for 59% of the total SO2 emission's reduction from 1985 level. Thirty-
two percentage(83 units) of the units used an allowances purchasing strategy and 
contributed to 9% of SO2 emission reduction. Four units were retired, and eight 
units used other strategies(switch to natural gas, repowering, etc.). Only 10%(27 
units) of the total units installed scrubbers, and they accounted for 28% of SO2 
emission reductions. The main reason for fuel switching from high-sulfur coal to 
low-sulfur coal was that the compliance cost of fuel switching was lowest 
(estimated to cost $113 per ton of SO2 removal)(Ellerman et al, 1997) since the 26 
comparative prices of low-sulfur coal, railroad transportation costs, and boiler-
modifying costs were low. A small number of units installed scrubbers since the 
costs for scrubbers was highest($322 per ton of SO2 removal). 
One effect of the emission reduction compliance strategies was that it influenced 
the coal supply and demand pattern. Since many generating units switched their 
fuel to low-sulfur coal, the sales of low-sulfur coal from the Powder River 
basin(Wyoming and Montana) increased by 78 million tons between 1990 and 
1995,  while  sales  of high  sulfur  coal  from the  northern  Appalachian 
region(Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio, west Virginia) decreased by 29 million 
tons during the same period(DOE/EIA, 1997). 
The Department of Energy(DOE) reported that, because of the stronger 
environmental regulation, the 261 phase I generating units emitted 5.3 million 
tons of SO2 in 1995, 45% less than 1990's emission level(9.7 million tons) and 
50% less than 1985's emission(10.5 million tons)(this emission statistics includes 
the emission of total 435 units including 261 Table I units, 174 substitution and 
compensation units). In contrast, non-phase I units(those non-affected by CAAA) 
during the phase I period emitted 6.6 million tons in 1995, an amount 12% higher 
than 1990's emission level(5.9 million tons) (DOE/EIA, 1997). The Department 
of Energy(DOE) reported that the phase I generating units achieved the SO2 
emission goal of 5.7 million tons in the very first year of the phase I period. This 27 
report implies that the federal government's environmental policy was successful 
in achieving the reduction of emission in the first year of phase I period. 
Meanwhile, the mean electricity generation  in  the phase  I  period was 
approximately 10% higher than the electricity generation prior to the phase I 
period(1990-1994), but SO2 emission in the phase I period is around half of the 
SO2 emission level before phase I period. In terms of input, generating capacity 
was almost constant during the whole period, and the amount of labor was 
actually reduced by 15% over the pre-pahse I period. The fuel consumption in the 
phase I period was around 10% higher than the fuel consumption before the phase 
I period. The general trend is that good output(electricity generation) increased, 
bad output(S02 emission) declined, labor input declined, and capital input 
remained constant, while fuel input increased. In other words, even under the 
stronger SO2 emission regulations, good output increased and some input and bad 
output declined. In general, it seems like that electric units produced more good 
output and less bad output using less input under stronger environmental 
regulation. 
The first question is, however, whether the SO2 emission reduction regulations 
affected the productivity change of US electric power units, and if so, how did it 
affect the productivity. That is, did the introduction of stronger environmental 
regulation  affect  the  productivity change of power units? And did the 
environmental regulation affect the productivity change by compliance strategy 28 
group  asymmetrically?  If the  emission  reduction  induced  a  decline  in 
productivity, then the U.S environmental policy achieved the emission goal 
sacrificing productivity growth. If not, the environmental policy was successful 
since it achieved the emission reduction without productivity decline. 
The second question is about the sources of productivity change. That is, to what 
extent did the efficiency change affect the productivity change? What is the 
contribution of technological change to the productivity change? If we decompose 
the productivity change into scale efficiency change, pure technical efficiency 
change and the technological change, then we can identify the source of the 
productivity change. 
The third question is about the opportunity cost of SO2 emission regulation. In 
other words, what is the extent to which the phase I generating units could 
increase their productivity growth if there was no environmental regulation ? 
Since the generating units may have adjusted to the stronger environmental 
regualtion, we can decide whether this stronger environmental regualtion is 
binding on the productivity growth or not. 
This paper estimates the Luenberger productivity indicator of 209 phase I 
generating units(we exclude 52 units) of fossil fuel powered electric power units 
in the pre-phase I period(1990-1994) and in the phase I period(1995-1999), and 
decompose the productivity change into scale efficiency change, "pure" technical 
efficiency and technological change. Then we can estimate the effect of 29 
environmental regulation on the productivity change and estimate the effect on 
the productivity change by  SO2 emission reduction compliance strategy group. 
Also, we can figure out the source of the inefficiency and the source of the 
productivity change. Non-parameteric technique  for  directional technology 
distance function was used to estimate the Luenberger productivity indicator. The 
generating unit level's data was used since the environmental regulation in phase I 
period was applied to individual generating unit. The time period of the data is 
from 1990 to 1999. 30 
3.2 Literature Survey 
3.2.1 Parametric Estimation of Productivity Growth 
Dhrymes et al( 1964) used constant-elasticity-of-substitution production model to 
identify the returns to scale and to estimate the effect of technological change on 
returns to scale of 362 steam electric generating plants constructed during the 
period between 1937-1959. They used electricity generation,  3  kinds of 
inputs(fuel, labor, capital), and found that the increasing returns to scale prevailed 
in the electricity generation industry. 
Christensen et al(1976) used translog cost function for 124 privately owned 
fossil fuel fired electric  utilities in 1955 and 114 utilities in 1970. They 
incorporated electricity output, prices of fuel, labor, and capital into a cost 
function to estimate the economies scale between 1955 and 1970. They found that 
the economies scale prevailed for most utilities in 1955, but was exhausted in 
1970 since the per firm electricity output increase(around 3 times between two 
time periods) outweighed the firm size increase(around 60% increase) required to 
exhaust economies of scale. 
Gollop et al( 1981) estimated factor-augumented flexible translog cost function 
to estimtae the contribution of scale effect and technology change to the 
productivity growth. One good output(electricity generation), quantity and price 
of three inputs(capital, labor, fuel) of 11 electric utilities in 1958-1975 periods 
were used. The electric utility included the electricity generation, transmission, 31 
and distribution section. The productivity growth can be decomposed into scale 
economies, growth rate of output and technological change, and these three 
factors are a function of input prices, output, and time variable. The productivity 
growth rate was estimated to be 4% per year in the sample period, and the 
technological change(2.4%) contributed 3/4 of the productivity growth. The 
remaining contribution was from scale economies(1 .6%). The productivity 
achieved a high growth rate during the 1958-73 period, but the productivity 
declined in 1973-75 period. The annual mean cost growth rate for the 11 utilities 
was 9.9%. The contribution of scale effect to the cost growth rate was 5.5%. The 
capital price had a positive effect on total cost growth, the fuel price had a 
negative effect, and the wage rate was not found to have a statistically significant 
effect. The mean effect of three input prices on the total cost growth was 
5.9%(2.7% of capital price, 0.8% of wage, 2.4% of fuel price), and the 
contribution of output growth and technological change to the total cost growth 
was 5.5% and -2.4% respectively. 
Cowing et al(1981) estimated and compared the productivity growth under 
different kinds of methodology. They studied 81 electrical utilities between 1964-
75 by using one good output(electricity generation), quantity and input prices of 
three inputs(capital, labor, fuel). They decomposed the effect of returns to scale, 
capacity  utilization,  regulatory  effect(rate-of-return  constraint  effect)  into 
Laspeyres index, Divisia index, flexible translog cost function measurement. The 32 
mean total factor productivity(TFP) growth was from 1.35% to 2.0% under 
Divisia index method, was from 0.79% to 1.22% under Laspeyres index method. 
The industry mean productivity growth was statistically same across the various 
methodologies(Divisia index, Laspeyres index) and the adjustment of each 
variable(returns  to  scale,  capacity  utilization,  regualtory  constraint).  The 
regulatory effect on the productivity growth was found to be relatively small. 
Gollop et al(1983) estimated the effect of SO2 emission regulation on the 
productivity growth of 56 privately owned electric utilities during the 1973-79 
period. They incorporated the output(electricity generation), prices of capital, 
labor, high-sulfur fuel, low-sulfur fuel, regulatory intensity variable(combination 
of actual  SO2 emission, uncostrained  SO2 emission, state government's regulated 
SO2 emission) and time variable into the translog cost function to estimate the 
productivity growth. They decomposed the  productivity growth  into  the 
contribution of scale economies, environmental regulation, and technological 
change. The productivity growth of the utilities facing binding  SO2 emission 
constraints was lower than that of the utilities without regulation. The  SO2 
emission regulation set by CAAA of 1970 reduced the productivity growth by 
0.59% point annually because of the increased use of expensive low-sulfur fuel 
and capital. The effect of SO2 emission regulation on the electricity production 
cost increased during the 1973-79 period, and the environmental regulation 
required more input except for high-sulfur fuel. SO2 emission regulation affected 33 
the productivity change negatively in the sample period, and the degree of 
negative effect was highest in 1976 when the SO2 emission regulation had to be 
met fully for the first time of CAAA of 1970. Economies of scale were present 
and contributed to the productivity growth in a small degree(0.3% annually) 
because of slow increase of output not because of exhaustion of scale economies. 
The smallest utilities faced substantial scale economies, but the largest utilities 
were producing in a range of scale diseconomies. Technological regression(1 .05% 
for utilities facing binding regulation to 1.12% for utilities not facing binding 
regulation) was the main source of productivity decline. 
Kleit et al(2001) estimated the efficiency, returns to scale, and price elasticities 
of 78 natural gas fired electricity generating plants using the Bayesian stochastic 
cost frontier model. They used total cost, output, prices of three inputs(capital, 
labor, fuel) for U.S plants in 1996. The wage was county level's data. The result 
showed that the plants could reduce production costs by 1  by eliminating 3° /o 
inefficiency, and that most of the plants were operating at increasing returns to 
scale. So there is more potential to reduce cost by increasing the output. The 
finding that own-price elasticities(-1.45 for labor, -0.53 for fuel, -1.37 for capital) 
showed that capital and labor are more sensitive to price than fuel. This means 
that the deregulated plants can reduce costs by reducing labor costs. 
3.2.2 Nonparametric Estimation of Productivity Growth 34 
Fare et al(1986) estimated the effect of environmental regualtion on the 
efficiency of 100 electric plants in 1975 by using an output distance function. 
They imposed the strong(free) disposability and weak disposability of good and 
bad output separately. They then set up the ratio of output distance value with 
strong disposability to the distance value with weak disposability to calculate the 
effect of SO2 regulation on the efficiency change. The opportunity cost measured 
in output loss due to disposability was from 0.1% to 48% of good output for each 
plant. On average, the total output loss of the 100 electric plants(1,622 million 
KWh) due to environmental regualtion was 1.3% of actual electricity output in 
1975. One good output(net electricity generation) and four kinds of bad 
outputs(particulate  matter,  sulfur  dioxide,  nitrogen  oxide,  heat)  and  five 
inputs(generating capacity, labor, coal, oil, gas) were included. The efficiency of 
the plants regulated by the thermal pollution was higher than the efficiency of the 
regulated plants due to the adjustment in technology to avoid thermal pollution. 
The publicly owned plants and the non-based load plants(plants factor is less than 
50%) were most affected by the environmental regulation. 
Berstein et al(1990) estimated the impact of SO2 regulation on the productivity 
of 76 coal-fired power plants in 1984. Good output(net electricity generation) and 
three inputs(generating capacity, fuel consumption and labor) were included in 
this input-based efficiency model.  The efficiencies of the plants that had 
scrubbers was found to be 5-7% lower on average than those with no scrubbers. 35 
The efficiency of the plants that had no regulation was the highest, and the 
efficiency of the plants that switched their fuel to low-sulfur coal was next 
highest. They regressed the efficiency score on several environmental variables to 
identify the impact of the variables on productivity. Since a 1 0/ decrease in sulfur 
output related to a 0.01% decrease in efficiency, SO2 emission regulation 
negatively affected the productivity. The size of the plants positively affected the 
productivity. The efficiency of the small size plants is higher than the large size 
plants, but the effect after imposition of SO2 emission regulation was lower 
relative to the effect during the pre-regulation period. 
Fare et al(1990) used an input based Malmquist productivity index to calculate 
the productivity change of 19 coal-fired plants in Illinois during the 1975-1981 
period. They found that efficiency change was stable except for the period in 1975 
and 1981 when efficiency improved. There was productivity decline only in the 
1976-1977 period, while the productivity was stable in the other periods. Since 
there was a technological regress in the sample period, the productivity decline 
during the 1976-77 period. In this model, one good output(net generation) and 
three inputs(fuel, labor, load factor) were used. 
Yaisawarng et al(1994) used 61 coal-fired electricity genarating plants' data to 
calculate the effect of sulfur dioxide regulation on the productivity change 
between 1985 and 1989. The input-based cumulative Malmquist productivity 
index was used, and the productivity change was decomposed into scale 36 
efficiency change, pure technical efficiency change, and changes in frontier 
technology. They used short-run technology and estimated sub-vector input 
efficiency. SO2 emission was defined as bad output, net electricity generation as 
good output, sulfur content in the coal as bad input, generation capacity as fixed 
input, and fuel and labor as variable inputs. They imposed the strong disposability 
for bad input and imposed the constraint such that the sulfur content should be 
higher than the sulfur content of the frontier plants. That is, the sulfur content of 
the coal used by electric plants should not be below the minimum level that the 
frontier plants achieved. In order to avoid the zero bad input, they substituted a 
minimum sulfur content(0.3%) in the sample for the plants with zero sulfur 
content. The efficiency score measured the capability that the electric plant can 
use the variable inputs to produce given good output and bad output for a given 
technology and a fixed level of bad input. They found that the overall efficiency 
was 0.92-0.94, and the main source of inefficiency was pure technical 
inefficiency, rather than scale efficiency. Although the efficiency of the plants 
with scrubbers was slightly lower than the efficiency of plants without scrubbers, 
this  difference was  statistically  insignificant.  Around half(47.4%) of net 
electricity was produced by the plants that are in the increasing returns to scale 
range, 25.2% of the net generation was produced by the plants that was in the 
constant returns to scale, and 27.4% was produced by the plants showing 
decreasing returns to scale. They found that the productivity slowdown in the 37 
1980's came from the exhaustion of the scale economies. One interesting finding 
was that both the scale efficiency and the pure technical efficiency of the plants 
that are in the constant returns to scale are very high(efficiency score is 1.0). The 
other plants that are in the range of decreasing or increasing returns to scale is 
scale inefficient. And the plants in the increasing returns to scale range are 
consistently more productively inefficient than the plants in the decreasing returns 
to scale range. The cumulative productivity change between the base year(1985) 
and the target years(1986-1989) was between -1.73% and 0.77%.  The main 
source of productivity change was different each year. In 1986, the productivity 
decline came from the fact that the efficiency deteriation offset scale efficiency 
improvement and technological improvement. 
One interesting finding between parametric estimation and the nonparametric 
estimation of productivity growth is that most of the parametric technique except 
for Gollop et al.'s method(1983) did not include the reduction of SO2  emission in 
the functional form explicitely, while the nonparametric technique did. If we 
ignore the bad output reduction in the productivity measurement, then the 
efficiency or productivity will be biased. This will be discussed in the next 
section. 38 
3.3 Directional Technology Distance Function 
3.3.1 Compliance Strategy 
In the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990, the US federal government set 
electricity utilities'  SO2 emission target in terms of total annual SO2 emission for 
phase I utilities. The annual target of 8.7 million tons(around half of emission 
level in 1980) that will be achieved through two phases(Curtis, et al., 2000). hi the 
phase I period(from 1995 to 1999), the dirtiest 261 generating units(connected to 
263 boilers that belong to 110 electric plants) had to reduce SO2 emission rates to 
the level of 2.5 pounds per million BTU of fuel input. Iii the second phase(from 
2000), most of the fossil fuel fired power units of which the generating capacity is 
25 or more megawatts have to reduce SO2 emissions to 1.2 pounds per million 
BTU of heat input. The federal government allocated the allowances to each 
generating unit in proportion to average heat input in the 1985-87 period(Carlson 
et al, 2001). That is, the federal government's allowance allocation will be limited 
to 2.5 pounds of 502 emission per million BTU of heat input in the phase I period 
and 1.2 pounds of  SO2 emission in the phase II period. One allowance is 
equivalent to the right to emit one ton of SO2. 
The electric power units can choose one or a combination of strategies to comply 
with the SO2 emission standards. The electric power units can reduce the SO2 
emission by reducing the production of electricity since  SO2 emission is the 
byproduct of electricity generation. This compliance strategy includes Demand 39 
Side Management(DSM), the purchase of electricity from hidependent Power 
Producers(IPP) or other non-regulated power units, and retiring the unit. The 
other example of a fuel switch is to change the fuel from coal or oil to natural gas, 
or change from high-sulfur oil to low-sulfur oil. In this paper, these kinds of 
switches are referred to under the heading of "other" strategy. This strategy is 
labelled "other" strategy in this paper since the characteristics of these units is 
heterogeneous and the number of the generating units that used this strategy is 
relatively small(15 units). 
The second strategy to comply with the environmental regulation is to install 
teclmology to reduce emissions from the coal burning process. The representative 
strategy of this method is to install scrubber(or FGD:Flue Gas Desulfunzation 
equipment) to absorb the SO2 emission. This strategy required a larger capital 
investment and operation and management costs compared to other strategies. 
The third strategy is to decrease the use of dirty inputs that contain the 
pollutants, for example, high-sulfur coal in fossil fuel fired electric unit, and 
increase the use of clean inputs, for example, low-sulfur coal. This is called fuel 
switch strategy, that is, the electric units or generating units switch their fuel from 
cheap high-sulfur coal to expensive low-sulfur coal. In this paper, the fuel switch 
includes only the switch from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal. The fuel switch 
from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal needs a relatively small amount of capital 
compared to the capital costs of scrubber strategy or "other" strategy. 40 
The fourth compliance strategy is to buy the right to emit the pollutants when the 
property right is well defined. This is called allowance purchasing strategy. In 
other words, electric units buy emission permits from other firms that reduced 
SO2 emission below the emission standard or that they can buy permits in 
allowance auction market. The allowance strategy needs some transaction costs to 
deal with the strategic behavior in the allowance market. 
The choice of strategy depends on several factors including the market situation 
of each input factors and the unit owners' expectation. If the capital cost is, or is 
expected to be, relatively cheap comparing to the cost of other strategies, then 
some units will choose the capital intensive strategy(for example, scrubbers). 
When the low-sulfur coal price is not expensive, then some units will switch their 
fuel from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal. If some units' owners expect the 
allowance price to be low, then the owners will buy the allowances instead of 
choosing fuei. switch or scrubber strategy. 
Each strategy needs a different kind of input combination to produce electricity 
and to reduce SO2 emission, and each generating unit uses different production 
technology. As a result, it is probable that the environmental regulation will affect 
the efficiency of the generating units based on their compliance strategy 
asymmetrically. 
3.3.2 Bad Output and Productivity Measurement 41 
If some of the outputs are bad outputs, the measurement of efficiency should 
include the reduction of bad output in the productivity measurement. The  SO2 
emission is a byproduct of electricity generation procedure in the fossil fuel fired 
electric units. If one unit produces more electricity than another unit given inputs, 
then it's efficiency is higher than the efficiency of other units when we consider 
only good output in the efficiency measurement. Suppose another case in which 
one unit emits more SO2 than another unit under the same level of electricity and 
inputs. The traditional efficiency measurement gives the same efficiency value to 
both of the units even though one unit produces more bad output. Giving both 
units same efficiency value is inappropriate especially considering that  SO2 
emissions have a negative effect on the welfare of society. The appropriate 
method in measuring efficiency, then is to give credit for both having a higher 
level of good output and a lower level of bad output. 
When we measure the productivity change or efficiency change of the electricity 
industry, the major problem is  that there are some bad outputs as sulfur 
dioxide(S02), nitrogen oxide(NO), and carbon dioxide(CO2) and  particulates. 
These bad outputs are usually jointly produced as a by-product of good output. 
When the government regulates the emission of bad output, then the electric units 
or utility will use more resources to decrease the bad output. Since all the 
compliance strategies need more resources to reduce bad output when there is a 
environmental regualtion, the amount of bad output must be considered. For 42 
example, say an electric utility has to install scrubber to reduce  SO2 emissions 
from coal burning. The scrubber needs more capital expenditure for  it's 
installation, operation, and maintenance. The fuel switch strategy needs capital 
expenditure to retrofit the boiler to burn low-sulfur coal and spend more capital 
expenditure to buy expensive low-sulfur coal. If we exclude the reduction of bad 
output, then the productivity measurement will be downwardly biased since the 
effort to reduce the bad outputs are not included in the productivity measurement, 
even though the electric unit decreased the socially undesirable outputs. 
The directional distance function(output and input distance function) can can 
take any positive or negative values as the efficiency score(Chung et a!, 1997). 
The directional output distance function, however, does not consider the 
simultaneous decrease of input even though this function gives credit for the 
simultaneous decrease of bad output and the increase of good output. The 
directional input distance function does not consider the simultaneous adjustment 
of good output and bad output. Since the directional technology distance function 
can account for the simultaneous decrease of bad output, inputs, and the increase 
of good output, this distance function can encompass all kind of distance 
functions(Fare at el, 2000). 
3.3.3 Directional Technology Distance Function 
The directional technology distance function is an appropriate model to estimate 
the productivity change when there is bad output. Also, the directional technology 43 
distance function can generalize all the known distance functions(Fare et al, 
1996). 
First, technology is defined by 
T  {(x,y,b) : x can produce y and b}  (3.1) 
where x = (xi, x2...... XN) E  RN  are input vector, good output vectors are y = (yi, 
Y2 ...... yM) e RM, and bad output vectors are b = (b1, b2...... bj) E R. This 
technology represents the mapping of input vector into good output and bad 
output vectors. 
Good outputs are assumed to be costlessly disposable. That is, 
(x, y, b)eT andy'  ythen (x, y', b)ET.  (3.2) 
In other words, less or equal amount of good outputs are feasible given 
technology, inputs, and bad outputs. Since the reduction of bad output is costly, 
and the bad output is jointly produced with good output, the reduction of bad 
output is feasible when the good output is reduced. So we assume the weak 
disposability of good output and bad output as: 
(x, y, b)eT and 0  0  1  imply (x, Oy, Gb) ET  (3.3) 
We also assume that the strong disposability of inputs as: 
(x, y, b)eT and x  x' then (x', y, b)ET  (3.4) 
That is, more or equal amount of inputs are feasible given technology and good 
output and bad outputs. 44 
Also, we have to impose the null jointness of good output and bad output since 
the bad output is jointly produced with the good output. So the zero good output is 
feasible only when zero bad output is produced. The imposition of null jointness 
as follows 
if(x, y, b) E T andb = 0 theny= 0  (3.5) 
In other words, this null jointness means that there should be a positive amount 
of bad output when there is a positive amount of good output. This restriction 
means that we have to exclude zero SO2  emissions when the unit produced some 
positive electricity in the empirical model. It is impossible to produce positive 
output when there is no input, but it is possible that positive amount of inputs can 
produce no outputs(Fare et al, 1996). That is, we can produce outputs whenever 
we use inputs, but it is possible not to produce outputs even though we use some 
positive inputs. 
The Directional technology distance function is defined on the technology as 
follows: 
D(x,y,b;-gx,  gy, -gb) = sup {13  : (x- y+g, b-3gb)E T }  (3.6) 
where (-g,, gy, -gb) is a non-zero directional vector. The directional technology 
distance function represents the maximum distance value compared to the 
reference technology. 
For convenience, suppose that there is one good output and one input, and the 
technology is constant returns to scale(CRS). Then the directional technology can 45 
be visualized as all input-output vectors, and the point(x,y) is the observed input-
output vector(Fare,  et  a!,  1996). The direction in which the input-output 
vector(x,y) is expanded is given by (-gx, gy). The direction of gy means that the 
observation or decision making unit(DMU) can add the output as much as  times 
gy to the observed output(y), and the direction of -g, means that the firm can 
subtract the input as much as 3 times g from observed input(x). The maximal 
expansion value, that is the maximum increase of output and the maximal 
decrease of input, is defined byD  gy).
(x,y;-gx, 
Figure 3.1 Directional Technology Distance Function 
0 x 46 
The directional distance function has translation property. That is, the directional 
distance function satisfies the translation property if for a  E R 
DT (x- agx, y+ agy; -g, gy) =  DT (x, y; -g, gy)  a  (3.8) 
The translation property means that if we increase or decrease the observations 
being evaluated as much as a times directional vector, then the new directional 
distance value is equal to the original distance value minus a under the same 
reference technology(Fare  et  al,  2000). This property corresponds to  the 
homogeneity of degree one of outputs in the output distance function. 
The Shephard output distance function is defined on the technology as follows: 
D0  (x,y) = inf{O : (x, y/ 0)  E T}  (3.9) 
The output distance function measure the maximum expansion of output given 
inputs under the current technology relative to the frontier technology. 
And the output distance function is homogeneous of degree one in outputs(Fare 
et al, 1995): 
D0  (x, 0 y) = 0 D0(x, y)  (3.10) 
Homegeneity of degree one means that if all of the output increases by 0 times 
given inputs, then the maximal distance of output will increase by 0 times. 
The directional distance function is related to the Shephard output distance 
function when the directional vector of input is zero, that is, when g =0, gy =y, as 
follows 
DT (x,y ; 0, y) =  lID0 (x,y) 1  (3.11) 47 
Also, when we take the zero directional vector of output, that is, when g =x, gy 
=0, then the directional tecimology distance function is related with the Shephard 
input distance function as follows 
DT(X,Y;X,0)  1- 1/D1(y,x)  (3.12) 
The traditional input distance function and the output distance function are thus a 
special case of directional technology distance function. There are also other 
relationships between the traditional distance function and the directional distance 
function(Fare et al,2000). 48 
3.4 Luenberger Productivity Indicator 
3.4.1 Efficiency Measurement 
The directional technology distance function evaluates the efficiency of each 
observation in specified time period compared to the frontier technology in a 
specified time period, and based on a specified directional vector. That is, the 
directional technology distance  function measures the  efficiency of each 
observation based on the combination of observed input-output vectors, reference 
technology, directional vectors and time period. For example,  DT  t(xt  yt, bt;gx, 
gy, -gb) evaluates the efficiency of observed good output, bad output, and inputs of 
(yt  bt,  xt) of each observation in time period  t compared to the reference 
technology of Tt in time period t based on the directional vector of (-g,, gy, -g,) as 
follows: 
DT(x,  yt, bt;-g, gy, -gb) = sup{  :  (xt  yt+3g, bt-I3gb)E Tt }  (3.13) 
Also, we can change the time period of the input-output vectors being evaluated, 
and we can change the time period of the reference technology to which it is 
yt being comapred. So  DT  (xt,  bt;gx,  gy, -gi) evaluates the efficiency of 
observed good output, bad output, and inputs of (yt, bt, xt) of each observation in 
time period t compared to the reference technology of Tt  in time period t+1 
based on the directional vector of (-g,, gy, -gb) as follows 
t t+1 t t  t t  t  t+1 DT  (x, y, b ;-g,, gy, -gb) = sup  : (x  3g, y+f3g, b -3gb)e T  }  (3.14) 49 
DT t(xt+1 y", bt±l;gx,  gy, -gi,) evaluates input-output vector in time period t+1 
compared to the reference technology in time period t based on the same 
directional vector as: 
t+1  t+1  t+1  t+ I
DT (x  , y  , bt1;-g, gy, -gb) = sup{  : (x  yt+I+3gy  b -gi)e Tt } (3.15) 
t+1  t+1  t+l
DT t+I(x 
,  y  ,  b  ;-g,, gy, -gb) evaluates output-input in time period t+1 
compared to the reference technology in time period t+1 based on the same 
directional vector as above 
t+I  t+I  t+I 
D(x,y,b;-gX,  gy, -gb) = sup {13:(x  -3g, y +3g,b  -13gb)E Tt1} (3.16) 
In the diretional distance function, the distance value measures the efficiency of 
each observation relative to the refernence technology. That is, the efficiency 
score measures the extent to which each observation can increase the good output 
and decrease the input and bad output simultaneously compared to the frontier 
technology in the directional technology distance function. Suppose the distance 
value of one observation is 0.6 based on its own directional vector(-g=x, gy=y, 
g=b). This observation can increase it's own output and can decrease its own bad 
output and inputs by 60% to get to the frontier technology. 
The distance value in the directional distance function can take positive, negative 
or zero value depending on the observations being evaluated and the reference 
technology, it is being compared to. The most efficienct observation's efficiency 
score is zero when the time period for observations being evaluated is the same as 50 
the time period for which the reference technology is being compared to-- that is, 
when the reference technology envelopes all observations. In this case, the 
positive distance value means the inefficiency. 
A negative efficiency value is possible only when observations are placed 
outside the reference technology. In other words, this case is possible only when 
the time period of the observations being evaluated is different from the time 
period of the reference technology it is being compared to. The negative distance 
value means a higher efficiency score than the most efficient observation's score 
when some observations are placed outside the reference technology. 
So the efficiency is defined as the directional technology distance value in the 
corresponding time period. That is, the efficiency in time period t[EF(t,t)] is 
defined as the directional technology distance value in time period t such that 
distance value measures the maximal distance of input-output vector in time 
period t relative to the reference technology in time period t. The efficiency in 
time period t+1[EF(t+l, t+1)]  is also defined as the directional technology 
distance value in time period t+1. The efficiency[EF(t, t+1)] is defined as the 
distance value when we evaluate the input-output vector in time period t relative 
to the reference technology in time period t+1. 
EF(t, t)  DT t(xt, yt, bt;_gx, gy, -gb) 
EF(t, t+1) = DT(x, yt, bt;_gx, gy, -gb) 
t  t+1  t+1 EF(t+l, t) = D1  (x  , y  , bt';-g, gy, -gb) 51 
- t+1  t+1  t+1  t+I EF(t+1, t+1) = DT  (x  , y  , b  ;-g, gy, -gb)  (3.17) 
The efficiency measure can be decomposed into scale efficiency and pure 
technical efficiency. Suppose that the production technology is constant returns to 
scale, then the efficiency of each observation will be lower than the efficiency 
under another kind of production technology, for example, variable returns to 
scale teclmology(increasing, constant and decreasing returns to scale technology). 
If one observation is in the increasing or decreasing returns to scale range, then 
the efficiency under the variable returns to scale technology will be different from 
the efficiency under the constant returns to scale technology. Since the variable 
returns to scale technology envelopes the input-output vectors more closely than 
the constant returns to scale, the efficiency under variable returns to scale(VRS) is 
higher than the efficiency under CRS. 
The difference between the efficiency score under the constant returns to scale 
technology and the efficiency score under the variable returns to scale technology 
is defined as the scale efficiency since this difference comes from a different kind 
of returns to scale technology. That is, 
SCEF(t, t) = EF(t, t)CRS - EF(t, t)VRS  (3.18) 
where EF(t, t)CRS is efficiency under CRS technology 
EF(t, t)VRS is efficiency under VRS technology 52 
Pure technical efficiency is defined as the efficiency when we exclude any 
specific assumptions for the reference technology. That is, the pure technical 
efficiency is the efficiency under VRS technology as: 
PUTE(t, t) = EF(t, t)VRS  (3.19) 
In other words, pure technical efficiency is the difference between the efficiency 
score and the scale efficiency. 
If the observation is in the range of constant returns to scale, then the efficiency 
of the observation will not alter when we change the returns to scale technology. 
However, if the observation is in the increasing returns to scale range, then the 
efficiency under the constant returns to scale technology should be lower than the 
efficiency under the variable returns to scale technology and should be the same 
as the efficiency under non-increasing returns to scale(NIRS). Also, when the 
efficiency of the observation under the non-increasing returns to scale technology 
is higher than the efficiency under the constant returns to scale technology, then 
the observation is in the range of decreasing returns to scale. 
Since the directional distance function takes the additive form, the efficiency is 
the sum of scale efficiency and the pure technical efficiency. That is, 
EF(t, t) = SCEF(t, t) + PUTE(t, t) 
= {EF(t, t)CRS  EF(t, t) VRS] + EF(t, t)VRS 
= EDT  T T 
= Dit(xt, yt, bt;-g, gy, -gb)cRs  (3.20) 53 
3.4.2 Productivity Change Measurement 
The difference in the efficiency between two time periods measures the change 
of efficiency. Suppose that the efficiency of one observation in time period t is 
0.6, and the efficiency in time period t+1 is 0.4 when we assume there is no 
technological change, that is, the frontier technology is same. Then the difference 
of the efficiency measure is 0.2. This positive efficiency change means an 
improvement of efficiency between time period t and t+1 since the smaller 
distance value means a higher efficiency score. In other words, the observation is 
placed closer to the frontier technology in time period t+l than time period t. So 
the efficiency of the observation improved. 
However, there should be a technological change between the two time periods. 
Suppose that there is a technological development in time t+1 such that the most 
efficient observations in  t period introduced advanced technology into the 
production procedure. Then the frontier production technology in t+1 will be 
shifted outward. As a result, the efficiency of one observation may be deteriorated 
even though the observation produced more output given input in time period t+1 
because of the technological change in the frontier production technology. So we 
have to consider the technological change when we measure the productivity 
change. The productivity change includes the  efficiency change and the 
technological change simultaneously. 54 
If we use the  directional technology distance  function,  the Luenberger 
productivity indicator is defined as the difference of the directional distance 
function since the directional distance function takes the additive distance 
value(Chamber et  al,1996, Fare  et  al,2001). The Luenberger productivity 
indicator for period t and t+1 based on the directional technology distance 
function is defined as the combination of efficiency change and the technological 
change when there is good output, bad output and inputs as follows: 
t+1  t+1 PRODCH(t, t+1) = L(xt, y, b, x  , y  , bt)  (3.21) 
[$11 
PRODCH(t, t+l) = 1/2[(DT 
t+1(x ,y,bt;_gx, gy, -gb) -DTt(xt1, yt'bt'g gy, gt) 
t  t+1  t+1  t+1
+ DT t(xt,yt,bt;-g,g,-gb)- D1 (x ,y  ,b  ;-gx,gy,-gb)]  (2.22) 
We can decompose the Luenberger productivity indicator into efficiency change 
and  technological  change.  Efficiency  change comes from  the  technical 
combination of input vectors and the output vectors of each observation. That is, 
the efficiency change is the result of the observation's owner's capability to map 
the inputs into outputs. However, the technological change comes from outside 
the observation's decision making, that is, technological change is exogeneous to 
the owner's decision making. 
PRODCH(t, t+1) = EFCH(t, t+1) + TECH(t, t+1)  (3.23) 
Efficiency change between time period t and t+1 is defined as the difference in 
the directional technology distance value between two time periods. We can get 55 
the following equation using efficiency defined in the directional technology
 
distance function(3.17) as:
 
EFCH(t, t+l) = EF(t, t) - EF(t+1, t+1)
 
t+i  t+1  t+1
DT  t(xt yt, bt;gx, gy, -gb) 
f 
1-IT  (x  , y  bt+l;gx, gy, -gb)  (3.24) 
That is, the efficiency change is the difference between the efficiency of each 
observation in time period t when each observed input-output vector is evaluated 
to the reference technology in time period t and the efficiency in time period t+1 
when each observed input-output vectors is evaluated to the reference technology 
in time period t+l. 
We can also decompose the efficiency change into scale efficiency change and 
pure technical efficiency change. Scale efficiency in period t is defined as the 
difference between the distance value under the constant returns to scale(CRS) 
technology and the distance value under the variable returns to scale(VRS) 
technology. The scale efficiency change is also defined as the difference between 
the scale efficiency in period t and the scale efficiency in period t+1. Since the 
pure technical efficiency in period t is defined as the distance value under VRS 
technology, pure technical efficiency change is defined as the difference between 
the pure technical efficiency in period t and the pure technical efficiency in period 
t+1. 
That is, 
EFCH(t, t+1) 56 
= SCEFCH(t, t+1) + PUTECH(t, t+1)
 
= [SCEF(t, t)  SCEF(t+1, t+1)] + [PUTE(t, t)  PUTE(t+1, t+1)]
 
=[{ OT  y, bt;_gx, gy, -gb)  D1  tvRs(xt,  t 
gy, -gb)} 
-.  t+1  t+1  t+1  t+1  t+1  t+1  t+1 D  CRS(X  , y  bt+l;gx, gy, -gb)  DT  VRS(X  , y  ,  b  ;-g, gy, -gb)}] + 
is  t+1  t+1  t+1  t+1
[{ D  VRS(X, yt, bt;-g, gy, -gb)  LT  VRS(X  , y  , b  ;-g, gy, -gb)}]  (3.25) 
The technological change measures the average distance in technologies 
between the two time periods. In other words, technological change measures the 
effect of the technological change between two time periods when we evaluate 
each observation under different reference technology. 
TECH(t, t+ 1) 
= l/2[{EF(t+l, t) - EF(t, t)} + {EF(t+1, t+1) - EF(t, t+l)}] 
t+1  t t = 1/2[{DT  (x, y, bt;-g, gy, -gb)  DT(x, yt, bt;-g, gy,  b) } + 
t+1  t+I  t+1  t  t+1  t+1  t+1 f  (x { "T  , y  , bt';-g, gy, -gb)  -'T (x  , y  , b  ;-g, gy, -gb) }]  (3.26) 
And, since the directional distance function takes the additive distance value, the 
Luenberger productivity indicator is the sum of the efficiency change and the 
technological  change.  The positive  indicator means an improvement  in 
productivity, and the negative indicator means a decline in productivity between 
the two adjacent periods. We can get the following equation for the Luenberger 
productivity indicator using previous equations as: 
PRODCH(t, t+1) 57 
= EFCH(t, t+1) + TECH(t, t+1)
 
= SCEFCH(T, T+1) + PUTECH(T, T+1) + TECH(T, T+1)
 
= [EF(t, t)  EF(t+1, t+1)] + 1/2[{EF(t+1, t)  EF(t, t)} + {EF(t+1, t+1)  EF(t,
 
t+ 1) }]
 
or,
 
PRODCH(t, t+1)
 
t+1  t+1 = L(xt, yt bt, x  bt+l) , y 
t  t+I  t+1  t+1 = EDT (xe,  bt;_gx, gy, -gb)  D1 t+1(x 
, y  , b  ;-g, gy, -gb)] 
t+I  t+1  t+1 
DT t(xt + 1/2[{(DTt (x  ,  y  ,  b  ;-g, gy,  -gb)  yt, bt;-g, gy,  -gb)} + 
{ D(x, 
yt+1 
gy, -gb)  DT
t+1 (x,  bt;_gx, gy, -gb)}] 
t+1  t+1  t+1  t = 1/2[{(D T  (xi, yt bt;_gx, gy, -gi  T t+1(xt+1 
Y  b  ;-g, gy, -gb) +  b t(xt 
t  t+1  t+1 bt;-g, gy, -gb)  DT (x  ,  y  , bt';-g, gy, -gb)]  (3.27) 
Suppose the variable returns to scale technologies are represented by TtVRS and 
Tt±vRs in period t and t+l respectively, and the  constant returns to scale 
technology is represented by TtCRS and Tt+lcRs respectively in the following 
figure. The directional vector is denoted by g(-gx, gy) when there is only one good 
output and one input for convenience. The observed input-output vector(xt, yt) 
being evaluated in period t is a, and the observed input-output vector(xt+l, yt+l) 
being evaluated in period t+l is d. Then the most efficient observations based on 
constant returns to scale technology(b, c,  e,  f) and variable returns to scale 58 
technology(g, i) can be defined in terms of the observed input-output vectors(a,
 
d),  technology(TCRS TVRS) and directional vector(g) in two time period(t, t+1) as
 
follows:
 
b=a+
 
t+1 c=a+  D1  cRs(a:g)g 
t+1 e=d+  D1  cRs(d:g)g 
t+1 f=d+  D1  cRs(d:g)g 
g=a+  Dt(a.g)g 
i=d+  Tt1vRs(d:g)g  (3.28)
 
And efficiency change is defined as;
 
EFCH = EFt EFt'
 
= (b-a)  (f- d) 
DcRs(g)g-DcRs(d.g)g 
= [T tCRS (a: g)  CRS (d : g) ]g  (3.29) 
Also efficiency change can be decomposed into scale efficiency change and pure 
technical change as; 
EFCH = SCEFCH + PUTECH 
= [(SCEF(t, t)- SCEF(t+l, t+1) + (PUTE(t, t)  PUTE(t+1, t+1))] 
= [(b-g)  (f-i)] + [(g-a)  (i-d)] 
t  t  -.  t+1  t+I
=  [{(DT CRS (a:g)g  DT  VRS (a:g)g)  (DT  CRS(dg)g -DT  VRS(d : g)g)} 59 
t+1 +{DtVRs(a:g)g-D  vRs(d:g)g}]
 
=[D1tcRs(a:g)g- Dt+l(d.g)g]
 
iS  t+I 
=  [DTtCRS (a: g)  CRS (d: g)] g  (3.30) T 
And technological change is defined as:
 
TECH = 1/2 [(EFtTt+1  EFtTt) + (EF
t+1
Tt+1  EF
t+1
Tt)  I
 
= 1/2 [ {(c-a)  (b-a) } + { (f-d) -(e-d)}  I
 
= 1/2 [(f-e) + (c-b)]
 
t+1  -.  t+1 1/2 [DTt'cRs (d:g)g  cRs(a:g)g -DT  CRS (a:g)g  I 
= 1/2 {Dt1cRs(d:g) -D CRS(d:g) + Dt'cRs(a:g) -DT
t+1 
CRS (a:g)]g (3.31) 
That is, the efficiency change measures how close the input-output vector(a,d) is 
to  the  constant returns  to  scale technologies  in each time period. The 
technological change is the average distance between the two constant returns to 
scale technologies. Also, the efficiency change can be decomposed into scale 
efficiency change and pure technical change. That is, scale efficiency change 
between time period t and t+1 is (b-g) -(f-i), and the pure technical change is (g-a) 
-(i-d). So the efficiency change is the sum of scale efficiency and the pure 
technical change. The Luenberger productivity indicator is defined in the figure 
as; 
PRODCH(T, T+1) = EFCH(T, T+1) + TECH(T, T+1)
 
= [(b-a)  (f-d)] + 1/2 [(f-e) + (c-b)] = 1/2[(f-e) + (c+b)] + (d-a)
 
t+1 = [{DTtcRs (a: g)  is 
CRS  g)} + 1/2{DTt'cRs(d: g)  D1cRs(d: g) T 
t+1 + D  cRs(a:g)  is  cRs(a:g)}]g  (3.32) -T 
Figure 3.2 Productivity Change Measurement 
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3.5 Effect of SO2 Emission Regulation on Productivity Growth Potential 
3.5.1 Opportunity Cost of SO2 Emission Regulation 
In the previous section, we assumed weak disposability of outputs. Since the 
reduction of bad output is not necessarily costless under the  SO2 emission 
regulation, good output should be reduced with the reduction of bad output, or 
more inputs should be required to reduce bad output. The reduction of bad output 
can be costlessly disposed if there is no SO2 emission regulation, however. Then 
the generating units can produce more good output without any restriction of 
disposability of bad output when there is no restriction in the disposability of bad 
output. 
For convenience, suppose the output sets have one good output(y) and one bad 
output(b)(Fare et al, 1986, 1989). The output set with weak disposability is 
bounded by OABCD, and the output set with strong disposability is bounded by 
OEBCD. If the bad output can be disposed costlessly, then the OEBA is the 
feasible part of the technology. If the disposal of bad output is not costlessly, then 
OEBA is not feasible. 
Suppose that we measure the efficiency of the generating unit of u(y,b) based on 
the directional vector of (gy=y, gb=-b) and that Dos and  Dow are the distance 
values of the directional output distance function under strong disposability and 
weak disposability respectively. The maximal good output under the strong 
disposability is y + gy* Dos when the generating unit is most efficient(point G). 62 
And the minimized bad output at point G is b - gb* Dos. Also, maximal good 
output under the weak disposability when the  generating  unit  is  most 
efficienct(point F) is y + gy* Dow since the maximal expansion of good output is 
restricted to the point F because of the disposability restriction of bad output, and 
the minimized bad output at point F is b - gb* Dow. 
Figure 3.3 Opportunity Cost of Bad Output Regulation 
(gy 
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As a result, the difference between the distance value under strong disposability 
and the distance value under weak disposability is defined as efficiency loss due 
to the environmental regulation of bad output in the same time period. That is, 
EFLOSS(t, t) 
= EF(t, t)  EF(t, t) w 
= (Dos-Dow)  (3.33) 
where EF(t, t)  is efficiency under strong disposability 
EF(t, t) w is efficiency under weak disposability 
If we multiply the efficiency loss by the good output, then we can get the 
opportunity cost of bad output regulation in a specific time period. More 
specifically, the opportunity cost of the restricted disposability of bad output is the 
directional vector of good output times the difference between the distance value 
under strong disposability and the distance value under weak disposability. That 
is, the opportunity cost of the restricted disposability of bad output in terms of 
good output is defined as the efficiency loss times the directional vector of good 
output in the same time period as: 
OPPCOST = EFLOSS*gy 
(gy*Dos)(gy*Dow) 
= gy*(Dos -Dow)  (3.34) 64 
where EFLOSS is the efficiency loss defined as the difference between the 
distance value under strong disposability and the distance value under weak 
disposability 
Dos, Dow are distance values in the output directional distance function under 
strong disposability and weak disposability respectively 
The same logic can be applied to the directional technology distance function. 
That is, the opportunity cost of the regulation of bad output disposability is 
defined as the directional vector of good output times the differential in the 
distance value between under strong disposability and under weak disposability in 
the directional technology distance function 
OPPCOST 
= [gy*D  ] - [gy*D] 
gy*(  (3.35) 
where D and D  , are the distance values in the directional technology distance 
function under strong  disposability and  the  distance  value under weak 
disposability respectively. 
Opportunity cost can be defined only in terms of potential loss of good output in 
the directional technology distance function since both the distance value under 
strong disposability and weak disposability include the adjustment of inputs. 65 
Opportunity cost can be decomposed into opportunity cost derived from scale 
efficiency and the opportunity cost derived from pure technical efficiency. That 
is, 
OPPCOST 
= OPPCOST SCEF + OPPCOST PUTE 
= (gy*ScEFLOsS) + (gy*PUTELOSS) 
= gy* {SCEF(t, t) s  SCEF(t, t) w } + gy* {PUTE(t, t) s  PUTE(t, t) w } 
= g*{{(EF(t, t)CRS,S  EF(t, t)VRS,S)}  {(EF(t, t)CRS,W  EF(t, t)VRS,W)}]+ 
[{EF(t, t)VRS,S - EF(t, t)VRS,S }  { EF(t, t)VRS,W  EF(t, t)VRS,W}]  (3.36) 
where OPPCOST SCEF is opportunity cost derived from scale efficiency 
OPPCOST PUTE is opportunity cost derived from pure technical efficiency 
SCEFLOSS is efficiency loss derived from scale efficiency 
PUTELOSS is efficiency loss derived from pure technical efficiency 
3.5.2 Effect of SO2 emission regulation on productivity growth potential 
Let us take an example in which the productivity of one generating unit under 
strong disposability improved by 0.5 between two time periods, and the 
productivity under weak disposability improved by 0.3 in the same time period. If 
there is no environmental regulation, the productivity growth of this unit should 
be 0.5 which is the same as the productivity growth under strong disposability. 
The productivity growth of this unit, however, improved only by 0.3 because of 
the restriction of the bad output disposability. So the difference in productivity between under strong disposability(O.5) and under weak disposability(O.3) is 0.2 
which is thus the effect of SO2 emissions regulation on the productivity growth 
potential. 
The productivity change under strong disposability generally shows a more 
stable trend compared with the productivity changes under weak disposability. 
This fact comes from the characteristic that the technology of weak disposability 
more closely envelopes the data set than does the technology of strong 
disposability. Suppose that the productivity of one generating unit under strong 
disposability improved by 0.5, but the productivity under weak disposability 
declined by 1.3 because of the introduction of stronger SO2 emission regulation. 
The effect of environmental regualtion on the productivity change is thus 1.8. 
That is, this unit can increase the directional vector of good output 1.8 times if 
there is no environmental regulation. So the positive value of opportunity cost 
change means an increase of productivity growth potential because of the 
environmental regulation. If the environmental regulation affects the productivity 
change negatively, then the productivity growth potential should be positive. 
However, if the extent to which the regulation binds on the productivity change is 
neglegible, then the productivity growth potential will be positive or zero. We 
expect a positive value of productivity growth potential in the phase I period 
compared with the pre-phase I period since stronger regulation was introduced in 
the phase I period. 67 
So, the effect of SO2 emission regulation on the productivity growth potential, 
can be defined as the difference between productivity growth under strong 
disposability and productivity growth under weak disposability. That is, 
OPPCOSTCH 
= PRODCH(t, t+1) s  PRODCH(t, t+l)w  (3.37) 
where PRODCH is productivity change under strong disposability of output 
PRODCH is productivity change under weak disposability of output 
We can decompose the productivity growth potential into the productivity 
growth potential derived from the efficiency loss change and the productivity 
growth potential derived from technological loss change. The logic is the same as 
the decomposition for the productivity change. The only difference is that we 
impose strong disposability and weak disposability separately. 
The change of the efficiency loss between two time periods(t and t+ 1) is defined 
as the difference in the efficiency loss in time period t and the efficiency loss in 
time period t+1 under the same directional vector(g). That is, 
EFLOSSCH(t, t+l) 
= EFLOSS(t, t)- EFLOSS(t+1, t+1) 
= [EF(t, t)s  EF(t, t) w]  [EF(t+1, t+l)s - EF(t+1, t+1) wi 
= [{ D  t(xt yt, bt;_gx, gy, -gb)  t(xt yt bt;_gx, gy, -gb)} 
t+1  t+1 
{ D  t+1(xt±1  y  , b  ;-g, gy, -gb)  t+1(xt+1 yt+l bt+I;_gx, gy, -gb)}]  (3.38) 
where 68 
EFLOSSCH(t, t+1) is the efficiency loss change between time period t and t+1 
EFLOSS(t, t) and EFLOSS(t+l, t+1) are efficiency loss in t and t+1 period 
respectively. 
The change of efficiency loss between two time periods is defined as the effect 
of SO2 emission regulation on the efficiency change. For example, the efficiency 
score of one generating unit under strong disposability is 0.8, and the efficiency 
score under weak disposability is 0.5. Then the efficiency loss due to the lack of 
disposability of bad output in time period t is 0.3. In the next time period(t+1), the 
efficiency score under strong disposability is 0.6, and the efficiency score under 
weak disposability is 0.4 because of the strong environmental regulation. Then the 
efficiency loss in time period t+1  is 0.2. So the efficiency loss change is 
positive(0. 1) because of the stronger environmental regualtion. If the efficiency 
loss change is positive, then the productivity growth potential increased. Also if 
the efficiency loss change is negative, then the productivity growth potential from 
efficiency change declined. 
So, productivity growth potential derived from efficiency loss change, that is, the 
effect of SO2 emission regulation on the productivity growth potential derived 
from the efficiency loss change, is defined as the efficiency loss change weighted 
by the directional vector of good output. In other words, productivity growth 
potential derived from efficiency loss change is defined as the good output 
directional vector times the efficiency loss change 69 
OPPCOSTCHEFCH
 
= gy*EFLOSSCH(t, t+1)
 
= gy*[EFL0SS(t, t)  EFLOSS(t+1, t+1)]  (3.39)
 
The effect of S02 emission regulation on the productivity growth potential 
derived from the efficiency loss change also can be decomposed into productivity 
growth potential derived from scale efficiency loss change and productivity 
growth potential derived from pure technical efficiency loss change: 
OPPCOSTCHEFCH 
= gy*[sCEFL0SscH(t, t+1) + PUTELOSSCH(t, t+1)]  (3.40) 
The effect of SO2 emission on the technological growth potential is also defined 
as the average distance between technologies in two time periods when we 
evaluate the technology under strong disposability and weak disposability for 
each time period. As we noted previously, each generating unit can generally 
produce more good output under no environmental regulations. So the frontier 
production technology under no environmental regulation will shift outwardly 
more than the frontier production technology under the environmental regualtion. 
The loss in the technological change because of the environmental regulation is 
defined  as  the  average distance value between technology under strong 
disposability and the technology under weak disposability: 
TELOSSCH 
= 1 /2[ { ii  (xt ytbt;_gx gygb) D  t(xt,yt,t;_g,gy,_g) 
} + { 
t+1 (xt+I ,y
t+1 ,b
t+1 
; 70 
t  t+1  t+1  t+1  t+1  t -gX,g,-gb)-D, (x  ,y  ,b  ;-gx,gy,-gb)}-D  (x 
-gx,gy,-gb)} + D rw 
t+I (xt+l  ,b
t+1 
;-gx,gy,-gb)- D 
t(xt+1 yt+1 ,bt+I ;-gx,gy,-gb) }  (3.41) 
The productivity growth potential derived from technological change is defined 
as the directional vector of good output times technological change loss 
OPPCOSTCHTECH  gy* TELOSSCH  (3.42) 
So the effect of SO2 emission regulation on the productivity growth potential is 
the sum of the effect on the efficiency change and the effect on the technological 
change. That is, the effect of SO2 emission regulation on the productivity growth 
potential is the sum of efficiency loss change and the technological loss change 
follows; 
OPPCOSTCH = OPPCOSTCHEFCH + OPPCOSTCHTECFJ  (3.43) 71 
3.6 Empirical Model 
3.6.1 Returns to Scale Technology 
The first step for empirical model specification is to set the linear programming 
for the technology based on the assumption as noted in the previous section. 
Assume that there are k generating units and good output(y), bad output(b) and 
inputs(x) in period t. The analysis model for the constant returns to scale 
teclmology(CRS) with the observation of input and output (xkt,  kt  bkt) in time 
period t is 
t Tt CRS = {( xt,  bt) 
Zk y y' ,m=1 ..... M 
Zk b =b ,j=1 ..... J 
Zk x x' ,n=1,...,N 
ZkOjc_1.....K} 
(3.44)
The  inequality  of  good  output(ym)  and  input(x)  means  the  free 
disposability(strong disposability) of good output and inputs, and the equality of 
bad output(b) means the weak disposability of good output and bad output. The 
inequality of activity intensity(zk), that is, the positive activity intensity for each 
firm means that the technology is represented by a constant returns to scale. We 72 
have to impose different technology constraints in the linear programming. The 
technological constraint of variable returns to scale technology(VRS) is that the 
sum of each activity intensity is equal to one. That is, the additional constraint to 
positive activity intensity of CRS is 
Zk  =1 
(3.45) 
So the linear programming for the variable returns to scale technology(VRS) is 
follows: 
Tt VRS = {( x, yt, bt) 
zk y y' ,m=1 ..... M 
=6b  ,j=1,...,J k=lk 
b 
Zk  x,  x ,n  1,...,N 
81 
(3.46) 73 
And the constraint of non-increasing returns to scale teclmology(NIRS) is that 
the sum of the activity intensity is equal or less that one, that is, the additional 
constraint to positive activity intensity of CRS is 
1 Zk 
(3.47) 
We have three kinds of returns to scale technology. When we change the 
technology, we have to add the technological constraint to the CRS constraint. 
Let (-g,, gy, -gi) be the directional vector of input, good output and bad output. 
Then the representative linear programming for the Luenberger productivity 
indicator under the constant returns to scale technology(CRS) is 
CRS (xk't,  bt;gx, gy, -gb) = max 
s.t 
zkyy, +,m=1.....M 
Zk  X  X,  J3g,,,n =1 ..... N 
Zk  bk =  /hj  , 1 =1 ..... J 
Zk O,k=l ..... K} 74 
(3.48) 
3.6.2 Time Period 
The second step is to change the time period of the observation being evaluated 
and the  reference  technology. The above  linear programming evaluates 
observation k' in t period relative to the reference technology Tt in t period under 
the constant returns to scale technology in the direction of (-g, gy, -gb). This 
directional distance value measures the maximum expansion of good output and 
the maximum contraction of bad output and input in time period t under the 
constant returns to scale technology as compared to the reference technology in 
time period t. Similar programming can be formed for the different time period's 
combination of the observation being evaluated and the technology being 
compared. For example, the linear programming to evaluate the observations k' in 
t period relative to the reference technology Tt  in t+1 period under the constant 
returns to scale technology in the direction of (-g, gy, -gb) as follows 
CRS (xI(t,  k't  bkt; -gx gy, -gb) = max 
s.t 
Y'  +flg ,m =1.....M Zk 
b' =b,1  flgJ,j1.....J Zk 
Zk  x  x,  flg  , n = 1,..., N 
..... K zkO,kl75 
(3.49) 
The remaining combination of observation and reference technology are to 
evaluate k' in time period t+1 relative to reference technology in t, and to evaluate 
k' in t+1 period relative to reference technology in t+1. As a result, we have four 
kinds of combination of observation and reference technology under the same 
returns to scale technology and directional vector. That is, the first combination of 
observation and reference technology is observations being evaluated in t time 
period(xkt,  kt btct)  and the reference technology to being compared in t time 
period(Tt). The second combination of observation and the reference technology 
is observations being evaluated in t time period(xkt,  kt bl(t) and the reference 
technology to being compared in t+1 time period(Tt). The third combination of 
observation and the reference technology is observations being evaluated in t+1 
time period(xkt+l,  kt+1 bI(t+I) and the reference technology to being compared in 
t time period(Tt), and the last combination of observation and the reference 
technology is observations being evaluated in t+l time period(xl(t+l,  kt+l b(t+t) 
and the reference technology to being compared in t+1 time period(Tt+). Through 
4 kinds of combinations, we get four different efficiencies of each observation. 
3.6.3 Directional Vector 
The third step is to choose the directional vector. There are many choices of the 
directional vectors. In this paper, we are using the symmetric directional 
vector(g=y, gb=-b, gxx) since this directional vector has a good property for 76 
aggregation. This directional vector evaluates each observation based on the 
symmetric direction such that the maximal expansion of good output and the 
maximal contraction of bad output and inputs are treated symmetrically. Suppose 
that the measurement unit of good output(electricity generation) is KWh, bad 
output(S02 emission) is ton, input(fuel consumption) is million BTU, and the 
distance value of one generating unit is 12. Then the distance value means that the 
generating unit can increase good output by 12 KWh, and can contract bad output 
and input by 12 ton and 12 million BTU respectively relative to the frontier 
technology. If the measurement unit of good output is changed from KWh to 
MWh, and if we multiply the directional vector by 1,000, then we can get the 
same distance value.  This directional vector can get an unbiased aggregate 
efficiency or aggregate productivity indicator. 
T CRS (xI(t,  kt  bk't; -1,1,-i) = max 
s.t 
Y y +,m=1 ..... M Zk 
b =b,1 /3,j=1.....J Zk 
ZkX;X:,  fl,n=1,...,N 
zk0,kl ..... K 77 
(3.50) 
3.6.4 Productivity Change 
The next step is to calculate the efficiency change and productivity change using 
the previous linear programming. This step follows the definition of efficiency 
change measurement and productivity change measurement from the previous 
section. The only difference is that we measure the efficiency and productivity 
change of each generating unit as follows: 
EFCHk,CRS =  DT CRS(X  ykt bkt; g)  T  CRS(X 
k,t-1-I  ykt+l bk't+l; g)  (3.51) 
The efficiency change of unit k under CRS is the difference in the distance value 
in period t and period t+1 under CRS based on directional vector(g). The scale 
efficiency is calculated as the difference in the distance value between CRS and 
VRS; 
SCEFCHk = [DTtCRS (xk't,  kt bc't; g)  D1 tVRS (xlt, ykt bkt; g)] 
t+1  t+1  kt+1  yk',t+I  k,t+1 EDT  CRS(x  )kb  ;g)-DT  VRS(X  ,b  ;g)](3.52) 
Also, the pure technical efficiency change is the difference between overall 
efficiency change and the scale efficiency change. That is, 
k',t.  t+1  k',t+l  ykt+1 bkt PUTECHk = EDTtVRS (xkt, ykt  b  , g)  DT  VRS (x  g )] (3.53) 
As noted in the previous section, the efficiency change is decomposed into scale 
efficiency change and the pure technical efficiency change. That is, 
EFCHk = SCEFCHk + PUTECHk  (3.54) 78 
The technological change is calculated under the CRS technology as follows:
 
j  t+I  k',t+l  ),kt+1 bkt;g)_D1 t
CRS(X
k',t+l  ykt+l bkt+l; g )]
 TECHk=1/2{[T  CRS(X 
+[DTt+ICRS (xkt,  ,k',t  bl('t; g) 
iS  t+1 
CRS (xl(t,  kt bk't; g)]} LT  (3.55) 
The Luenberger productivity change is  the sum of efficiency change and
 
technological change. That is,
 
PRODCHk = EFCHk + TECHk  (3.56)
 
3.6.5 Identification of Returns to Scale 
When the distance value under CRS is the same as the distance value under 
VRS, then the unit is in the constant returns to scale range like OBCE in the 
following figure. When the distance value under CRS is different from the 
distance value under VRS, but the distance value under VRS is same as the 
distance value under non-increasing returns to scale(NIRS), then the unit is in the 
decreasing returns to scale range like CD in the figure. If the CRS distance value 
is different from the VRS distance value, and the VRS distance value is not 
same(or greater) as the NIRS distance value, then the unit is in the increasing 
returns to scale range like AB in the figure. iDJ 
Figure 3.4 Identification of Returns to Scale 
A
 EDJ 
3.7 Data 
3.7.1 Definition and Source 
The Acid Rain Program of CAAA 1990 started in 1995 to reduce the sulfur 
dioxide(S02) emissions of the electricity industry. This program achieved the 
target level of SO2 emission through two Phases. The first Phase started in 1995 
and ended in 1999, and the second Phase was implemented from 2000. In Phase I, 
the emission rate standard for sulfur dioxide(S02) was set to 2.5 pounds per 
million BTU of heat input for the dirtiest 261 generating units. The emission rate 
standard in Phase II was strengthened to 1.2 pounds of SO2 emission per million 
BTU of heat input for most of the fossil fuel fired electric generating units of 
which generating capacity is 25 MW or more including Phase I units. The federal 
government gave each generating unit allowances that are equivalent to the SO2 
emission rate standard calculated based on the average heat input during the 1985-
87 period. 
The 261 Phase I generating units were the objective of the Phase I environmental 
regulation from 1995 to 1999 since these units' SO2 emission rate was the highest. 
In Phase II, over 3000 units including Phase I units are affected by the Phase II 
SO2  emission regulation. Since the environmental regulation of Acid Rain 
Program is applied to the individual unit instead of electric plant or utility, we use 
the electric generating unit level's data. 81 
Boilers produce heat, and the generating unit use that heat to produce 
electricity. So there is a basic physical relationship between boilers and the 
generating unit. In most cases, there is a one-to-one relationship between boilers 
and the generating unit such that one boiler supplies the heat to one generating 
unit. But, there is a multiple relationship among boilers and generating units too. 
In those cases, one boiler supplies heat to multiple generating units, several 
boilers supply heat to one generating unit, or several boilers supply heat to several 
generating units. There are 263 boilers that supply the heat to the 261 Phase I 
generating units.  Among the 263 boilers, 261 boilers have a one-to-one 
relationship with generating units, and only 2 boilers have a multiple relationship. 
Electricity is produced from generating unit using the heat supplied from boilers, 
but the SO2 is emitted from boilers. So we assume that the basic observation unit 
is the generating unit. 
The E1A767(Annual Steam Electric Unit Operation and Design Report) of the 
Energy Information Administration(EJA) of the Department of Energy(DOE) 
contains the unit and boiler level's data. The EIA-767 data file is a steam-electric 
unit data file that includes annual data from organic- or nuclear-fueled steam-
electric units with a generator nameplate rating of 10 or more megawatts. The 
data are derived from the Form EIA-767 "Steam-Electric Unit Operation and 
Design Report". 82 
We get the annual electricity production(MWh) and generating capacity(MW) of 
each generating unit from E1A767. Some of the generating units do not produce 
electricity,  and instead receive  electricity from other generating units(this 
electricity production is listed as minus electricity production in the E1A767 
database). We exclude these units from the sample. 
Except for electricity generation and generating capacity data, we can not get the 
data of the generating unit. Since most of the 261 Phase I generating units(except 
for 2 units) have a one-to-one relationship with the boiler, we assume that the 
boiler's data is  the same as the generating unit's  data. That is,  the fuel 
consumption and SO2 emission of each boiler are assumed to be the fuel 
consumption and SO2 emission of each corresponding generating unit. However, 
in the case of a multiple relationship between boiler and unit, we assume that the 
fuel consumption and the SO2 emission of generating units are proportional to the 
ratio that each boiler contributed to the total electricity generation of each unit. 
We can get the fuel consumption(million BTU) of each generating unit by 
multiplying the boiler's fuel consumption by the electricity production ratio of 
each generating unit since the electricity production is assumed to be proportional 
to the heat input. There are four kinds of fuel : coal, oil, gas and other fuel. We 
multiply the monthly quantity of fuel consumption by the heat content of each 
fuel. Then we sum it to get the annual fuel consumption using the data from the 83 
E1A767 data set since the EL&767 data base offers monthly fuel quantity and heat 
content for each boiler. 
We get the SO2 emission(ton) data of each boiler from the Environmental 
Protection Agency(EPA)'s Acid Rain Program data base. This emission data is 
measured from Continuous Emissions Monitoring System(CEMS). CEMS was 
installed with the implementation of the Acid Rain Program in 1994. We 
transformed the boiler's SO2 emissions multiplying the emission by the electricity 
production ratio to get the SO2 emissions of each generating unit. In the period 
between 1995-1997, we could not get separate SO2 emissions for some boilers 
that shared a stack. In this case, we also divided the SO2 emissions of the stack by 
the electricity generation ratio of each unit. Since 1998, we were able to get 
separate CEMS SO2 emission data for each boiler. 
Table 3.1 Variable Definition and Source 
Variable  data file name  institute 
Quantity 
good output  electricity generation(MWh) E1A767  DOE/EIA : 
bad output: S02 emission(ton)  Acid Rain Program Database  EPA
 
inputi  fuel consumption(mmBTU)  E1A767  DOE/EIA
 : 
input2  electricity capacity(MW)  E1A767  DOE/EIA : 
input3: labor(person)  FERC-1  FERC 
We could not get the generating unit's labor data since the labor data was 
available only in the level of electric utility. Instead we got the utility's labor data 84 
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's FERC- 1 (Electric Utility 
Annual Report). The FERC-1 is a comprehensive and operating Report for 
Electric Rate regulation and financial audits. Major defined as (1) one million 
Megawatt hours or more; (2) 100 megawatt hours of annual sales for resale; (3) 
500 megawatt hours of annual power exchange delivered or (4) 500 megawatt 
hours of annual wheeling for others (deliveries plus losses). So we assume that the 
generating unit's labor is proportional to the electricity production ratio of each 
unit to the electric utility' electricity production. We multiply the number of the 
utility's employees by the electricity generation ratio of each generating unit to get 
the labor of each generating unit. The labor of the half-time employee is assumed 
to be the half of the full-time employee. 
We excluded 52 units from the sample data since we could not get their labor 
data. So the final data set is composed of 209 generating units during the 1990-
1999 period. 
3.7.2 Identification of Compliance Strategy Change 
All of the phase I generating units reported their  SO2 emission reduction 
compliance strategy to the Department of Energy(DOE) before 1995. This 
information is the only available data to identify the compliance strategy of each 
generating unit. Among the 261 phase I generating units, 136 units reported 
switching their fuel to low-sulfur coal, 27 units were to install scrubbers, 83 units 
were planning to purchase allowance, 7 units were scheduled to retire, and 8 units 85 
were to use "other" strategies according to the report. However, many plants 
changed their compliance strategy in the phase I period because of changes in the 
market and the time lag between the reports and the implementation of the 
strategies. 
For information about utilities applying the scrubber compliance strategy, we 
checked the scrubber(FGD) data for each generating unit. We identified whether 
the unit installed the scrubber or not, and the year when the unit installed and 
operated scrubber even before the phase I period. All 27 units which reported 
their compliance strategy as scrubbers had installed and operated scrubber from 
1995. One unit(utcode-ptcode-unit-blid: 13998-2861-1-1) used scrubber strategy 
from  1996,  and  another  unit(utcode-ptcode-unit-blid: 1 8454-645-ST3-BBO3) 
operated scrubber from 1997. Even though two other units(18454-645-1,ST2-
BBO 1 ,BBO2) installed scrubber in 1999, these units are applied to the phase II 
penod(from 2000) since they did not operate scrubber in 1999. So two units 
additionally adopted scrubber strategy. Both of these units had previously 
reported their compliance strategy to be a fuel switch. As a result, the realized 
number of generating units that installed and used scrubber strategy in the phase I 
period was 29 units. 
If the SO2 emission of the generating units in phase I period that reported 
allowance strategy as a compliance strategy is continuously below the emission 
standard(2.5 pound of S02/mmBTU of heat input), and these units did not buy 86 
allowance, then we identified these units changed strategy from reported 
allowance purchasing to actual fuel switch strategy. Four generating units(ptcode-
unit:2872-5,2049-4,5, 2527-4) changed their strategy to fuel switch from the 
allowance strategy they reported to the Department of Energy(DOE). Of these, 
one unit changed its strategy in 1995, while the remaining three units changed 
their strategies in 1997. 
If the SO2 emissions of the generating units that switched their fuel to low-sulfur 
coal was continuously over the emission standard(2.5 pound of S02/mmBTU of 
fuel consumption) and bought the allowance, then we identified their strategy 
changed from reported fuel switch to actual allowance strategy. Twenty-three 
generating units changed their compliance strategy to allowance strategy from 
fuel switch. Only one unit changed its strategy in 1996, while the remaining 22 
units changed their strategies in 1995. 
Instead of 7 units, only 4 generating units retired. Seven units used "other" 
strategies including switching to natural gas or oil. The final total of compliance 
strategies for the 261 phase I generating units, then, is as follows : 29 generating 
units used scrubber strategy as SO2 emission reduction compliance strategy, 102 
units used allowance strategy, 116 units used fuel switch strategy, 11 units used 
"other" strategy. 
One interesting point to note is that 23 units changed their strategies from fuel 
switch to allowance, while only 4 units changed their strategies from allowance to 87 
fuel switch. The reason for this is that the initial forecasted price of allowance 
before 1993 was much higher than the actual price when the allowance market 
opened in 1993. The allowance price was between $100 and $150, while the 
forecasted price was over $200. Since the reported compliance strategy was made 
before the opening of allowance market, the electric utility may have based their 
compliance strategy on the forecasted price of allowance. 
Table 3.2 Number of Generating Units by Compliance Strategy 
aUowance strategy  1995  1996  1997 
-reported  83  104  105 
change from fuel switch  22  1  0 
change to fuel switch  1  0  3 
- estimated  104  105  102 
"other' strategy
-reported  11  11  11 
scrubber strategy 
reported  27  28  28 
change from fuel switch  1  0  1 
estimated  28  28  29 
fuel switch strategy
-reported  136  114  113 
changed from allowance  1  0  3 
- change to allowance  22  0 1 
-estimated  114  113  116 
3.7.3 Data Statistics 
The mean electricity generation(MWh) of the 209 phase I generating units 
declined continuously before  1995, but rapidly increased in the phase  I 
period(1995-1999).  SO2 emission(ton) declined sharply in the pre-phase I period, 
but stabilized in the phase I period. Fuel consumption(mmBTU) which generally declined before 1995, increased in the phase I period. Generating capacity(MW) 
was constant from 1990 to 1998,  increased a little in 1999. Labor(person) 
declined continuously in the sample period. One interesting point is  that 
electricity generation and fuel consumption increased from 1996. 
The mean electricity generation of the units with scrubber was the biggest, the 
next was fuel switch, then allowance and "other" strategies. In terms of electricity 
generation level, the units with scrubber generated about twice as much as units 
with fuel switch and allowance and three times as much as units with "other" 
strategies. In particular, the mean electricity generation of the units with "other" 
strategies in 1995 declined to half level of 1990's level and finally returned to 
1990's level in 1999. 
In the pre-phase I period, units with "other" strategies emitted the highest level 
of SO2. units using a scrubber strategy emitted half of what those units did, while 
units applying a fuel switch strategy reported emitting only 1/4 as much. 
However, the units applying "other" strategies emitted the lowest SO2 emission in 
phase I period, the emission level of the units with scrubber is the next lowest, 
followed by fuel switch and allowance. As a result, the units with "other" and 
scrubber strategy decreased  SO2 emission rapidly, but the units with allowance 
decreased  SO2 emission only a little. The mean SO2 emission of the units with 
allowance in the phase I period was around three times the SO2 emission of the 
units with "other" and scrubber strategy. 89 
Table 3.3 Data Statistics of 209 Phase I Generating Units in 1990-1999 
Variable  unit  Mean  Std 0ev  Minimum  Maximum 
1990 
gen  (MWh)  1775873.06  1370720.12  19467.00  7518927.00 
so2  (ton)  37882.95  37532.52  940.8080000  232218.70 
cap  (MW)  348.4261579  248.9971032  18.7500000  1300.00 
fuel  (mmBTU)  17634256.65  13139777.26  412831.04  71469772.74 
labor  (person)  335.6736427  270.6323179  4.2931790  1137.51 
1991 
gen  (MWh)  1733597.59  1431387.56  13226.70  7696922.00 
so2  (ton)  37028.33  39344.56  506.4652600  252220.50 
cap  (MW)  348.4261579  248.9971032  18.7500000  1300.00 
fuel  (mmBTU)  17192218.11  13700742.69  263628.02  75603347.39 
labor  (person)  315.0047325  272.8067020  3.2364950  1374.89 
1992 
gen  (MWh)  1731247.56  1430171.82  94.0000000  7565484.00 
so2  (ton)  34332.05  34443.23  113.0300000  204588.96 
cap  (MW)  348.4261579  248.9971032  18.7500000  1300.00 
fuel  (mmBTU)  17201869.26  13818019.58  43792.86  72649029.91 
labor  (person)  318.3897140  268.2475773  0.0238202  1285.78 
1993 
gen  (MWh)  1719881.40  1354831.97  43679.00  7635631.00 
so2  (ton)  32188.18  32550.35  513.7107348  201666.50 
cap  (MW)  348.4261579  248.9971032  18.7500000  1300.00 
fuel  (mmBTU)  17083906.73  12932880.82  705786.28  73148144.10 
labor  (person)  306.0908743  250.2589442  6.4797670  1281.81 
1994 
gen  (MWh)  1674907.63  1378213.01  16218.50  6492163.00 
so2  (ton)  27210.50  26493.05  461.1526500  169776.03 
cap  (MW)  348.4261579  248.9971032  18.7500000  1300.00 
fuel  (mmBTU)  16699725.60  13283718.10  265943.58  62866288.46 
labor  (person)  279.3140586  233.8854289  3.4525605  1196.70 
1995 
gen  (MWh)  1682788.04  1431325.41  2679.00  7437300.00 
so2  (ton)  17134.16  17398.48  10.0000000  104172.00 
cap  (MW)  348.4261579  248.9971032  18.7500000  1300.00 
fuel  (mmBTU)  16435212.26  13550926.99  132144.00  73277883.79 
labor  (person)  255.8648205  223.5761547  0.2392648  973.3960567 
1996 
gen  (MWh)  1793539.78  1472783.89  11364.00  9163854.00 
so2  (ton)  18575.13  17218.37  4.0000000  105553.00 
cap  (MW)  348.4261579  248.9971032  18.7500000  1300.00 
fuel  (mmBTU)  17576554.31  13932728.89  139939.65  88418383.67 
labor  (person)  254.6653751  222.8778100  2.1338257  997.3714125 Variable  Label  Mean  Std 0ev  Minimum  Maximum 
1997 
gen  (MWh)  1829141.87  1448321.66  4352.00  7933261.00 
so2  (ton)  18649.98  17300.75  3.0000000  95312.00 
cap  (MW)  348.4261579  248.9971032  18.7500000  1300.00 
fuel  (mmBTU)  18325846.02  14014520.39  47658.69  77800003.42 
labor  (person)  250.1796626  212.8769525  2.1463232  950.0194826 
1998 
gen  (MWh)  1872398.98  1491141.73  14804.00  9051140.00 
so2  (ton)  18727.94  17270.01  7.0000000  120253.00 
cap  (MW)  348.4261579  248.9971032  18.7500000  1300.00 
fuel  (mmBTU)  18756872.22  14390526.05  164675.14  88499674.27 
labor  (person)  236.8375799  207.1038679  8.1806157  1051.31 
1999 
gen  (MWh)  1880184.35  1494072.99  3661.00  8297011.00 
so2  (ton)  17314.60  16342.79  22.5423858  91310.00 
cap  (MW)  348.4936220  248.9245636  18.7500000  1300.00 
fuel  (mmBTU)  18846785.94  14393586.46  40792.19  81169346.19 
labor  (person)  238.5745910  221.1468727  1.8238992  1357.45 91 
Figure 3.5 Mean Electricity Generation(MWh) 
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Figure 3.6 Mean Electricity Generation(MWh) by Strategy 
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Figure 3.7 Mean SO2 emission(ton) 
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Figure 3.8 Mean SO2 emission(ton) by Strategy 
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Figure 3.9 Mean Generating Capacity(MW) 
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Figure 3.10 Mean Generating Capacity(MW) by Stratcgy 
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Figure 3.11 Mean Fuel Consumption(mmBTU) 
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Figure 3.12 Mean Fuel Consumption(mmBTU) by Strategy 
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Figure 3.13 Mean Labor(person) 
4001
 
6917  I ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ .-.--..- -.--. --____________________________________________________________
 
207  -._____________________________ 
190  -
100  _ 
SD- ____________________________________________________________________________ 
1Y7  ISO?  1992  bOa  1994  005  1096  1297  996  1979
 
Figure 3.14 Mean Labor(person) by Strategy 
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3.8 Estimation Result 
We estimate the Luenberger productivity indicator and the effect of SO2 
emission regulation on the productivity change using the symmetric directional 
vector(g=-1, g)=1, gi,=-l). The mean value of efficiency and productivity per 
year is defined by using the agregation of each generating unit's efficiency score 
and productivity indicator and dividing it by the number of generating units(209 
units per year). The mean value of the efficiency and productivity indicator in the 
pre-phase I period and during the phase I period is calculated by summing each 
unit's corresponding value and dividing it by the total number of units. We used 
the same method for the efficiency and productivity of each compliance strategy. 
Since we use a symmetric directional vector, there is no aggregation problem. 
3.8.1 Efficiency Estimation 
3.8.1.1 Efficiency by Time Period 
We aggregate the efficiency score and divide it by the number of units(209) each 
year to get the annual mean efficiency score. We use same method to get the 
mean efficiency score pre- and during the phase I period. 
When we evaluate each observation based on the symmetric directional 
vector(g=- 1, gy= 1, g,=- 1) under weak disposability of outputs, the mean 
efficiency of the 209 phase I generating units is 86.59 in 1990-99 period. This 
efficiency score means that, on average, the units can increase 87 MWh of 
electricity generation and decrease 87 ton of SO2 emissions and inputs by 87 97 
units(MW for generating capacity, mmBTU for fuel consumption, person for 
labor) respectively. 
Table 3.4 Mean Efficiency Score in 1990-1999 
weak disposability of output  strong disposability of output
scale  pure tech  scale  pure tech 
year  efficiency  efficiency  efficiency  efficiency  efficiency  efficiency
1990  94.48249  23.70794  70.77455  109.32282  25.41995  83.90287 
1991  89.44086  17.70397  71.73689  104.56158  21.16325  83.39833 
1992  92.47258  24.80636  67.66622  105.66804  28.61163  77.05641 
1993  82.89876  21.85086  61.04789  91.22340  18.63057  72.59282 
1994  90.74488  21.66612  69.07876  103.16923  28.16000  75.00923 
1995  85.50522  22.29660  63.20861  87.16852  22.24153  64.92699 
1996  86.27010  20.76000  65.51010  89.31301  21 .44067  67.87234 
1997  83.47598  23.23100  60.24498  85.18163  24.46938  60.71225 
1998  84.24909  20.32785  63.92124  85.07971  20.67622  64.40349 
1999  76.32416  18.72431  57.59986  77.92904  20.25230  57.67675 
rnean(90-99)  86.58641  21.50750  65.07891  93.86170  23.10655  70.75515 
mean(90-94)  90.00791  21.94705  68.06086  102.78901  24.39708  78.39193 
mean(95-99)  83.16491  21.06795  62.09696  84.93438  21.81602  63.11836 
The mean scale efficiency is 21.5, and the pure technical efficiency is 65.1 in the 
whole time period(1990-1999). So the main source of inefficiency is  pure 
technical inefficiency when we decompose the efficiency scores into scale 
efficiency and pure technical efficiency. The pure technical inefficiency comes 
from the manage?s capability, but the scale inefficiency is beyond the manager's 
capability.  So, the managers of the phase I  units can increase electricity 
generation and can decrease SO2 emission and inputs by around 43 units more 
through reorganizing the production procedure or administrative  structure 98 
efficiently(pure teclmical efficiency improvement) than through changing the 
operation scale(scale efficiency improvement). 
Figure 3.15 Mean Efficiency with Weak Disposability of Output 
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Since scale efficiency is higher than the pure technical efficiency before and 
during the Phase I period, so the mian source of inefficiency is pure technical 
inefficiency regardless of time period. This finding means that phase I generating 
units have more potential to increase to efficiency through  pure technical 
efficiency improvement than scale efficiency improvement. 99 
Even though both the scale efficiency and pure technical efficiency improved 
after 1995, the degree of pure technical efficiency improvement is greater than the 
improvement of scale efficiency in the phase I period. Therefore the efficiency 
improvement in the stronger environmental regulation period was lead by pure 
technical efficiency improvement. 
The trend of efficiency score under the strong disposability of outputs is similiar 
to the trend of the efficiency score under weak disposability. The mean efficiency 
under strong disposability  is 8% lower than the  efficiency under weak 
disposability. That is, the technology under weak disposability envelopes the data 
set more closely than the technology under strong disposability. h other words, 
the efficiency score under the weak disposability technology is better than the 
efficiency score under strong disposability technology. 
The main source of inefficiency is pure technical inefficiency regardless of 
disposability and time period. So the units have more potential to increase 
efficiency through pure technical efficiency improvement than through scale 
operation. 100 
Figure 3.16 Mean Efficiency with Strong Disposability of Output 
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3.8.1.2 Efficiency by Compliance Strategy 
The average efficiency score under weak disposability was highest  for 
generating units that use "other'  strategies aiid next highest for units using 
allowance strategy in the period between 1990 and 1999. The efficiency of 
scrubber units was third, and the efficiency of units using fuel switch strategy was 
lowest. 
If we seperate the efficiency score of each strategy group into before and during 
the phase I period, there is a big change in the efficiency ranking. The efficiency 
of the units with "other" strategy is the highest before the phase I period, the next 101 
being the allowance strategy, followed by fuel switch and scrubber. The ranking 
in the phase I period, however, is allowance-scrubber-fuel switch-"other" units. In 
the stronger SO2 emission regulation, the efficiency of the units with allowance 
and scrubber is high, but the efficiency of the units with fuel switch and "other" 
strategy is relatively low. The units using an allowance strategy maintained the 
high ranking in the efficiency, but the units with "other" strategy fell in the 
ranking during the whole period. 
Table 3.5 Mean Efficiency by Compliance Strategy 
weak disposability of output  Jstrong disposability of output 
scale  pure tech  scale pure tech
efficiency  efficiency  efficienc  efficiency  efficiency  efficiency 
1990-99 
allowance  69.37003  18.84999  50.5200  72.30474  20.40394  51.90080 
Other  62.29263  6.46950  55.8231  65.17050  7.43188  57.73863 
scrubber  89.56249  42.81857  46.74392  104.10613  49.33470  54.77143 
Switch  99.46046  20.10674  79.3537  108.52914  20.78584  87.74330 
1990-94 
allowance  85.88892  18.07387  67.8150  92.59419  21.74698  70.84721 
Other  15.13375  5.34900  9.7847  15.39175  5.33650  10.05525 
scrubber  103.87695  57.44771  46.4292  123.13419  64.80095  58.33324 
Switch  94.85612  18.79561  76.06051  110.60272  19.87537  90.72735 
1995-99 
allowance  56.64765  19.44773  37.1999  56.67839  19.36956  37.30883 
other  109.45150  7.59000  101.8615(  114.94925  9.52725105.42200 
scrubber  76.14268  29.10375  47.0389  86.26732  34.83509  51.43223 
switch  105.02562  21.69147  83.33411  106.02285  21.88630  84.13655 102 
The major source of inefficiency is pure technical inefficiency except for the 
units with scrubber in the pre-phase I peirod. The main source of inefficiency in 
the phase I period is pure technical inefficiency for every compliance strategy. 
The ranking of the efficiency score under strong disposability is same as the 
ranking of the efficiency score under weak disposability regardless of time period. 
And the main source of inefficiency is the same as the main sources under weak 
disposability. 
The common finding in the efficiency of each compliance strategy is that the 
efficiency of the units using an allowance strategy is relatively high before and 
during the phase I period, while the efficiency of the units using scrubber is the 
next highest in the Phase I period. The main source of inefficiency is pure 
technical inefficiency regardless of disposability and time period. 
Table 3.6 Most Efficient Units Numbers by Strategy Under Weak Disposability 
strategy  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
allowance  1  2  2  2  0  12  11  12  11  14 
"other"  4  3  5  4  3  1  2  2  3  2 
scrubber  0  1  3  3  3  5  4  5  4  5 
switch  15  17  14  15  9  6  2  3  6  3 
suni  20  23  24  24  15  24  19  22  24  24 
Approximately 12%(around 24 units each year) of the total number of units 
consisted of the frontier units which had efficiency score of zero each year. 
Before 1995, over half of the frontier units were from units using a fuel switch 103 
strategy, during the phase I period most of the frontier units were from units using 
an allowance strategy. The number of the units with fuel switch and "other" 
strategy that are on the frontier technology declined in the phase I period, but the 
number of the units with allowance and scrubber strategy that are in the frontier 
technology increased. 
The proportion of electricity generation that was produced by the generating 
units in the range of the constant returns to scale increased continuously from 7% 
in 1990 to around 12% in 1999. But the proportion of the increasing returns to 
scale also decreased continuously from 36% in 1990 to 23% in 1999. The 
proportion of the decreasing returns to scale increased from 57% in 1990 to 64% 
in 1999. The decline in the proportion of increasing returns to scale overweighted 
the increase in the proportion of constant returns to scale. Over half of the 
electricity generation was produced by units that were in the range of decreasing 
returns to scale. Since the proportion of the electricity generation of the units that 
were in the range of increasing returns to scale and constant returns to scale 
declined, there was an exhaustion of economies of scale in the 1 990s. So, this 
finding implies that the efficiency of the phase I plants can improve if they 
decrease their operating scale. 
The mean electricity generation of the units in the increasing returns to scale was 
the lowest, while the units in the constant returns to sclae was next. The highest 
mean electricity generation was achieved by units in the range of decreasing 104 
returns to scale. This finding is consistent with the general trend in production 
economics. Generally, since regulated industry is not characterized by constant 
returns to scale, failure to account for scale effects will lead to biased productivity 
measurement(Cowing et a!, 1981). The efficiency of the units that are located in 
the region of constant returns to scale is almost 20 times the efficiency of 
decreasing returns to scale. So, if we ignore the scale effects, the efficiency 
measurement will be distorted. The mean efficiency of the units in the range of 
constant returns to scale is the highest, and the efficiency of the units in the range 
of increasing returns to scale is next. 
Table 3.7 Efficiency and Returns to Scale Technology 
mean 
tech- scale  pure tech  total electricity  electricity  ratio 
generation( 
year  nology  efficiency  efficiency  efficiency  generation(MWh)  MWh)  (%) 
1990  CRS  0.000  0.000  0.000  25,873257  1,293,663  0.07 
1990  DRS  152.282  44.120  108.162  211,556,459  2,898,034  0.57 
1990  IRS  74.399  14.950  59.449  133,727,755  1,152,825  0.36 
1991  CRS  0.000  0.000  0.000  29,891,377  1,299,625  0.08 
1991  DRS  139.717  32.298  107.419  220,778,727  2,867,256  0.61 
1991  IRS  72.798  11.130  61.668  111,651,794  1,024,328  0.31 
1992  CRS  5.204  0.000  5.204  35,427,011  1,417,080  0.10 
1992  DRS  155.578  57.019  98.559  199,918,078  3,029,062  0.55 
1992  IRS  75.665  12.045  63.621  126,485,650  1,071,912  0.35 
1993  CRS  8.296  0.000  8.296  36,825,787  1,416,376  0.10 
1993  DRS  134.207  48.103  86.104  204,374,268  2,878,511  0.57 
1993  IRS  67.692  10.281  57.410  118,255,159  1,055,850  0.33 
1994  CRS  6.381  0.000  6.381  22,892,458  1,430,779  0.07 
1994  DRS  145.599  40.917  104.681  211,329,206  2,780,647  0.60 
1994  IRS  66.650  12.124  54.526  115,834,033  990,034  0.33 
1995  CRS  4.675  0.000  4.675  42,507,050  1,771,127  0.12 
1995  DRS  134.876  47.861  87.016  219,372,040  2,812,462  0.62 105 
1995  IRS  67.645  8.662  58.983  89,823,610  839,473  0.26 
1996  CRS  22.157  0.000  22.157  36,712,543  1,668,752  0.10 
1996  DRS  142.653  41.398  101.256  223,380,811  2,901,049  0.60 
1996  IRS  59.624  10.466  49.159  114,756,461  1,043,241  0.31 
1997  CRS  0.011  0.000  0.011  45,806,969  1,991,607  0.12 
1997  DRS  132.747  42.337  90.410  245,701,678  2,613,848  0.64 
1997  IRS  54.000  9.517  44.483  90,782,004  986,761  0.24 
1998  CRS  4.212  0.000  4.212  50,411,044  2,016,442  0.13 
1998  DRS  138.295  40.417  97.879  247,936,006  2,817,455  0.63 
1998  IRS  55.550  7.207  48.343  92,984,337  968,587  0.24 
1999  CRS  11.412  4.091  7.321  47,595,440  1,903,818  0.12 
1999  DRS  122.071  35.824  86.247  253,175,700  2,876,997  0.64 
1999  IRS  51 .294  6.861  44.433  92,187,392  960,285  0.23 
mean  CRS  6.281  0.447  5.835  373,942,936  1,632,939  0.10 
mean  DRS  139.127  42.647  96.480  2,237,522,973  2,839,496  0.61 
mean  IRS  65.140  10.478  54.662  1,086,488,195  1,012,571  0.29 106 
3.8.2 Productivity Change 
3.8.2.1 Productivity Change by Time Period 
When we measure the Luenberger productivity indicator under the weak 
disposability of output using the symmetric directional vector(g=-1, g=1, g,=-l) 
in  the 1990-1999 period, the average annual productivity of the 209 phase I 
generating units improved. There were productivity decline only in two time 
periods(1992/93,  1996/97),  but  the remaining time  periods  showed the 
productivity growth. Furthermore, the two time periods with productivity decline 
have a common feature that the magnitude of technological decline is greater(five 
times) than the positive efficiency growth. 
Table 3.8 Productivity Change under Weak Disposability 
scale  pure tech.
efficiency efficiency efficiency technological productivity
year  change  change  change  change  change
1990/91  7.49364  -2.26411  5.22388  0.94885  6.18239 
1991/92  -6.72325  3.46522  -3.25416  22.79684  19.52847 
1992/93  3.02861  6.49053  9.51880  -10.97895  -1.45794 
1993/94  -0.64421  -7.20191  -7.84804  78.28129  70.43129 
1994/95  -0.95751  5.86249  4.90244  31 .86866  36.76306 
1995/96  1.63789  -2.40301  -0.76612  6.75124  5.97541 
1996/97  -2.72904  4.93368  2.20641  -40.78498  -38.57651 
1997/98  2.66292  -3.43593  -0.77507  9.00431  8.23129 
1998/99  1.60354  6.32139  7.92522  -5.78019  2.15177 
mean(1990-99)  0.59695  1.30759  1.90371  10.23412  12.13658 
mean(1990-94)  0.78870  0.12243  0.91012  22.76201  23.67105 
mean(1995-99)  0.79383  1.35403  2.14761  -7.70240  -5.55451 107 
Both the efficiency growth and the technological growth contributed to the 
productivity growth in the whole period, but the magnitude of technological 
growth contribution was greater than the degree of efficiency growth. So during 
the whole time period, the main source of productivity growth came from 
technological growth. 
Figure 3.17 Luenberger Productivity Change under Weak Disposability of Output 
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When we decompose the efficiency growth into scale efficiency growth and pure 
technical efficiency growth, we find that both the scale efficiency and  pure 
technical efficiency improved, but the pure technical growth was greater than the scale efficiency growth. Therefore, the main source of efficiency growth was pure 
technical efficiency improvement rather than the scale efficiency growth. 
There was a high degree of productivity improvement before the phase I period 
since both the efficiency and the technology improved. In particular, the main 
source of productivity growth before the phase I period was technological growth. 
However, there was a productivity decline in the phase I period since the negative 
technological change was greater than the positive efficiency growth even though 
the productivity decline was small in terms of magnitude. The productivity 
change was affected mainly by the technological decline in phase I period. The 
main source of productivity growth in phase I period was efficiency growth. One 
interesting finding was that the productivity change was affected mainly by the 
technological change regardless of the time period. 
There was a big technological improvement between 1993 and 1995, but there 
was a technological decline between 1996 and 1997. This fact may come from the 
fact that the bad output(S02 emission) and some inputs(fuel consumption, labor 
input) decreased between 1993 and 1995 even though the good output(electricity 
generation) decreased at the lower degree in the same period. So the frontier 
production technology improved during the 1993-1995 period. However, there 
was a big increase of fuel consumption between 1995 and 1996 even though there 
was an increase in electricity generation in the same time period. But the 
magnitude of that electricity generation increase was less than the magnitude of 109 
the fuel consumption increase. Moreover, the previous time period(from 1993 to 
1995) showed major technology improvements. Summing up statement, there was 
a big technological decline in 1996/97 time period. This fact means that the phase 
I generating units changed their technologies two years before the beginning of 
phase I environmental regulation. 
The scale efficiency and the pure technical efficiency showed positive growth in 
both the pre- and phase I period when we decompose the efficiency growth into 
scale efficiency growth and pure technical efficiency growth. The contribution of 
scale efficiency growth to the efficiency growth was greater than the pure 
technical growth before the phase I period, but the contribution of pure technical 
efficiency growth was greater than that of the scale efficiency growth during the 
phase I period. In short, the main source of efficiency growth was scale efficiency 
growth in the pre-phase I period and pure technical efficiency growth in the phase 
I period. 
Table 3.9 Non-Parametric Test for Productivity between pre- and phase I period 
Wilcoxo  Kolmogoro
ANOVA  n  Kruskal- Median  Van-der- v-
test  test  Wallis  test  Waerden  Savage  Smirnov 
F  Z  chi-square chi-square  Z  Z  KSa 
(prob>F)  (prob>Z) (prob>chi)  (prob>chi)  (prob>Z)  (prob>Z) (prob>KSa)
1.1 productivi
statistics 
ty under WD 
7.81  -0.1101  0.0122  0.0859  0.3479  1.4326  1.027144 
probability  0.0054  0.4562  0.912  0.3847  0.364  0.076  0.242 
1.2 productivi
statistics 
ty under SD 
1.6703  -2.7988  7.8356  -3.2243  -2.6413  -2.4305  1.907552 
probability  0.1969  0.0026  0.0051  0.0006  0.0041  0.0075  0.0014 110 
The productivity in phase I period declined, but the magnitude of the decline(-
5.6) was small relatively compared with the magnitude of the productivity 
improvement in the pre-phase I period(23.7). So to test the hypothesis that the 
cumulative productivity indicator in the pre-phase I period(1990-1994) is the 
same as the cumulative productivity indicator in the phase I period, we used a 
non-parameteric test in SAS program. Since we can not reject the null hypothesis 
at 10% significance level, the productivity decline in the phase I period was not 
significantly different from the productivity growth in the pre-phase I period. 
Table 3.10 Productivity Change under Strong Disposability 
1990/91 
scale 
efficiency 
change 
0.50330 
pure tech. 
efficiency 
change 
4.25871 
efficiency technological 
change  change 
4.76191  1.71354 
productivity 
change 
6.47316 
1991/92  -7.93426  6.82699  -1.10694  -1.84828  -2.96172 
1992/93 
1993/94 
8.34512 
-10.44163 
6.09474 
-1.50421 
14.43885 
-11.93847 
-14.62316 
12.68383 
-0.18086 
0.74048 
1994/95  4.35306  11 .09909  15.45517  -25.30440  -9.85407 
1995/96  0.25072  -2.39804  -2.14928  13.89699  11.74813 
1996/97  -3.07612  6.83900  3.76435  -6.96818  -3.20670 
1997/98  3.51368  -3.41167  0.09756  6.59569  6.69986 
1998/99  0.42392  6.72675  7.14971  1.59019  8.69861 
mean(1990-99) 
mean(1990-94) 
-0.45136 
-2.38187 
3.83682 
3.91906 
3.38587 
1.53884 
-1.36264 
-0.51852 
2.01743 
1.01776 
mean(1995-99)  0.27805  1.93901  2.21559  3.77867  5.98498 
When we measured the productivity change under strong disposability, there 
was also productivity improvement in both the pre-phase and phase I periods, 
even though there wase productivity decline in four time periods. The main 111 
source of productivity growth was efficiency growth which was contrary to the 
finding of the main source under weak disposability. We tested the null 
hypothesis that the productivity change in the pre-phase I period was the same as 
the productivity change in phase I period using nonparametric test. Since we 
rejected the null hypothesis at a 5% significance level, there was a productivity 
growth in phase I period under strong disposability. 
Figure3.18 Luenberger Productivity Change under Strong Disposability of Output 
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Efficiency growth was the main source of productivity growth before the phase I 
period.  The main source of productivity growth in phase  I  period was 
technological growth even though efficiency showed growth both before and 112 
during the phase I period. The main source of productivity growth under strong 
disposability was also contrary to the main source of the productivity growth 
under weak disposability. That is, productivity improved in the stronger SO2 
emission regulation period under strong disposability, and the efficiency growth, 
especially, pure technical efficiency growth was the main source of productivity 
growth before the phase I period, and the technological development was the 
main source of productivity growth in the phase I period. 
When we compare the productivity change under weak disposability with the 
productivity growth under strong disposability, generally the productivity change 
under weak disposability was higher than the productivity change under strong 
disposability before and during the phase I period. The productivity decline under 
weak disposability was relatively greater than the productivity change under 
strong disposability in the phase I period, however. And there was a negative 
productivity change before the phase I period when we measure the productivity 
change under the weak disposability of outputs(even though it is statistically 
insignificant at 10% significance level). There was, however, productivity growth 
in the phase I period under strong disposability. This fact implies that there may 
be a distortion in the productivity change measurement when we ignore the 
characteristics of production technology like weak disposability of output. And 
there is big difference in the productivity change under weak disposability and 
under  strong  disposability.  Among the  nine  time  periods,  four  time 113 
periods(1991/29, 1993/94, 1994/95, 1996/97) showed a large distortion between 
productivity change under two different disposabilities. As a result, if we ignore 
the production tecimology characteristics, then there is a large distortion in the 
productivity change measurement. 
Figure 3.19 Luenberger Productivity Change 
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3.8.2.2 Productivity Change by Compliance Strategy 
The first finding of the productivity change by compliance strategy under weak 
disposability is  that the productivity improved in the whole period for the 
generating units using all compliance strategies except "other". The productivity 114 
growth of the generating units with scrubber strategy was the highest in the 
sample period, and the productivity growth rate of the units with allowance was 
the second. The main source of productivity growth for the generating units 
applying scrubber and fuel switch was technological growth, and the main source 
for the units using an allowance strategy was efficiency growth. In case of "other" 
strategy, both the efficiency change and the technological change declined in the 
period between 1990 and 1999. 
Table 3.11 Productivity Change by Strategy under Weak Disposability 
1990-99 
allowance 
scale 
efficiency 
change 
0.56706 
pure tech. 
efficiency 
change 
2.82630 
efficiency technological 
change  change 
3.39173  1.43614 
productivity 
change 
4.83034 
other  -1.00111  -7.40403  -8.40403  -6.62417  -1 5.04097 
scrubber  4.81103  0.41557  5.22098  88.33381  93.55763 
switch  -0.10598  1.12628  1.02079  1.71514  2.73227 
1990-94 
allowance  0.01 742  -0.98238  -0.96671  0.72004  -0.24520 
other  0.05563  1.55469  1.61031  -5.59250  -4.00250 
scrubber  1.05583  1.44857  2.49357  189.69310  192.19310 
switch  1.20618  0.38137  1.58863  6.60754  8.19370 
1995-99 
allowance  1.67274  0.72579  2.39695  5.61314  8.01509 
other  -1.68781  9.12781  7.43844  0.68031  8.12063 
scrubber  3.45876  -1.87124  1.58404  -101.60090  -100.02236 
switch  -0.35876  1.98543  1.62840  1.91315  3.53904 
Second, the productivity of the units with scrubber and fuel switch showed 
growth, but the units using allowance and "other" strategy showed declines in the 
pre-phase I period. This may come from the fact that the electricity generation of 115 
the units with all strategies except for "other" was constant in the pre-phase I 
period, but the electricity generation of the units with "other" strategy declined to 
half of 1990's level. The main source of productivity growth in the pre-phase I 
period was technological development except for the units with "other" strategy. 
Third, only the generating units applying the scrubber strategy showed a 
productivity decline since there was a big technological decline. All the remaining 
strategies, however, showed productivity growth in the phase I period. This 
finding may come from the fact that units with scrubber decreased lots of SO2 
emissions before the phase I period(1993-1994), and could not catch up with the 
technological growth lead by the units using an allowance strategy. The 
productivity of the units with allowance and "other" strategy changed from a 
decline in the pre-phase I period to an improvement in the phase I period. The 
units with fuel switch showed productivity improvement regardless of time 
period. The main source of productivity growth for the units with fuel switch and 
allowance strategy was technological change, but the source for the units with 
"other" strategies was efficiency growth. 
We test the null hypothesis that the productivity change in the pre-phase I period 
was the same as the productivity change during the phase I period by using a 
nonparametric test. We reject the null hypothesis of same productivity change for 
the units with allowance and fuel switch strategy, but can not reject the hypothesis 
for the units with scrubber and "other" strategy. This test means that we can not 116 
say that the productivity of the units with scrubber declined in the phase I period, 
and that the productivity of the units with "other" strategy increased duringin the 
phase I period. As a result, the productivity of the units using all compliance 
strategies except for "other" strategy improved, while the units with "other" 
strategy showed a decline in productivity during the phase I period. 
Table 3.12 Productivity Change by Strategy under Strong Disposability 
scale  pure tech. 
1990-99 
allowance 
efficiency 
change 
0.14090 
efficiency 
change 
4.13774 
efficiency technological 
change  change 
4.27902  1.01425 
productivity 
change 
5.28022 
other  -1 .22889  -7.27250  -8.48458  -11.68972  -20.20458 
scrubber  2.80103  3.24464  6.04727  -0.69093  5.34428 
switch  -1 .43469  4.57885  3.14315  -2.30410  0.84110 
1990-94 
allowance  -2.49579  2.02710  -0.46476  -0.32091  -0.78937 
other  -0.08875  1.83719  1.74844  -5.71125  -3.98281 
scrubber  -1 .60226  0.26476  -1 .33131  -0.80595  -2.14893 
switch  -2.61724  5.73605  3.11853  -0.21827  2.90113 
1995-99 
allowance  1.55491  0.84399  2.39741  6.70305  9.07902 
other  -1.70063  10.12969  8.43344  -1.03500  7.39750 
scrubber  2.55225  1.08416  3.63191  2.03180  5.65146 
switch  -1 .16354  2.38641  1.22163  2.09990  3.32253 
The productivity change under strong  disposability was similar  to  the 
productivity change under weak disposability. The productivity change of "other" 
strategy declined during the whole period since both the efficiency change and the 
technological change declined. The productivity of the units with all compliance 
strategies declined in pre-phase I period, but improved in phase I period. The 117 
main source of productivity growth was efficiency growth for the units applying 
fuel switch and "other" strategy in the pre-phase I period. In the phase I period, 
however, efficiency growth was also the main source of productivity growth for 
units using "other" and scrubber strategy. 
There are several interesting findings when we compare the productivity change 
under weak disposability and strong disposability. First, the productivity growth 
of the units using all compliance strategies except for "other" strategy was 
positive, but the productivity growth of the units with "other" strategy was 
negative regardless of disposability during the whole time penod(1990-1999). 
Second, the productivity growth of the units with scrubber strategy was the 
highest regardless of disposability in the 1990s. Third, the productivity growth of 
the units applying an allowance and "other" strategy changed from a decline in 
the pre-phase I period to an increase in the phase I period. Fourth, in the phase I 
period, the main source of productivity growth was efficiency growth for units 
applying "other" and scrubber strategies. While the main source for the units 
using allowance and fuel switching strategy was technological change. 118 
3.8.3 Effect of SO2 Emission Regulation on Productivity Change 
3.8.3.1 Opportunity Cost of SO2 Emission Regulation 
The opportunity cost of SO2 emission regulation in the sample period was 7.28. 
This number means that if units could dispose the  SO2 emission freely each 
generating unit could increase electricity generation by 7.28 MWh, decrease the 
SO2 emission by 7.28 tons and decrease the inputs by 7.28 units(7.28 MW of 
generating capacity, 7.28 mmBTU of fuel consumption, 7.28 person of labor). 
The opportunity cost of  SO2 emission regulation derived from pure technical 
efficiency was greater than that derived from scale efficiency. This finding means 
that units can adjust the good output, bad output, and inputs more through pure 
technical efficiency improvement than through scale efficiency improvement. 
Table 3.13 Opportunity Cost of SO2 emission Regulation 
year 
1990 
scale 
efficiency 
1.71201 
pure tech 
efficiency 
13.12833 
efficiency 
14.84033 
1991  3.45928  11.66144  15.12072 
1992  3.80526  9.39019  13.19545 
1993  -3.22029  11.54493  8.32464 
1994  6.49388  5.93048  12.42435 
1995  -0.05507  1.71837  1.66330 
1996  0.68067  2.36225  3.04292 
1997  1.23837  0.46727  1.70565 
1998  0.34837  0.48225  0.83062 
1999  1.52799  0.07689  1.60488 
mean(90-99) 
mean(90-94) 
mean(95-99) 
1 .59905 
2.45003 
0.74807 
5.67624 
10.33107 
1.02141 
7.27529 
12.78110 
1.76947 119 
The opportunity cost of SO2 emission regulation in the phase I period(1 .77), that 
is, the difference in the efficiency score under strong disposability of output and 
the efficiency score under weak disposability, was around one seventh of the 
opportunity cost before the phase I period(12.78). Because of the stronger  SO2 
regulation, the difference in the efficiency score between strong disposability and 
weak disposability of output became small. We imposed two different kinds of 
disposability only for the good output and bad output, but imposed one kind of 
disposability(strong disposability) for the inputs. In other words, the opportunity 
to increase electricity generation and to decrease SO2 emission declined under the 
current technology when the stronger  SO2 emission regulation was introduced. 
This fact means that the extent to which generating units could increase the good 
output and decrease the bad output in the phase I period was smaller than the 
extent they could do so during the pre-phase I period. This is because the frontier 
production technology under strong disposability and the weak disposability of 
the output in phase I period moved closer than before the phase I period. In terms 
of economic meaning, the potential to increase electricity generation and to 
decrease  SO2 emission declined during Phase I period comparing with the 
potential before Phase I period. This means that electric units needed more input 
or more productive production technology to increase electricity generation and to 
decrease  SO2 emission in the Phase I period compared to the pre-phase I period 120 
since the generating units used the resource more efficiently in the stronger 
environmental regulation. 
Figure 3.20 Opportunity Cost(indicator) of SO2 Emission Regulation 
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The opportunity cost derived from pure technical efficiency was greater than the 
opportunity cost derived from scale efficiency before and during Phase I period. 
This finding means that the electric generating units can increase more electricity 
generation and decrease more SO2 emission through the improvement of pure 
technical efficiency than through the improvement of scale efficiency. This 
finding was consistent with the source of inefficiency in the previous section. 
That is, the main source of inefficiency was pure technical inefficiency both 121 
before and during the Phase I period regardless of disposabilities. In other words, 
there was more opportunity to increase electricity generation and to decrease SO2 
emission through the improvement of pure technical efficiency than through the 
improvement of scale efficiency. 
Table 3.14 Opportunity Cost of SO2 Emission Regulation by Strategy 
scale  pure technical 
strategy 
1990-99 
efficiency  efficiency  efficiency 
allowance  1.55395  1.38076  2.93471 
"other"  0.96238  1.91550  2.87788 
scrubber  6.51613  8.02751  14.54364 
switch  0.67910  8.38958  9.06868 
1990-94 
allowance  3.67311  3.03216  6.70527 
'other"  -0.01250  0.27050  0.25800 
scrubber  7.35324  11 .90400  19.25724 
switch  1.07976  14.66684  15.74660 
1995-99 
allowance  -0.07817  0.10890  0.03073 
"other"  1.93725  3.56050  5.49775 
scrubber  5.73134  4.39330  10.12464 
switch  0.19483  0.80240  0.99723 
In the 1990-99 period, the opportunity cost of the units applying scrubber was 
the greatest among the four strategies, followed by units with fuel switch, then 
allowance, and finally "other" strategies. The opportunity cost of the units with 
scrubber was also the greatest before and during the Phase I period. In other 
words, the units with scrubber could increase electricity generation and decrease 
SO2 emission more than units applying any of the other strategies under the 122 
current technology. That is, the units with scrubber could increase electricity 
generation and decrease  SO2 emission and inputs without introducing more 
productive production technology. The opportunity cost of the units with "other" 
strategy was the lowest before the Phase I period, but marked second in the Phase 
I period. The ranking of the opportunity cost of the units with fuel switch was 
second before the Phase I period, but fell to third in the Phase I period. We can 
infer that the units with scrubber and "other" strategy could decrease more  SO2 
emission and increase more electricity generation in the Phase I period than units 
applying allowance and fuel switch strategy under the current technology. 
The main source of the opportunity cost in the pre-phase I period was pure 
technical efficiency for all strategies except the allowance strategy. Similarly, in 
the phase I period, pure technical efficiency was the main source of the 
opportunity cost for all compliance strategies except for those units employing 
scrubber. In particularly, the main source of the opportunity cost for the units 
applying scrubber is scale efficiency even though the degree of scale efficiency 
was almost same as the degree of pure technical efficiency. This finding may 
come from the fact that the units with scrubber are in the decreasing returns to 
scale range since these units are big in terms of electricity generation and 
generating capacity. As a result, the units with scrubber can increase more 
electricity  generation  and  decrease  SO2  emission mainly through  scale 
adjustment. 123 
3.8.3.2 Effect of SO2 Emission Regulation on Productivity Growth Potential 
The effect of SO2 emission regulation on the productivity growth potential iss 
defined as the difference in the productivity growth under strong disposability of 
good output and bad output and the productivity growth under weak disposability 
of good output and bad output. The mean effect of SO2 emission regulation on the 
productivity growth potential showed negative value during the the whole 
period(1990-1999) and pre-phase I period(1990-1994). This negative value means 
that the environmental regulation reduce the productivity growth potential in 
1 990s. But there was a positive value of effect in the phase I period which means 
that the  SO2 emission regulation showed positive productivity growth potential. 
That is, the productivity growth under the stronger environmental regualtion may 
be low, or productivity under the strong environmental regulation declined more 
relativel to the productivity growth under weak environmental regulation. 
In the pre-phase I period, three time periods showed a negative value of effect, 
and two time periods showed a positive value of effect on productivity growth 
potential. The finding that the mean value of the effect in the pre-phase I period 
was negative(-22.65) means that each generating unit could improve  its 
productivity by 22.65 units more under the restriction of bad output disposability 
than under the free disposability of bad output. This finding also means that the 
extent of the environmental regulation in the pre-phase I period is actually binding 
on the productivity growth. This finding may come from the fact that there is a 124 
big technological improvement in 1992/93 and 1993/94 periods. The phase I 
generating units reduced lots of SO2 emission during 1993-95 period to prepare 
phase I emission regulation in advance. Since our model incorporates the 
reduction of bad output, there may be a big technological improvement in these 
periods. 
Table 3.15 Effect of SO2 emission Regulation on Productivity Growth Potential 
1990/91 
scale 
efficiency 
change 
-6.99033 
pure tech. 
efficiency 
change 
6.52282 
efficiency technological 
change  change 
-0.46196  0.76469 
productivity 
change 
0.29077 
1991/92  -1.21100  3.36177  2.14722  -24.64512  -22.49019 
1992/93  5.31651  -0.39579  4.92005  -3.64421  1.27708 
1993/94  -9.79742  5.69770  -4.09043  -65.59746  -69.69081 
1994/95  5.31057  5.23660  10.55273  -57.17306  -46.61713 
1995/96  -1 .38718  0.00498  -1 .38316  7.14574  5.77273 
1996/97  -0.34708  1.90531  1.55794  33.81679  35.36981 
1997/98 
1998/99 
mean(1990-99) 
mean(1990-94) 
mean(1995-99) 
0.85077 
-1.17962 
-1.04831 
-3.17056 
-0.51578 
0.02426 
0.40536 
2.52922 
3.79663 
0.58498 
0.87263 
-0.77550 
1.48217 
0.62872 
0.06798 
-2.40861 
7.37038 
-11.59676 
-23.28053 
11.48108 
-1 .53144 
6.54684 
-10.11915 
-22.65329 
11.53949 
The main source of productivity growth potential was efficiency change in the 
pre-phase I period. In other words, there is a positive productivity growth 
potential from efficiency improvement. Moreover, the generating units could 
improve their productivity change mainly through efficiency improvement if there 
was no environmental regulation. 125 
However, the finding that the effect of  SO2  emission regulation on the 
productivity growth potential in phase I period was positive(1 1.54) means that the 
SO2 emission regulation is not actually binding on the productivity change 
comparing to pre-phase I period. So, if there was no strong environmental 
regulation in the phase I period, the 209 generating units could improve their 
productivity change by 11.54 units of indicator. That is, the generating units 
would have been able to increase 11.54MW more electricity generation per each 
unit annually. 
The main source of the potential productivity growth is the technological change 
in the phase I period, even though efficiency change also had a potentially 
positive effect on productivity growth. If there was no strong environmental 
regulation in the phase I period, the phase I generating units could improve the 
productivity growth mainly through technological improvement. 
We test the hypothesis that the effect of SO2 emission regulation on the 
productivity growth potential in pre-phase I period was the same as the effect in 
the phase I period by using a non-parametric test. We reject the null hypothesis at 
a 1% significance level. So the effect of SO2 emission regulation in the phase I 
period was different from the effect in the phase I period. As a result, while there 
is a productivity growth potential derived from technological development in 
phase I period, there is a potential derived from efficiency improvement in pre-
phase I period. 126 
Table 3.16 Non-Parametric Test for Effect of SO2 emission Regulation on 
Productivity Growth Potential between Pre- and Phase I period 
Kolmogoro
ANOVA  Wilcoxon  Kruskal- Median  Van-der- v-
test  test  Wallis  test  Waerden  Savage  Smirnov 
F  Z  chi-square chi-square  Z  Z  KSa 
(prob>F)  (prob>Z)  (prob>chi)  (prob>chi)  (prob>Z)  (prob>Z) (prob>KSa)
effect of S02 
statistics  10.082  -4.5035  20285  -5  -4.4591  -2.1149  3.081431 
probability  0.0016  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0172  0.0001 
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The mean effect of  SO2 emission regulation between 1990 and 1999 was 
negative except for the units applying the allowance strategy. So the phase I 
generating units with scrubber, fuel switch, and "other" strategies could increase 
their electricity generation and decrease the SO2 emission and inputs despite 
strong environmental regulation. The finding that the effect of SO2 emission 
regulation on the technological change was negative for all kinds of compliance 
strategies means that the phase I units could increase productivity growth mainly 
through efficiency change improvement, not through technological improvement. 
The effect of SO2 emission regulation in the pre-phase I period was negative for 
the units except for units with "other" strategy. This finding means that only the 
units with "other" strategy were affected by the environmental regulation in the 
pre-phase I period. This finding may come from the fact that the units with 
"other" strategy decreased lots of SO2 emission compared with units applying 
other compliance strategies before the phase I period. The finding that the effect 
of SO2 regulation on technological growth potential is negative for all compliance 
strategies means that the units could increase the productivity growth mainly 
through efficiency improvement rather than technological development in pre-
phase I period. 
In the phase I period, the productivity change of the units using the scrubber and 
allowance strategies were affected by the SO2 emission regulation, but the units 
using "other" and fuel switch strategy were not actually affected by the SO2 128 
emission regulation relatively. In particular, the effect of SO2 emission regulation 
was binding on the productivity growth of units using scrubber and allowance 
through binding on the technological change. On the efficiency change side, the 
502 emission  regulation was binding on the  pure  technical  efficiency 
improvement. As a result, the production technology improvement for the units 
applying the scrubber strategy in the phase II period will be the biggest effect on 
productivity growth potential in the U.S electricity industry. 
Table 3.17 Effect of SO2 emission Regulation on Strategy's Productivity Growth 
Potential 
scale  pure tec. 
efficiency  efficiency  efficiency  technological  productivity 
1990-99 
allowance 
change 
-0.42616 
change 
1.31145 
change 
0.88729 
change 
-0.42190 
change 
0.44988 
other  -0.22778  0.13153  -0.08056  -5.06556  -5.16361 
scrubber  -2.01000  2.82907  0.82629  -89.02474  -88.21335 
switch  -1.32871  3.45257  2.12236  -4.01925  -1.89117 
1990-94 
allowance  -2.51321  3.00948  0.50194  -1.04095  -0.54417 
other  -0.14438  0.28250  0.13813  -0.11875  0.01969 
scrubber  -2.65810  -1.18381  -3.82488  -190.49905  -194.34202 
switch  -3.82342  5.35468  1 .52989  -6.82581  -5.29256 
1995-99 
allowance  -0.11784  0.11820  0.00046  1.08991  1.06393 
other  -0.01281  1.00188  0.99500  -1.71531  -0.72313 
scrubber  -0.90652  2.95539  2.04787  103.63270  105.67382 
switch  -0.80478  0.40098  -0.40677  0.18674  -0.21651 129 
We test  the hypothesis that  the SO2 emission regulation effect on the 
productivity growth potential in the pre-phase I period was the same as the effect 
in the phase I period for each compliance strategy. We reject the null hypothesis 
for all strategies except for "other" strategies. While there is evidence that the SO2 
emission regulation affected the productivity growth potential of the units using 
scrubber, fuel switch and allowance strategies, the SO2 emission regulation did 
not affect  the productivity growth potential of the units applying "other" 
strategies. 
Table 3.18 Non-Parametric Test for Effect of SO2 emission Regulation on 
Productivity Growth Potential by Compliance Strategy between Pre- and Phase I 
period 
ANOVA  Wilcoxon  Kruskal- Median  Van-der- Kolmogorov-
test  test  Wallis  test  Waerden  Savage  Smirnov
 
F  Z  chi-squarechi-square  Z  Z  KSa
 
(prob>F)  (prob>Z)  (prob>chi) (prob>chi)  (prob>Z)  (prob>Z)  (prob>KSa)

1. allowance 
statistics  0.0255  -1.7436  3.0412  -2.2213  -1.2429  3.8893  4.428136 
probability 
2. "other" 
0.8731  0.0406  0.0812  0.0132  0.1069  0.0001  0.0001 
statistics  0.0807  1.3312  1.7906  1.6595  1.1341  -0.8006  1.75 
probability  0.7773  0.0916  0.1809  0.0485  0.1284  0.2117  0.0044 
3. scrubber 
statistics  10.6772  -1.6513  2.7318  -1.4432  -2.1452  -2.5624  1.285552 
probability  0.0013  0.0493  0.0984  0.0745  0.016  0.0052  0.0734 
4. switch 
statistics  17.8836  5.4807  30.0399  6.7032  4.6969  -0.5942  4.844246 
probability  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.2762  0.0001 130 
3.9 Discussion 
We used the directional technology distance function to measure the productivity 
change, opportunity cost of  SO2 emission regulation, and the effect of SO2 
emission regulation on the productivity growth potential of the 209 phase I 
generating units before and during phase I period using symmetric directional 
vector. 
There is more potential to increase efficiency through pure technical efficiency 
improvement rather than scale efficiency improvement. The main source of 
inefficiency was pure technical inefficiency, regardless of time period and 
disposability of outputs. The generating units using allowance and  'other" 
strategies showed high efficiency in the pre-phase I period, while the units 
applying allowance and scrubber strategy showed high efficiency in the phase I 
period. 
The mean productivity of phase I generating units improved during the 1990-
1999 period, and the main source of productivity growth was technological 
change. There was a productivity growth in the pre-phase I period, and the main 
source of productivity growth was technological improvement. Under the stronger 
SO2 emission regulation in the 1995-99 period, the phase I units showed 
productivity decline, but that decline did not differ significantly from the 
productivity growth in the pre-phase I period. Efficiency improvement, especially 
the pure technical efficiency improvement, contributed to productivity growth in 131 
the phase I period. Scale efficiency improvement contributed to productivity 
growth more in the pre-phase I period than phase I period. The units using all 
compliance strategies except for "other" strategies showed productivity growth in 
the sample period. In the phase I period, all the strategies except for the scrubber 
strategy showed productivity growth. 
The opportunity cost of SO2 emission regulation, that is, the difference between 
efficiency under strong disposability of outputs and the efficiency under weak 
disposability, declined in the phase I period because of the stronger environmental 
regulation. The main source of opportunity cost decline was pure technical 
efficiency both in the pre- and phase I periods. This finding means that the 
stronger SO2 emission regulation was binding on efficiency, and the generating 
units  could  improve  the  efficiency  through  pure  technical  efficiency 
improvement. The opportunity cost of the units using scrubber and fuel switch 
strategy was high in the sample period, but the units using scrubber and "other" 
strategy showed high opportunity cost in the phase I period. So the units with 
scrubber could increase efficiency more than units using the remaining strategies. 
The effect of SO2 emission regulation on productivity growth potential showed 
negative in pre-phase I period, but showed positive value in phase I period. The 
main source of productivity growth potential is efficiency improvement in pre-
phase I period, and technological change in phase I period. This finding means 
that there is a more potential to increase productivity through technological 132 
development than through efficiency improvement in phase I period. The units 
with  scrubber  strategy  showed big number of positive  potential  from 
technological development. So the policy should be focused on the introduction of 
more productive production technology to achieve productivity growth in the 
Phase II period, especially for scrubber strategy. 133 
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Appendix 
Emissions Factor 
Table A3. Sulfur Dioxide, Nitrogen Oxide, and Carbon Dioxide Emission
Factors 
Emission 
Fuel  Boiler Type!  Factors 
Firing 
Configuration 
Sulfur 
Dioxide 
Nitrogen 
Oxides 
Carbon 
Dioxide 
Utility
Coal and Other Solid 
Fuels 
Bituminous  cyclone 
lbs per ton 
38.00 x 5 
lbs per 106
lbs per ton  Btu 
33.00  see Table A4 
fluidized bed  31.00 x 5  5.00  see Table A4 
spreader stroker  38.00 x 5  11 .00  see Table A4 
Subbituminous 
tangential 
all others 
cyclone 
38.00 x 5 
38.00 x 5 
35.00 x 5 
15.0(14) 
22.0(31) 
17.00 
see Table A4 
see Table A4 
see Table A4 
fluidized bed  31.00 x 5  5.00  see Table A4 
spreader stroker 
tangential 
35.00 x 5 
35.00 x 5 
8.80 
8.40 
see Table A4 
see Table A4 
Lignite 
all others 
cyclone 
fluidized bed 
35.00 x S 
30.00 x S 
10.00xS 
12.0(24) 
15.00 
3.60 
see Table A4 
see Table A4 
seeTableA4 
front/opposed  30.00xS  13.00  see Table A4 
spreader stroker 
tangential 
30.00 x S 
30.00 x S 
5.80 
7.10 
see Table A4 
see Table A4 
Petroleum Coke 
all others 
fluidized bed 
30.00 x 5 
39.00 x 5 
7.10(13) 
21.00 
see Table A4 
225.13 
all others  39.00 x 5  21.00  225.13 
Refuse 
Wood 
Petroleum and Other 
all types 
all types 
3.90 
0.08 
5.00 
1 .50 
199.82 
0.00 
Liquid Fuels 
Residual Oil  tangential  157.00 x S  32.00  173.72 
vertical  157.00 x S  47.00  173.72 
all others  157.00 x S  47.00  173.72 
Distillate Oil  all types  157.00 x S  24.00 
see Table 
161 .27 
Methanol 
Propane(liquis) 
all types 
all types 
see Table A5 
86.5 
A5 
19.00 
see Table 
138.15 
139.04 
Coal-Oil-Mixture  all types  see Table A5  A5  173.72 137 
Natural Gas and Other 
Gaseous Fuels 
Natural Gas and Other 
Gaseous Fuels	  tangential  0.6  170.00  116.38 
all others  0.6  280.00  116.38 
Blast Furnace Gas	  all types  950  280.00  116.38 
s : sulfur content in 
percent of weight
coal types are categorized by Btu content as
follows 
- Bituminous : greater than or equal to 9,750 Btu per pound 
-Subbituminous : equal to 7,500 to 9,750 Btu per pound 
- Lignite: less than 7,500 Btu per pound 
oil types are categorized by Btu as follows 
Heavy: greater or equal to  144,190 Btu per gallon 
- light: less than 144,190 Btu per gallon 
Table A6. Nitroaen Oxide Reduction Factors 
Reduction 
Nitrogen Oxide  EIA-767 Code(s)  EIA-860B Code(s)  Factor 
Control Technology  (Percent) 
Advanced Overfire Air  AA  30 
Alternate Burners  BF  20 
Flue Gas Recirculation  FR  FG  40 
Fluidized Bed Combustor  CF  20 
Fuel Reburning  FU  30 
Low Excess Air  LA  LE  20 
Low Nitrogen Oxide Burners  LN  LN  30 
Other(or Unspecified)  OT  OT  20 
Overfire Air  OV  OA  20 
Selective Catalytic Reduction  SR  CC  70 
Selective Catalytic Reduction 
with Low Nitrogen Oxide Burners  SR asnd LN  CC and LN  90 
Selective Noncatalytic Reduction  SN  30 
Selective Noncatalytic Reduction 
with Low Nitrogen Oxide Burners  SN and LN  50 
Slagging  SC  20 
Steam or Water Injection  SW  20 138 
I 
4. RIEGUALTORY EFFECT ON CHOICE OF COMPLIANCE 
STRATEGY OF PHASE I ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS 
4.1 Introduction 
The Clean Air Act Amendments(CAAA) of 1990 requires 261 Phase 
generating units with generating capacity of 100MW or more to reduce sulfur 
dioxide(S02) emissions to the level of 2.5 pounds per million BTU of fuel input 
in Phase  I period(1995-1999)(Winebrake at  al,  1995). The Environmental 
Protection Agency(EPA) set the target of 5.7 million tons of SO2 emissions, and 
this target was calculated by multiplying this emission rate by the average heat 
input in 1985-87 period for each unit(Carlson et al., 2000). Allowances are given 
to each generating units from EPA each year and each generating unit had to keep 
the sufficient allowances to cover the emission standard. One allowance is 
equivalent to the right to emit one ton of SO2. 
All phase I units adopted a compliance strategy to reduce SO2 emissions from a 
menu of strategies including buying additional allowances, installing a scrubber, 
fuel switching, retiring units or boiler repowering and switch to natural gas or 
low-sulfur oil. Phase I units reduced emissions over target level(DOE/EIA, 1997) 
in the first year(1995). Over half(136 units) units switched their fuel from high-
sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal(fuel-switch strategy) because of cost advantege. The 
estimated cost of fuel switch($ 113/ton of SO2 removal annually) is lower than 
that of scrubber($322/ton)(Ellerman et al,1997). 139 
Since the 1990 CAAA introduced the market-based system of tradable pollution 
permit for SO2 emission reduction, the electric units can choose the least-cost 
strategy to comply with SO2 emission reduction. Since each electric unit and each 
compliance strategy uses different combination of inputs, the abatement cost 
differs among strategy and generating units. So the choice of compliance strategy 
depends on the characteristics of each electric unit. If one unit that can decrease 
the SO2 emission over the emission rate standard at lower cost than allowance 
price, then the unit can sell surplus allowances. And the units of which marginal 
abatement cost(MAC) is higher than allowance price can buy allowances. So the 
CAAA of 1990 gave the electricity industry the flexibility to choose the 
compliance strategy. 
However, the electric utility may not achieve the least-cost compliance strategy 
because of inappropriate regulatory regime, uncertainty and etc. Some state public 
utility commission(PUC) restricted the choice of strategy, fuel and allowance 
trade through raw or guideline. For example, high-sulfur coal producing states 
worried about the job loss in coal mines, and the public utility commission or the 
legislative body made or tried guideline/rules to encourage the electric units to use 
in-state high-sulfur coal. These regulations will affect the compliance strategy 
choice, and the compliance cost will be higher than least-cost. 
Environmental economists are interesting in the success of this policy since the 
phase I provides a test of the economic theory of environmental policy. Only one 140 
study estimated regulatory effects on strategy choices(Arimura, 2002). However, 
this study focused only on the effect of state public utility commissions regulation 
and high-sulfur coal usage encouragement, but ignored other types of regulation. 
Moreover, it considered only two strategies of allowance and fuel switch. 
The goal of this paper is to identify the factors affecting the compliance strategy 
choices including regulatory effect in phase I period. Since all of the phase I 
generating units chose one strategy out of several available strategies, we use 
multinomial logit model to find factors. We use generating unit's level data for 
1995-99 since the SO2 emission regulation is applied to the generating unit, not to 
the the electric plant. 141 
4.2 Literature Review 
The CAAA 1990 was preceded by several acts. There was no direct regulation 
from electricity industry until CAAA 1970 set National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards(NAAQS) for  six  pollutants  in 274 air  quality control regions 
(DOE/EIA,1994,EPA,2001). The CAAA 1970 introduced the New Source 
Performance Standards(NSPS) that applied to coal-fired boilers built or modified 
after August 1971 and with 73 MW or greater capacity. The NSPS was 1.2 
pounds of SO2 emission per million BTU for coal-fired generators, 0.8 pounds for 
oil-fired generators. NAAQS and NSPS are still in place. The EPA imposed 
furthur regualtion that new plants built after or modified after September 1978 or 
of which capacity is 73 MW or more install emission desulfurization system 
(scrubber) under CAAA of 1977(Gollop et al, 1984), but SO2 emission standard is 
same as before standard. 
U.S electricity industry had experience of almost 20 years with limited type of 
emission trading in air pollution from 1972(Klaassen et al, 1997). This system in 
1970s and half of 1980s was evaluated as successful, and total expected cost 
saving of four systems(netting, offset, buble, banking) are from $1 billion to $13 
billion, and the aimual cost saving ranges from $100 million to $1,400 million. 
Netting system's annual cost saving was highest($53-1,230 million). Regulatory 
restrictions on trade, uncertainty on status of property right and high transaction 
cost negatively affected the cost-effectiveness of the trading system. 142 
Cronshaw et al(1996) made theoretical model for the dynamic effect of 
allowance banking on the efficiency of emission trading system with perfect 
competition and perfect foresight. Each firm will maximize the present value of 
profit subject to output, the environmental regulation and profit regulation. At 
optimal solution, permit price is not equal to marginal abatement cost(MAC) and 
allowance price exceeds MAC of scrubber or other strategies by regulatory profit 
to cover the cost of allowance purchase. If there is at least one economic agent or 
firm that are not subject to profit regulation, then the permit price is equal to 
MAC and the present value permit prices are not increasing over time, however. 
Firms will bank the permit only if permit price rises with the interest rate. But 
firms which are subject to profit regulation will bank permits even though permit 
prices rises more slowly with the rate of interest since the firm may gain in profit 
as the result of favorable regulation of permits. 
Winebrake et  al.(1995) simulated the  cost of regulatory and legislative 
intervention in the tradable permit market for 110 phase I electric plants. Direct 
intervention takes the form of restrictions on the choice of fuel, abatement 
technologies and amount of allowance trading by regulatory body. The indirect 
interventions are policy uncertainty that is the lack of clarity in future regulatory 
treatment of allowance sales and purchases, and uncertainty in utility decision 
making, technological uncertainty like the characteristics of different type of 
coals, and the economic uncertainties associated with fuel price and allowance 143 
price estimates. The MAC under the unrestricted emission trading system is 
$143/ton of  SO2  in 1995-2005 period. The emission trading within same 
utility(bubble system) increase the total production cost by 60%. The command-
and-control system increased the cost by 85% comparing with the cost under 
emission trading system. The restriction of allowance trade increased the MAC by 
240% for New York and 22% for Wisconsin. The compliance cost and allowance 
price will be stabilized at the equilibrium price($143/S02 ton) if the participation 
level is greater than 30%, where only firms with marginal cost almost equal to the 
market price are affected. And the total cost and allowance price in the range 
between 20% and 30% participation rate increases moderately. However, 
compliance cost and allowance price increase rapidly when market participation 
rate fall below 20%. 
Fullerton et al.(1997) estimated the effect of state Public Utility Commission 
(PUC)'s regulation on the cost of SO2 emission reduction using numerical model. 
The compliance cost to protect local pollution is 1.6 times that of minimum social 
costs of compliance which model utility only buy the allowances at assumed price 
of $150 to comply with the environmental regulation. When the model utility 
switches the fuel in large plant to low-sulfur coal, and install scrubber in the small 
plant, the complaince cost is 6 times that of minimum social cost. The utility only 
maximize the profit of allowance selling since the installation of scrubber and fuel 
switch cost can be compensated by the electricity price change. The cost of forced 144 
scrubbing to protetct local high-sulfur coal mining is 5 times as that of minimum 
social cost. 
Arimura(2002) estimated the effect of cost recovery regulation and the PUC 
regulation on the choice of compliance strategy of allowance strategy and fuel 
switch strategy using probit model. He used only 175 generating units out of 261 
phase I  units, and used the observations only in the first year of phase I 
period(1995). The choice set is composed of only two compliance strategy(fuel 
switch and allowance strategy) in the probit model. He assumed that the state 
PUC's rulings had uncertainty about the treatment of the allowance market and 
electric units that are regulated by state public utility commission(PUC) would 
more likely to choose self-sufficient strategy(fuel switching/blending strategy). If 
the electric units were located in five high-sulfur coal producing states, units 
would more likely to choose the allowance strategy since allowance strategy 
generally uses high-sulfur coal. These two parameters are significant at 1% 
significance level. 
Gollop et al(1984) estimated marginal abatement cost(MAC) of SO2 emission 
reduction of 56 electric utilities in 1973-79 period. They separated the time period 
into 1973-75 and 1976-79 period, and separated the U.S into five subregions. 
Since the 1976 is the first full year in which EPA's ambient air standards were to 
met by electric plants, they expected that the regulatory intensity will vary across 
sub-time period and sub-regions. The estimated MAC is from S 177/ton of SO2 145 
emission reduction for Midwest in 1973-1975 to $1022 for Northeast in 1976-
1979. The main factors affecting the differentials in MAC of SO2 emission among 
sub-time period and sub-regions were the price difference between high-sulfur 
coal and low-sulfur coal, and the differentials in the regulatory intensity. Cost 
saving will be 7.5% to 75.3% of current cost at the fixed level of SO2 emission 
and the electric plants can reduce SO2 emission by 1.3% to 3 3.2% at the fixed 
expenditure. 
Chao et al.(1993) estimated the option value of compliance strategy. Allowance 
strategy has the flexibility to adapt to uncertainty of emissions allowance demand 
while scrubber strategy does not have flexibility(irreversibility). So the allowance 
price may exceed the marginal cost of scrubber by the amount of option value. 
They considered the allowance strategy, scrubber, fuel switch and alternative 
technologies(non-coal fired electric power including renewable electric power). 
The option value is estimated as $89(using 10% of interest rate, zero drift, and a 
$40/ton of standard deviation of the change in the maximum demand price for 
allowances over a year). 
Ellerman et al.(1998) explained the reasons that the actual allowance price was 
lower than the expected price in phase I period. One factor for the allowance price 
decline is that the electric utilities complied with SO2 emission earlier than the 
beginning of phase I period. The anothet factor is that the rail road rate from PRB 
to Midwest declined because of rail road deregulation and also PRB mine-mouth 146 
prices declined derived from mining technological development. One interesting 
regulatory effect is that the existence of local government's strong SO2 emission 
regulation and the regulation to protect the high-sulfur coal mining job affect the 
choice of coal significantly. 
National Regulatory Research Institute(NRRI, 1993) figured out the possible 
regulatory type that will affect the allowance trade. Ohio, Pennsylvania and 
Kentucky introduced rule or guideline to restrict the allowance trade through by 
inappropriate treatment of allowance accounting, and pointed that this restriction 
will increase the abatement cost for electric industry. 147 
4.3 Regulatory Effect on the Choice of Compliance Startegy 
4.3.1 Choice of Compliance Startegy 
The electric power generating units can choose one or combination of strategy to 
comply with the SO2 emission reduction. "Other" strategy includes Demand Side 
Management(DSM), the  purchase of electricity  from Independent Power 
Producers(IPP) or other non-regulated power units, retiring of the unit and fuel 
switching to natural gas or low-sulfur oil. Fuel switch means that the electric 
generating units switch their fuel from cheap high-sulfur coal to expensive low-
sulfur coal. The third strategy is to install the technology to reduce the emission 
from the coal burning process. The fourth compliance strategy is to buy the right 
to emit the pollutants when the property right is well defined. This is called 
allowance purchasing strategy. 
hi a perfectly competitive market, the choice of the strategy depends on several 
factors including market situation of each input factors and the unit owners' 
expectation about the market. If the capital price is, or is expected to be relatively 
cheap comparing to the low-sulfur coal price or allowance price to achieve the 
given emission target, then the unit's owner will choose the capital intensive 
strategy of scrubber. When the low-sulfur coal price is low, or is expected to be, 
compared to the capital price or allowance price, then some units will switch their 
fuel from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal. If some units' owner expects the 
allowance price is low, then the owners will buy the allowances instead of fuel 148 
switch or scrubber strategy. Basically, each unit will choose the compliance 
strategy such that the cost of the strategy is expected to be the lowest among 
available strategies in a competitive market. So the price of inputs, and output will 
affect the choice of strategy, and other variable, like vintage of the electric unit, 
will affect the choice of compliance strategy. 
Generating units with lower MAC than allowance price at the regulated SO2 
emission level will abate SO2 emission over the emission rate, and will abate up 
to the SO2 emission level where it's own MAC is equal to the allowance price. 
These units will sell the surplus allowances in the allowance market or bank them. 
So these units can reduce the abatement cost. Generating units with MAC higher 
than allowance price at the emission rate will buy allowances to meet the SO2 
emission regulation. As a result, the MAC for all generating units will be same as 
the allowance price in the equilibrium. This condition is necessary for electricity 
industry to achieve abatement at minimum cost(Bohi, 1992). 
Since the CAAA introduced the trade of allowance, the supply and demand of 
allowances will represent the comparative marginal abatement cost of each 
compliance strategy. In the long-run, the marginal abatement cost of SO2 
emission will converge to allowance price in the allowance market since the 
allowance market reflects the supply and demand of SO2 emission. When the 
allowance market functions well, the allowance price is expected to be a 149 
equilibrium price as MAC even though there is an uncertainty about the market 
information and the decision making. 
4.3.2 Cost Minimization 
Each electric plant has to supply the sufficient amount of electricity considering 
the reserve ratio to cover the electricity consumption in it's junsdiction(Cronshaw 
et al, 1996). That is, the electric plant does not have the choice to reduce the 
electricity supply below the electricity consumption level. This strategy is 
equi'' alent to the DSM strategy or retire or substitution of generators. 
Electric utilities are subject to federal government and state regulation generally 
through electricity price regulation. State Public Utility Commission adjusts the 
electricity price when there is a change through fuel adjustment clause, and state 
government allows prices to reflect the cost of capital. So the price of electricity 
is assumed to be given to the utilities. This kind of regulation means that 
electricity utilities can not maximize the revenue, that is, the utilities are not 
expected to change the quantity of electricity output based on the profit 
maximization principle. Instead, electric utilities choose input levels to minimize 
cost. Even though new regime like deregulation and restructuring was partly 
introduced in California(Tschirhart et al. 1999), we do not include these variables 
in our model since our data set does not includes generating units in California. 
We assume that electric generating unit will choose optimum level of inputs to 
minimize the total cost subject to output and environmental constraints as; 150 
Mm C k.Pk + l.P1 +Jhs.Pjj +fls.Pfls + a.Pa 
subject to 
q(k, l,Jhs,fls, a, E1)  Q 
E(k, 1, Jhs, fis, a, a) = W + N + Sj S 
where 
C: total cost 
k: capital 
1: labor 
Jhs : high-sulfur coal 
fis : low-sulfur coal 
a : net traded(purchased) allowances 
Pk : capital price 
P1 : wage rate, 
PJhs : high-sulfur coal price 
low-sulfur coal price 
Pa: allowance price 
q : electricity generation function or actual electricity generation 
Q : output constraint 
E: SO2 emission function or actual SO2 emission level 
W: allocated allowances 
N: net purchased allowances(purchase-sell)  a 151 
Sj : previous period's allowance 
S: bank of allowance 
a  factors affecting the emission 
The electric unit will minimize the production cost and emission reduction cost 
subject to output constraint and environmental regulation. Output constraint is 
that each generating should supply sufficient electricity to their customers. 
Emission constraint is that the actual emission level should be equal to the sum of 
given allowance from federal govemment(EPA)(W) and the net purchased 
allowance(N) in the auction market or second hand market and the carried-over 
allowances from previous period(S1) minus the carried-over allowances to the 
next period or the current period's banked allowances(S). In the optimization(cost 
minimization), the optimum inputs are function of input prices, output and 
emission constraint. That is, X = X,*( P,, Q, E). So the cost function is a function 
of input prices(capital, labor, high-sulfur coal and low-sulfur coal), allowance 
price, output constraint and actual emission level. That is, 
C =  C(PI, Q,  E)  where P, = Pk, Pi, Pji, Pfls  Pa 
The electric generating unit will choose the input quantity such that the marginal 
rate of teclmical substitution is equal to the ratio of input prices. 
4.3.3 Regulatory Effect 
However, the shadow price of the inputs will be different from the actual price 
since the electricity utilities are regulated by the government. We assume that 152 
electric generating unit will minimize the behavioral cost subject to output and 
environmental constraints to avoid misspecfication bias(Kerkvliet, 1991). In the 
optimum, behavioral cost function is a function of shadow input prices, output 
and SO2 emission level as; 
CB= C  Q,  E) where çbP = gbkPk, çbiPi, 'kjiPji  flsPfls,  Pa 
We also assume that shadow input prices are function of regulatory variables as; 
A 
=k, l,J7'zs,fls, a p1  wherei =ç/,P1 
5, will measure the difference in the divergence between shadow input price and 
actual input price. If 4 >1, then shadow price is greater than actual price, and the 
corresponding input will be underused inefficiently. If 4j, <1, then the input will 
be overused inefficiently. If 4  =1, then shadow price is equal to actual price. For 
example, high-sulfur coal states worried about the job loss in the high-sulfur coal 
mines implement the policy favoring the capital intensive compliance strategy 
like scrubber, then the shadow capital price may be lower than the actual capital 
pnce. 
We assume that the actual prices of allowance, capital and high-sulfur coal are 
different from the shadow prices of allowance, capital and high-sulfur coal 
because of regulation. We assume that the actual price of low-sulfur coal and 
labor are same as the shadow prices. This assumption is not an arbitrary one since 
there is no regulation on the labor market, and the low-sulfur coal price can reflect 
the market situation very well. 153 
The shadow allowance price is assumed to be a linear function of the restriction 
of allowance  transactions(Dtr),  the  restriction of allowance  sale(Dse),  the 
restriction of allowance  purchase(DbU), and other unidentified effect(So). And the 
shadow capital price is a function of high-sulfur coal  the encouragement(DhS), 
expenditure(D0), existence of cost recovery for the capital  and unknown 
effect(yo). The shadow price of high-sulfur coal is a function of encouragement of 
high-sulfur coal  usage(DhS) and other unidentified effect(50). The government 
regulation is assumed to affect shadow input prices and to affect the choice of 
input bundles and to affect the choice of compliance strategy. One special thing is 
that the encouragement of high-sulfur coal usage is assumed to affect both capital 
price and high-sulfur coal price. 
We assume that, while the above regulations will affect the cost through the 
effect on the shadow input prices, some regulations will affect the cost of 
compliance strategy directly. That is, the direct regulatory(R) is assumed to affect 
the cost of each compliance strategy directly. This effect will be dependent on the 
adopt of allowance strategy(Dai), the ownership of the units(D), existence of 
previous regulation or local government's stringent emission regulations(D,) and 
the existence of substitutionlcompensation  The intercept of direct boiler(D51). 
regulatory variable(ao) will measure the uncertainty effect of state PUC regulation 
and the technical inflexibilities up to some level since this intercept includes all 
kinds of unidentified effects including the uncertainty effect of state PUC. 154 
a Pa = (/3o + /3tr Dtr + /3se Dse + /3bu Dbu)Pa 
Dh5 bk Pk =(yo ± Yhs  + y'  D0)Pk 
/iJls PJhS = ((5 + (5hs Dhs)PJhs 
fls Pfls = Pfls 
I,.. 
R  a0 + aal Di +  + apr Dpr + 
where 
Dtr. Dummy variable for the states that restricts the allowance trasactions 
Dse. Dummy variable for the states that restricts the allowance sales 
Db. Dummy variable for the states that restricts the allowance purchase 
Dh: Dummy variable for states that encouraged in-state high-sulfur coal usage 
D0  .  Dummy variable for the states that have the cost recovery for capital 
expenditure of compliance strategy investments 
R  .  direct regulatory variables 
Dai. dummy variable for the units that adopted allowance strategy 
D,1: dummy variable for the units that are non-privately owned units 
Dpr. Dummy variable for the units that are regulated by the previous regulation 
D: Dummy variable for the units that have substitution/compensation boilers 
We add vintage variable(srvmonth) in cost function since we suspect that the old 
units will not likely use capital  intensive compliance strategy. That is, this old 
units will not adopt the  scrubber or "other" strategy since the operation life of 155 
scrubber is different from the life of unit, and the operation and maintenance cost 
of scrubber is more expensive comparing with the cost of new units. 
We assume linear behavioral cost function, and cost is a function of shadow 
input prices, other actual input prices, actual output, actual SO2 emission level, 
vintage and the other direct regulatory variables. 
CB = C(  P. Q, E, V. R) 
Where 
= Pk, P1, PJlis, Pfls, Pa 
Q:  electricity production 
E: actual SO2 emission 
V: vintage variable
 
That is,
 
CB= ao+aalDal+aflpDflp+aprDpr+asuDsu+(flo+/JtrDtr+flseDse+flbu
 
Dbu)Pa + (Yk + Yhs Dh + Yco Dco)Pk + (ö0 + ohs Dhs)P112s + Pfls + Pi + /3qQ + fleE +
 
fl51.srvmonth 
4.3.4 Types of Regulation 
4.3.4.1 Existence of SubstitutionlCompensation Boilers 
Many utilities in the Midwest and East had incentive to run clean boilers that are 
not applied by phase I regulation even though this benefit was disappeared in 
1995. Some utilities used substitutionlcompensation boilers to produce electricity 156 
instead of dirty phase I boilers. These units can comply with the SO2 emission 
standard of phase I generating units since the units can use more efficient 
subtitutionlcompensation boilers(Klaassen et al, 1997). If the generating units 
have the substitutionlcompensation boiler, then the MAC of allowance strategy 
will be lower than other strategy and the units can sell or bank the unused 
allowances. That is, the shadow allowance price will be lower for these units. So 
these units are more likely to choose allowance strategy and less likely to choose 
other kinds of strategies. 
4.3.4.2 Option Value of Allowance Strategy 
If one unit installed scrubber or switched the fuel to low sulfur coal, it will be 
different for the unit to change it's compliance strategy. However, the units with 
allowance strategy can change it's compliance strategy easily. The inflexibility of 
strategy change will induce the higher compliance cost compared with the flexible 
strategy. Allowance strategy has option value of flexibility compared with 
scrubber, fuel switch and "other" strategy. We expect that the shadow allowance 
price will be lower for these units and the marginal compliance cost of allowance 
strategy will be lower than the cost of capital intensive strategies(scrubber, fuel 
switch, "other" strategy). 
4.3.4.3 Compliance with Local Stringent Regulation 
The electric plants that constructed after 1971 had to comply with National 
Ambient Air Quality Standard(NAAQS) SO2 emission standards by Title I of 157 
CAAA 1990. And the plants that were built or modified after August of 1971 had 
to comply with the NSPS of SO2 emission(1 .2 pounds of SO2 per mmBTU of heat 
input)(Klaassen et al, 1997). Before phase I period, some states or some local 
governments imposed stronger SO2 emission standards to protect the local 
environment than phase I SO2 emission standard. Three states of Wisconsin, 
Minnesota and New Hampshire had enacted acid rain laws or taken regulatory 
actions to reduce SO2 emissions(Ellerman et al., 1998). These standards should be 
met by utilities irrespective of allowance possessing, and there was actually no 
allowance market before 1995. So the electric plants will not choose allowance 
strategy, instead will choose scrubber, fuel switch or "other" strategy. 
4.3.4.4 Restriction of Allowance Purchase 
Georgia Public Service Commission Order required the  utilities  to buy 
allowance only when the allowance price  is below  it's  compliance cost. 
Connecticut PUC decided that the future sale of allowances should provide the 
sufficient detail on the transaction(Klaassen et al,  1997). This restriction of 
allowance purchase will cost for the allowance strategy since the units with 
allowance strategy have to buy allowances. However, the allowance purchase 
restriction will reduce the demand for allowance in the market, and the allowance 
prices will go down. As a result, we do not know the combined effect of the 
allowance purchase restriction for the allowance strategy. But this restriction will 158 
impose high cost for other kinds of strategies since the units with other kinds of 
strategies generally sell the surplus allowances in the market. 
4.3.4.5 Restriction of Allowance Sale 
Nwe York restricted the selling of allowances, and restricted the banking of 
allowance to avoid the acid deposition(Winebrake et al, 1995). West Virginia 
allowed the revenue from allowance sales of the units with scrubber to go to the 
ratepayers. Missouri law specified that allowances are utility property and that the 
allowance sale must be approved by the PUC(Bohi, 1993). This regulation will 
affect the shadow allowance price indirectly. That is, the shadow allowance price 
may increase since this restriction will reduce the supply of allowances in the 
market. This effect will mainly affect the MAC of compliance strategy that can 
produce surplus allowances like scrubber and fuel switch strategy since these 
units will  sell the surplus allowances. As a result, the MAC of scrubber, fuel 
switch and "other" strategy will be high. There is a possibility that this restriction 
will raise the MAC of allowance strategy through by indirect effect since the 
reduced supply of allowances will raise allowance price in the market. However, 
we can not expect the prior negative effect of this regulation on the MAC of 
allowance strategy. 
4.3.4.6 Restriction of Allowance Trading 
Ohio Public Utilities Commission issued the guideline for the treatment of 
allowances that all gains and losses from allowance transactions would go to the 159 
ratepayers by fuel-adjustment-clause in the law passed in 1991(Bohi, 1993, Rose 
et al,1993). The guideline encouraged utilities to trade allowances only when it is 
economically justified. Pennsylvania ruled that allowances will be valued at 
original costs for ratemaking purposes, that is, zero cost for allowances originally 
allocated by EPA, and the purchase price plus broker fee for purchased 
allowances. Allowances are to be considered as fuel inventory and will be 
ratebased consistent with other operating inventory item. Allowance expenses are 
to be recovered through fuel-adjustment-clause. The gains or losses from 
allowance trading will go to ratepayers by fuel-adjustment clause. Iowa PUC's 
guideline is similiar to Ohio and Pennsylvania's guideline. Illinoise, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Florida and Georgia do not have any guideline for the treatment of 
allowance trade. Since the electric utility is regulated, we assume that the revenue 
and the cost from allowance trading will go to the ratepayers when there is no 
specific guideline for allowance trade. The restriction of allowance trade will 
reduce the trade volume of allowances in the market. So this restriction will make 
the shadow allowance price high. The allowance trade restriction will make the 
MAC higher for all kinds of compliance strategies. However, we do not know the 
relative intensity of this restriction on the MAC of each compliance strategy. The 
relative effect of this regulation will be decided by the data. 
4.3.4.7 Encouragement of High-Sulfur Coal Usage 160 
Some state governments worried about the job loss in the coal industry when the 
in-state electric plants change their fuel from the in-state high-sulfur coal to low-
sulfur coal or other kinds of fuels. Illinoise considered the law that utilities except 
two utilities should use certain proportions of Illinoise high-sulfur coal to avoid 
the high-sulfur coal mining job loss(Winebrake et a!, 1995). Illinoise law required 
that utilities can not reduce the usage of Illinoise high-sulfur coal without Illinoise 
Commerce Commissions' permission. In 1991, Ohio passed a law that provided 
tax credits for clean coal technology using Ohio high-sulfur coal, and allowed the 
cost recovery for the capital expenditure of compliance strategy investment. 
Indiana state law required the continuing use of Indianian high-sulfur coal unless 
there is an economic justification for the use of out-of-state coal that compensates 
for any negative impact on the Indian coal industry(Bohi, 1994). Pennsylvania 
and Kentucky state also encouraged to use in-state high-sulfur coal. 
The encouragement of high-sulfur coal usage will mainly affect the MAC of 
scrubber and allowance strategy through the shadow price of high-sulfur coal and 
the shadow price of capital since electric units can use high-sulfur coal through 
two kinds of compliance strategy, that is, scrubber and allowance strategy. If the 
high-sulfur coal states offered the law in favor of capital expenditure, then the 
electric plant will more likely install scrubbers and the shadow capital price will 
be lower for the scrubber strategy. In case that the states gave the benefit for the 161 
high-sulfur coal price, the shadow price of high-sulfur coal is low, and the electric 
plant will more likely use allowance strategy. 
4.3.4.8 Cost Recovery of Compliance Strategy Investment 
Many states have the favoring cost recovery clause for the capital expenditure of 
compliance strategy investment(Bohi, 1994). Ohio allowed for the cost recovery 
of capital expenditure resulting from compliance investment by the law passed in 
1991. The Indian law allowed for cost recovery of construction work in progress 
for pollution control equipment tilting the cost recovery rules in favor of capital 
expenditures over other compliance options. Pennsylvania law allowed also the 
cost recovery of capital expenditure on construction work in progress for 
pollution reduction project. West Virginia Public Service Commission allowed 
Monongahela Power Co. and Potomac Edison Co. to recover the cost of scrubbing 
the Harrison plant while construction work is in progress. Wisconsine also 
allowed the cost recovery for the capital expenditure of scrubber strategy. Illinoise 
law allowed the cost recovery. Kentucky allowed the quick recovery of capital 
cost for environmental compliance through monthly surcharge. Florida law 
provided that  all  environmental compliance cost be recovered through an 
Environmental Cost Recovery Factor(ECRF). Florida and Kentucky passed 
legislation that allowed recovery of compliance costs through a surcharge system 
that is distinct from base rate(Rose et a!, 1993). This system was designed to 162 
allow quick cost recovery for planned scrubbers especially for Kentucky. 
Maryland, Washington D.0 and Mississippi had similiar system. 
Cost recovery will affect the shadow capital price. It is unclear whether the states 
will favor the scrubber strategy over fuel switch or "other" strategy except for 
West Virginia and Wisconsin that allowed the cost recovery for the capital 
expenditure of scrubber. The five high-sulfur coal states are already tested 
through shadow high-sulfur coal price and shadow capital price in the previous 
section. So we include in the cost recovery variable the states that have cost 
recovery clause but were not included in high-sulfur coal states. The cost recovery 
will lower the shadow capital price for capital intensive compliance strategy, and 
then lower the MAC for these strategies. 
4.3.4.9 Type of Ownership 
The privately-owned generating units are regulated by state PUC, But the federal 
project of TVA is not subject to state regulation. The state PUC is representated 
by uncertainty of regulation since the PUCs were not clear about the treatment of 
allowance transaction in the accounting rule(Rose et al, 1993). If the units are 
regulated by state PUC, the units will less likely to use allowance strategy. 
Instead, they will more likely choose technically proven strategies like scrubber 
and fuel switch. Moreover, the private generating units will not take the risky 
strategy of allowance strategy, but the non-private units will take the challenging 
strategy. The degree that the manager of private units have the responsibility for 163 
the risky strategy will be higher than the degree of non-private units' manager. So 
non-private units will more likely to use allowance strategy. 
4.3.5 Multinomial Logit Model 
Multinomial logit model is a appropriate qualitative choice models when the 
dependent variable is discrete choice, and decision maker chooses one alternative 
among several alternatives based on the observed characteristics of decision 
maker (Train, 1993). Assume that there are n decision makers and a set of 
alternatives j that the decision maker faces. 
The qualitative choice situation, which qualitative choice models are used to 
describe, has to satisfy the following criteria; That is,  (1) the number of 
alternatives in the set is finite, (2) the alternatives are mutually exclusive and (3) 
the set of alternatives is exhaustive. 
Suppose that each decision maker will choose one specific alternative from a set 
of alternatives. Let the objective function a cost function and r the vector of all 
relevant characteristics of decision maker n that will affect the value in the 
objective function. The decision maker n will choose alternative i from a set of 
alternatives j  if and only if 
Cm <j for allj lflJn,J  1. 
where  is a set of alternatives n 
However, the researcher does not observe all relevant characteristics of decision 
maker n, and he does not know the cost function exactly. All relevant 164 
characteristics  of decision maker n can be decomposed  into  observed 
characteristics by researcher(sn) and unobserved part. So the objective function 
can be decomposed into two parts. That is, the cost function can be decomposed 
into one part(Vjn) that depends only on the observed characteristics of decision 
maker by researcher and whose form is known by the researcher up to a vector of 
parameters() that are either known a priori by the researcher or estimated, and 
the another part that represents all factors and the aspects of objective function 
that are unknown by the researcher(e1). That is, 
C = C(r) =  3) + 
The  probability(PR1) that decision maker n will choose alternative i is the limit 
of the proportion of times, as the number of times increases without bound. We 
can rewrite the probability that decision maker n will choose alternative i if and 
only if the objective value of alternative i is less than the objective value of any 
other alternative, given the observed components of objective function for each 
alternative. 
PR1n =  for all j in j, j  i)
Prob(C1 
Substituting the previous functions, then
 
PRin = Prob(Vjn +  <V +  for all j in Jn, j  i)
 
By rearranging, we get the following probability equation.
 
= Prob(e1  ejn <Vjn  Vin, for allj injn, j  i) PR1 165 
Since the researcher can calculate the difference in the objective va1ue(V  V1) 
using limited information, this part is deterministic. However, the researcher does 
not observe the  and  Since  and  are random variables, the difference 
between two random variables(e-e)  is  also random variable.  So the 
probability(PR1n) that decision maker n will choose alternative  i  is just the 
probability that each random variable(e-e) is below the known  value(Vjn-Vjn) 
for allj injn,j  1 
If the researcher knows the distribution of the random  he can variables(e1, 
derive the distribution of each difference in the random  variables(e1-e). And the 
researcher can calculate the  that decision maker n will choose probability(PR1) 
alternative i as a function of the difference in the objective value(V3-V, for all j 
1flJn,J  i). 
The logit model assumes that each random  for all j  in j) is variable(e1, 
distributed independently, identically in accordance with the extreme value 
distribution. Given this distribution, the probability(PR1n) that the decision maker 
will choose alternative i is defined as(Train, 1993); 
PR1  = exp(V) / [j exp(V)] = exp(zft)/  exp(zj), for all i injn. 
There are three properties in multinomial logit model(Train, 1993). First, each of 
the choice probabilities is necessarily between zero and one. Second, the choice 
probabilities necessarily sum to one since the set of alternatives is exhaustive; 166 
j (PR) =  1{exp(V) / [  exp(V) ]} = 1 
Third, the relation of the choice probability for an alternative to the objective 
value(V1) of that alternative, holding the objective values of the other alternatives 
fixed, is sigmoid, or S-shaped. 
The marginal effect of the probability is defined as the extent to which the 
probabilities change in response to a change in some observed characteristics. 
More specifically, the change in the probability that decision maker n will choose 
alternative i given a change in one of observed characteHstics(si  is the kth 
characteristics of observed characteristics of decision maker  n(s1) who choose 
alternative i) being included in the objective function of alternative i is(Long, 
1997) 
PR/ Sjkn = PR [(  Vjn/  5ikn)  ( V/ sjkn)(PRjn)] 
If the coefficient of 5jkn is f3ik in case that the observed objective function is linear 
in the observed characteristics, then V/ 5jkn = I3ik. So the marginal effect can be 
rewritten as; 
PR/ 5ikn = PRin[ik  (PR)] flk 
The changes in the choice probabilities sum to zero when one observed variable 
changes since the probabilities must sum to one before and after the change. 
j  PRm/  Sjn  ( Vjn/  +  j (  Vjn/  =0 167 
This means that, if one alternative is improved so that its probability of being 
chosen increases, the additional probability necessarily declines from other 
alternatives. That is, to increase the probability of one alternative necessitates 
decreasing the probability of another alternatives. 
We estimate the logit model using maximum likelihood estimation technique. 
The likelihood function is(Ben Akiva and Lerman); 
N J N J  J 
In L(i,,,,ftIy, S) = U U  [PR ] 
' = [J [J [exp(S3)/  exp(Lfl  J)J
n=1 j=1  n=I j=1  j1 
And the log-likelihood function is; 
N J 
LL(  ) = 
.1 
y[Su-j3- logy exp(SI3)] 
,i=1  j=1  j=1 
The likelihood ratio index is used to test hypothesis for each variable or several 
variables(Train, 1993). Let 3'  the constrained maximum likelihood estimate of 
the parameters. The ratio of likelihood is defined as 
where L(13') is the constrained maximum value of the likelihood function 
under the null hypothesis 
L(j3*) is the unconstrained maximum value of the likelihood function. 
The test statistic defined as 2*log(R) is distributed chi-squared with degree of 
freedom equal to the number of restrictions implied by the null hypothesis. That 
is, 168 
-2 * log(R) = -2 *  = -2 * [LL(I3H)LL(I3*) 
where LL(13H) is the log of constrained liglikelihood function 
LL(13*) is the log of unconstrained likelihood function 
If this statistic exceeds the critical value, then we can reject the null hypothesis. 
The other test is Wald test, which is easier to apply when there are many 
variables(Long,1997). Let j3k = (13'jk)' be the maximum likelihood estimates for 
variable k. Var (l3k) be the estimates' covariance matrix. The Wald test statistic is 
Wk = (I3k)' [var (k)]'(j3k). If the null hypothesis is true, the Wald statistic is 
distributed as chi-square wuth j- 1 degree of freedom. 
Hypothesis test for two alternatives using LR test is simple but statistically less 
powerful than Wald test. Select the observations that chose the alternatives being 
considered and estimate the binary logit on the new sample. Then calculate LR 
test that all coefficients(except for intercept) are zero. If this is true, then statistic 
is distributed with degree of freedom ofj-1. 
Wald test statistic is  [Qvar 
Where Q is the linear combination of restrictions,  I3'is the estimates from all 
parameters. 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives(IJA) property requires that if a new 
alternative becomes available, then all probabilities for the prior choices must 
adjust in precisely the amount necessary to retain the original odds among all 
outcomes(Long,1997). This property means that multinomial logit model should 169 
be used in cases where the outcome catogeries are distinct and weighted 
independently for decision maker. Hausman test can be used for testing 
IIA(Long,1997). The basic idea is that if the alternatives are irrelevant in 
computing the odds for two outcomes, then omitting those alternatives should not 
affect the estimates of the parameters that affect the two outcomes. The statistic is 
HIIA= (13R_I3*F) [var  (i3R)-var 
Where F3AR is stack of estimates of restricted model that eliminate one or more 
outcomes, 13*F is stack of estimates of full model. Degree of freedom is the row in 
13R, that is the number of included choices. 
4.3.6 Empirical Specification 
We define that the SO2 emission reduction compliance strategies as alternatives. 
So the set of compliance strategy is composed of four kinds of strategies of 
allowance, "other", scrubber and fuel switch, which are ones that each generating 
unit actually chose in Phase I period. Each unit chose only one compliance 
strategy among four kinds of strategies and we include whole units excluding only 
4 retired units that do not have observations. So the strategy set satisfies the 
conditions of alternative set, which is finite, mutually exclusive and exhaustive. 
We define the observed characteristics of unit are the shadow and actual prices of 
input factors(capital, labor, high-sulfur coal and low-sulfur coal), electricity 
generation level, the actual SO2 emission, allowance price and regulatory dummy 
variables and vintage variable. 170 
If we substitute behavioral cost function, then probability that compliance 
strategy i will be chosen by generating unit n is 
[j exp(V)], for all i lflJn. 
That is, 
PR1  =  exp(V1) / 
PR, = expftzo + aal Dai + anp  + apr Dpr +  + (fib + 131r Dtr + /Jse Dse+ Jibu 
Dbu)Pa + (Yk + Yhs Dh + Yco Dco)Pk + (5° + '5hs Dh)Pf  + Pfis + P1 + /3qQ + /3eE + 
/35srvmonth]/ 
{Ej=14 exp[ao + aal Dai +  + apr Dpr +  + (fib + fir Dir + /3se Dse+ 
/Jbu Dbu)Pa + (Yk + Yhs Dhs + Yco Dco)Pk + (5 + 5hs Dh)PJ,2 + Pfls + Pi + flqQ + fleE 
+fsrrvm0nth]},f0r all i inj.j=1,2,3,4 
In the estimation, we set the allowance strategy as the reference strategy. So we 
normalize the parameters of reference strategy(allowance strategy) to be zero. 
However, there is a separation problem for the dummy variable Dai for the units 
that adopted allowance strategy since the generating units with this dummy 
variable do not have any other kinds of compliance strategy. Even though this 
variable does not affect the consistency, we can not get the estimate for this 
variable since the probability approaches zero or infinity(Amemiya, 1985, Albert, 
1984), we exclude this variable. So the intercept of shadow allowance price will 
measure the option value and the technical inflexibilities up to some level since 
we drop the allowance dummy variable. 171 
However, the allowance price is same for all generating units and all kind of 
compliance strategies since there is only one allowance market price each year. 
So the actual allowance price does not explain the choice of compliance strategy. 
We drop the actual allowance price. Instead we assume that the two regulatory 
dummy variables of allowance trade restriction and allowance sale restriction will 
represent the shadow allowance price. 
Units that are located in the state(Georgia) that restricted the allowance purchase 
do not have allowance and "other" strategy. We drop this variable in the shadow 
allowance price because of separation problem. So the shadow allowance price is 
function of allowance trade restriction and allowance sale restriction. 
Since the emission is an endogenous variable, we use the estimated value for 
emission to avoide endogeneity problem. We estimate the emissions using 
observed input prices, output, allocated allowance, previous period's allowances, 
current period's allowance banking, SO2 emission removal efficiency rate for the 
case of scrubber. We add one more variable of sulfur content of coal to estimate 
SO2 emission. Actually we used the proxy variable for the sulfur content of coal. 
That is, we use SO2 emission level before scrubbing for the proxy variable of 
sulfur content. Since we use the SO2 emission level as a dependent variable, the 
use of proxy variable for SO2 emission level before scrubbing will not give the 
biased estimates. 
E = E(P, Q,,  S,. remeffc, sulfur) W1, 172 
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Definition and Source 
We get the annual electricity production(gen in KWh) of each generating unit 
from E1A767(Annual Steam Electric Unit Operation and Design Report) of 
Energy Information Administration of Department of Energy(DOE/EIA). We 
assume that the fuel consumption and the  SO2 emission of generating units are 
proportional to the ratio that each boiler contributed to the total electricity 
generation of each unit in case of multiple relationship between boiler and 
generating unit. 
We separate the coal into low-sulfur coal and high-sulfur coal based on the 
sulfur content of 1.2 pound SO2 emission per million BTU heat input since many 
units are applied by NSPS, NAAQS and stringent local emission regulation of 
which emission standard is at least 1.2 pound of SO2 emission per million BTU 
heat input, even though the emission rate standard in Phase I is 2.5 pound of SO2 
emission per million BTU(Carlson et al,2000). We calculate low-sulfur coal 
prices(lcoalpl in cents/mmBTU) and high-sulfur coal(hcoalpl in cents/mmBTU) 
from EIA-423(Monthly Cost and Quality of Fuels for Electric Units Data) data at 
the unit level. This database offerd only electric plant level's fuel cost. So we 
assume that coal prices are same as the other unit's prices if all these units belong 
to the same electric plant. Since each unit used only one kind of coal, we used the 
state average price weighted by the heat for missing price. If there is no price 173 
available in the corresponding state, we use the adjacent state's average price or 
US average price. 
We get the annual wage rate(wage in $/employee) from FERC- 1 (Electric Utility 
Annual Report) of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. We divide the sum of 
total salary, the pension and the benefit by the number of employees to get the 
annual wage rate for utility. The labor of the half-time employee is assumed to be 
the half of the full-time employee. We assumed that all the generating unit's wage 
rate is same as the wage rate of the electric utility to which the corresponding unit 
belongs. 
We calculated the capital price(rent in $I$) from FERC-1 form data. Capital is 
the sum of long-term debt, common stock issued and preferred stock issued, and 
capital cost is the sum of interest for long-term debt, dividends for common stock 
and preferred stock. We divide each component's cost by the total amount of 
capital, and multiply it by the component ratio. We deflate all the price data using 
Consumer Price Index(1982-1984=100). 
In case of the rent and the wage rate, same method as that of high-sulfur and 
low-sulfur coal price was used to estimate the rent and the wage of the units that 
do not have the price. We used the weighted average rent and wage rate of the 
state where the utility is located for the units of which rent and wage are missing. 
If the rent and the wage are not available in that state, we use the mean value of 
the United States. 174 
We get the SO2 emission(emis in ton) data of each boiler from Acid Rain 
Program data base of Environmental Protection Agency(EPA). This emission data 
is  measured from Continuous Emissions Monitoring System(CEMS). We 
multiplied boiler's SO2 emission by electricity production ratio to get the S02 
emission of each generating unit. In the period of 1995-1997, we can not get the 
separate SO2 emission for some boilers that share the stack. In this case, we divide 
the total SO2 emission of common stack by the electricity generation ratio of each 
unit. From 1998, we can get the separate CEMS SO2 emission data of each boiler, 
however. 
The vintage(srvmonth in months) is the in-service months of the generating unit 
from the commercial operation to the December of 1999 in terms of months using 
the data from E1A767 data set. We used SO2 emission before scrubbing for proxy 
variable for sulfur content of coal. 
The data of allowance are from EPA's Acid Rain Database. The other variables 
like location(state), ownership type of electric unit are available. We get the 
monthly allowance price in the second market where private transactions were 
taken place from EPA data base. We get the simple allowance price by dividing 
the sum of monthly price  by twelve. We use  the  private  brokerage 
firms's(Fieldstone) data base. 
4.4.2 Identification of Compliance Strategy Change 175 
All of the phase I generating units reported their SO2 emission reduction 
compliance strategy to Department of Energy(DOE) in 1993. This information is 
the only available data to identify the compliance strategy of each generating unit. 
However, many units changed their compliance strategy in phase I period since 
there were time lag between the report and the implementation of the strategy, and 
the market situation was changed. 
We checked the scrubber(FGD) data for each generating unit from ETA 767 data 
base, and identified the scrubber strategy and the year when the unit installed and 
operated scrubber before phase I period. One additional unit used scrubber 
strategy from 1995, and the other additional unit operated scrubber from 1997. 
These two units changed strategy from reported fuel switch to scrubber. Even 
though two other units installed scrubber in 1999, these units are assumed to be 
applied to phase II period(from 2000) since they did not operate scrubber in 1999. 
The realized number of units that installed and used scrubber strategy in phase I 
period is 29 units. 
If the SO2 emission of the generating units in phase I period that reported 
allowance strategy as a compliance strategy is continuously below the emission 
standard and did not buy allowance, then we identified these units changed 
strategy from reported allowance purchasing strategy to fuel switch strategy. Four 
generating units changed their strategy to fuel switch from allowance strategy. 176 
If the SO2 emission of the generating units with reported fuel switch is 
continuously over the emission standard and bought the allowance instead, then 
we define that their strategy were changed from reported fuel switch to allowance 
strategy. 23 generating units changed the compliance strategy to allowance 
strategy from fuel switch. 
Instead of 7 units, only 4 generating units retired. 7 units used "other" strategy 
including switch to natural gas or oil. Finally, 29 generating units used scrubber 
strategy as SO2 emission reduction compliance strategy, 102 units used allowance 
strategy, 115 units used fuel switch strategy and 11 units were "other" strategy 
among 261 Phase I generating units at the end of phase I period(1999). 
Especially, the number of units(23) that changed their strategy from fuel switch 
to allowance is greater than the number of the units(4) that changed their strategy 
from allowance to fuel switch. This comes from the fact that the initially 
forecasted price of allowance before 1993 was much higher than the actual price 
when the allowance market was opened in 1993. The allowance price was 
between $100 and $150, but the forecasted price was over $200. The reported 
compliance strategy was made before the opening of allowance market. So the 
electric utility may based their compliance strategy on the forecasted price of 
allowance. 177 
Table 4.1 Number of Generating Units by Compliance Strategy 
allowance strategy  1995  1996  1997 
- reported  83  83  83 
change from fuel switch  22  1  0 
- change to fuel switch  1  0  3 
estimated  104  105  102 
"other" strategy
-reported  11  11  11 
scrubber strategy 
reported  27  27  27
 
change from fuel switch  1  0
  1 
estimated  28  28  29 
fuel switch strategy
-reported  136  114  113 
- changed from allowance  1  0  3 
0 
-change to allowance  22  1 
-estimated  114  113  116 
* "other" strategy includes 4 retired units 
4.4.3 Data Statistics 
The mean electricity generation(MWh) of the 257 phase I generating units 
increased phase I period(1995-1999). SO2 emission(ton) increased until 1997, but 
declined after that year. The capital price(rent) declined in 1996, but increased in 
1997-1998 period, and declined in 1999. Both prices of high-sulfur and low-sulfur 
coal declined continuously in phase I period.  The allowance price declined in 
1996, but increased continuously, and the allowance price at the end of phase I 
period(1999) was highest during phase I period. The net traded volume of 
allowance was positive in 1995, which means the net purchase of allowances. 
However, the net traded volume of allowances was negative after 1995, which 178 
means that the units sold surplus allowances. This statistics means that the units 
over abated in phase I period. 179 
Table 4.2 Data Statistics of 257 units in 1995-99 
Variable  Label  Mean  Std 0ev  Minimum  Maximum 
gen  (KWh)  1800600289  1546583689  2679000.00  10266594000 
so2  (ton)  17847.45  18581.46  3.0000000  173285.00 
rent  ($/$)  0.0850058  0.0546187  0  1.1259843 
hcoalp  (c/mmBTU)  77.0626555  20.0698055  30.7202040  257.3602207 
lcoalp  (c/mmBTU)  80.1854326  16.1258495  10.4312860  151.4897414 
hcoalpl  (c/mmBTU)  80.2224275  18.0196531  31.2433145  222.5817167 
icoalpi  (c/mmBTU)  82.8283206  17.1097886  27.6244468  133.2175920 
wage  ($)  31573.59  12264.23  2986.69  99917.02 
srvmonth  (month)  420.1284047  92.6669320  96.0000000  588.0000000 
alocalow  (ton)  23038.42  21405.65  0  192637.00 
heldalow  (ton)  30207.04  30280.32  0  277612.00 
dedcalow  (ton)  17905.10  18614.93  3.0000000  173285.00 
caryalow  (ton)  12309.76  22147.48  0  236801.00 
netrade  (ton)  -1868.69  21530.88  -163445.00  181290.00 
alowprice  ($/ton)  83.2517853  22.6074296  55.0223072  116.4945978 
emissulflsum(standard)  3251.74  10323.49  0  88446.00 
emissulf2sum(standard)  0.4902724  6.6270902  0  90.0000000 
avgremeffc  (%)  0.0982428  0.2871283  0  0.9930000 
so2ebbtu(pound/mmBTU)  2.6006818  1.4853384  0.1540820  7.0858937 
Table 4.3 Data Statistics of units with allowance strategy in 1995-99 
Variable  Label  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
gen  (KWh)  1525355990  1139528842  48880000.00  7182524000 
so2  (ton)  27002.10  23108.92  1855.01  173285.00 
rent  ($/$)  0.0796335  0.0747544  0  1.1259843 
hcoalp  (c/mmBTU)  76.5409035  23.4630619  31.2433145  257.3602207 
lcoalp  (c/mmBTU)  79.1869103  12.6380191  39.4372162  118.6855306 
hcoalpl  (c/mmBTU)  77.6722713  18.9338000  31.2433145  185.2192111 
lcoalpl  (c/mmBTU)  83.2052811  15.2495334  33.6547222  133.2175920 
wage  ($)  33027.89  13400.03  4664.89  99917.02 
srvmonth  (month)  449.7101167  85.1886086  249.0000000  585.0000000 
alocalow  (ton)  19567.26  14941.99  0  135688.00 
heldalow  (ton)  33727.43  30676.58  0  277612.00 
dedcalow  (ton)  27175.71  23110.24  836.0000000  173285.00 
caryalow  (ton)  6573.52  13265.87  0  107454.00 
netrade  (ton)  9017.40  15980.69  -38973.00  181290.00 
alowprice  ($/ton)  83.0895167  22.6351203  55.0223072  116.4945978 
emissulflsum(standard)  2125.18  5955.11  0  45054.00 
emissulf2sum(standard)  0  0  0 
avgremeffc  ()  0.0038132  0.0610711  0  0.9800000 
so2ebbtu  (pound/mmBTU) 3.3673560  1.1655485  1.4108414  7.0858937 
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Table 4.4 Data Statistics of units with "other" strategy in1995-99 
Variable  Label  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
gen  (KWh)  809262107  589959107  2679000.00  1997621000 
so2  (ton)  3199.77  2411.04  3.0000000  10502.00 
rent  ($/$)  0.0733014  0.0218135  0.0297726  0.1236667 
hcoalp  (c/mmBTU)  78.2751711  11.0443890  63.0506826  100.8756000 
lcoalp  (c/mmBTU)  85.1311636  13.7824401  63.2465199  117.2705263 
hcoalpl  (c/mmBTU)  83.3124387  12.4893490  63.2021385  106.2439000 
lcoalpl  (c/mmBTU)  89.3043328  12.7106208  70.1238816  119.6960077 
wage  ($)  31936.11  12196.34  6779.63  55390.88 
srvmonth  (month)  442.6250000  75.1731975  317.0000000  540.0000000 
alocalow  (ton)  13907.45  7525.55  4385.00  25783.00 
heldalow  (ton)  10388.10  7736.56  33.0000000  32397.00 
dedcalow  (ton)  3199.68  2411.12  3.0000000  10502.00 
caryalow  (ton)  7146.25  6468.13  26.0000000  26289.00 
netrade  (ton)  -8636.90  7691.94  -27817.00  7975.00 
alowprice  ($/ton)  83.2517853  22.8865235  55.0223072  116.4945978 
emissulflsum(standard)  2.3050000  1.8389448  1.0000000  6.0000000 
emissulf2sum(standard)  0  0  0  0 
avgremeffc  (%)  0  0  0  0 
so2ebbtu  (pound/mmBTU) 2.8738739  0.5133078  2.2775154  3.6974621 
Table 4.5 Data Statistics of units with scrubber strategy in 1995-99 
Variable  Label  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
gen  (KWh)  3139685711  2710748706  207725000  10266594000 
so2  (ton)  6709.09  8633.77  103.0000000  73364.00 
rent  ($/$)  0.0812469  0.0346299  0.0204447  0.2731926 
hcoalp  (c/mmBTU)  732383236  15.7323635  31.2433145  113.7477069 
lcoalp  (c/mmBTU)  78.8397440  16.8100396  10.4312860  118.6855306 
hcoalpl  (c/mmBTU)  74.3152940  16.1639175  31.2433145  113.7477069 
lcoalpl  (c/mmBTU)  86.4814113  14.9564371  42.7971188  129.6519162 
wage  ($)  32979.78  13512.22  2986.69  99917.02 
srvmonth  (month)  360.6619718  89.3637786  237.0000000  579.0000000 
alocalow  (ton)  43845.84  41698.99  4703.00  192637.00 
heldalow  (ton)  31275.68  48198.81  2003.00  245652.00 
dedcalow  (ton)  6737.58  8680.07  103.0000000  73364.00 
caryalow  (ton)  24538.10  46715.30  28.0000000  236801.00 
netrade  (ton)  -30178.04  37841.40  -163445.00  47032.00 
alowprice  ($/ton)  83.4325234  22.7920601  55.0223072  116.4945978 
emissulflsum(standard)  1410.11  10496.97  0.2000000  88446.00 
emissulf2sum(standard)  1.9014085  12.9884345  0  90.0000000 
avgremeffc  (%)  0.8688873  0.2429563  0  0.9930000 
so2ebbtu  (pound/mmBTU) 4.5159024  1.1716016  1.0528269  6.8382983 181 
Table 4.6 Data Statistics of units with fuel switch strategy in 1995-99 
Variable  Label  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
gen  (KWh)  1785284444  1318628092  3661000.00  6570722000 
so2  (ton)  13538.55  11548.85  22.5423858  58818.00 
rent  ($/$)  0.0913951  0.0352268  0.0261552  0.3755116 
hcoalp  (c/mmBTU)  78.3576216  18.0634828  30.7202040  257.3602207 
lcoalp  (c/mmBTU)  81.0453631  18.5587798  43.3950150  151.4897414 
hcoalpl  (c/mmBTU)  83.6621437  17.2244584  39.4146308  222.5817167 
icoalpi  (c/mmBTU)  81 .1788520  19.0549333  27.6244468  131 .3393393 
wage  ($)  29940.84  10636.64  2986.69  52570.14 
srvmonth  (month)  407.1222411  91.1454433  96.0000000  588.0000000 
alocalow  (ton)  21671.30  16199.72  0  113801.00 
heldalow  (ton)  28223.23  24049.27  0  151649.00 
dedcalow  (ton)  13505.97  11529.16  22.5423858  58818.00 
caryalow  (ton)  14718.16  17860.40  0  120236.00 
netrade  (ton)  -4083.97  11705.84  -86919.00  64903.00 
alowprice  (s/ton)  83.3498181  22.5769310  55.0223072  116.4945978 
emissultlsum(standard)  4899.51  13038.22  0.0336203  55555.00 
emissulf2sum(standard)  0.6112054  7.3978263  0  90.0000000 
avgremeffc  (%)  0.0015280  0.0370839  0  0.9000000 
so2ebbtu  (pound/mmBTU) 1.4670250  0.7034313  0.1540820  4.9289996 182 
4.5 Estimation Result 
Table 4.7 Hypothesis Test Result 
Test  N2  Critical 
Hypothesis  Restrictions  Statistic  Value(a=0.05) 
no regulatory effect 
anp=apr=asu=/3tr= 
flse=Yhs=Yco=hs=O  240.23  36.42 
no effect on shadow allowance price  fltr=flse=O  40.452  12.59 
- no effect of allowance trade restriction  flir=O  10.894  7.81 
- no effect of allowance sale restriction  JJse=O  22.05  7.81 
no effect on shadow capital price  17.046  12.59 
-no effect of high-sulfur coal usage  15.276  7.81 
- no effect of cost recovery  Yco0  3.558  7.81 
no effect on shadow high-sulfur coal price  ô=O  3.086  7.81 
no effect of ownership  a=O  8.694  7.81 
no effect of local stringent regulation  apr=O  32.766  7.81 
no effect of sub/comp. Boilers  a5=O  28.028  7.81 
no effect of high-sulfur coal states  71.14  12.59 
no effect of generation  552.15  7.81 
no effect of capital price  Pk0  20.892  7.81 
no effect of wage  w=0  6.89  7.81 
no effect of high sulfur coal price  43.192  7.81 
no effect of low-sulfur coal price  158.25  781 
no effect of S02 emission  ?emishat0  731 .848  7.81 
no effect of vintage  srvmonth0  32 .436  7.81 
The null hypothesis of no regulatory effect, that is,  all of the coeficient of 
regulatory variables are zero can be rejected at 1% significance level. So we can 
say that the regulation significantly affected the choice of compliance strategy of 183 
phase I generating units. Since the hypothesis that the restriction of allowance 
strategy and allowance sale doe not affect the shadow allowance price is also 
rejected, these restrictions affect the choice of compliance strategy. Both of the 
restriction have statistically significant effect on the shadow allowance price. The 
encouragement of high-sulfur coal usage affect capital price, thereby the strategy 
choice at 10% significance level. But the cost recovery variable does not 
significantly affect the shadow capital  price. The regulatory variables of 
ownership type, existence of local stringent emission regulation, existence of 
substitutionlcompensation boilers affect the strategy choice. The encouragement 
of high-sulfur coal usage does not affect shadow high-sulfur coal price. 
The coefficient of ownership variable(DNP) is significant for the choice of fuel 
switch at 1% significance level, and significant for the choice of scrubber strategy 
at 5°/o significance level, but has weak explanatory power for "other" strategy in 
terms of relative probability compared to the probability of allowance strategy. 
The probability for all kinds strategy except for allowance is negative in marginal 
effect table. That is, the non-private electric utilities are more likely to choose 
allowance strategy. Contrary to non-private units, private units are less likely to 
choose allowance strategy, and more likely to choose technically confirmed 
scrubber, fuel switch strategy. The non-private units are more likely to adopt 
challenging compliance strategy of allowance strategy. One explanation for non-
private unit's choice of allowance strategy may be the fact that the non-private 184 
Table 4 Estimation Result 
LOG OF LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION =  -656.236 
parameters  "other" strategy  scrubber strategy  fuel switch strategy 
constant  -14.3849  (-3.77306  )  -3.63373  (-1.37696  )  0.869827  (0.81615 
-1.81152  (-1.47222  )  -1.0937  (-1.67228  )  -0.5428  (-2.40876 
1.56582  (0.186851  )  9.41177  (1.7416  )  -0.12529  (-0.05434 
IlprDpr  4.64138  (5.05707  )  2.36037  (2.38725  )  0.783438  (2.37046 
2.21794  (3.31323  )  -1.80507  (-3.2434  )  -0.09413  (-0.45293 
hSDhS  0.030539  (1.52236  )  -8.15E-03  (-0.47844  )  -2.17E-03  (-0.37044 
J3D,  0.016092  (1.18953  )  -1.62E-03  (-0.19853  )  9.30E-03  (2.84677 
PseDse  0.031155  (2.88155  )  7.52E03  (-0.87016  )  9.82E03  (-2.57541 
yh5Dh5  -2.15897  (-0.1165  )  24.1526  (1.8052  )  -12.3275  (-2.69727 
Gen  1.50E-09  (2.51917  )  5.80E-09  (14.5118  )  2.97E-09  (10.9287 
Rent  8.29014  (0.450513  )  -24.0098  (-1.90931  )  14.3508  (3.20625 
wage  3.35E-05  (1.3462  )  1.38E-05  (0.724331  )  -1.18E-05  (-1.55426 
hcoalpl  -0.05737  (-2.40203  )  -0.11286  (-5.60249  )  -0.02634  (-3.36358 
Icoalpi  0.208957  (9.24085  )  0.19244  (9.57582  )  0.101174  (8.16302 
Emishat  -5.12E-04  (-8.7868  )  -7.43E-04  (-15.356  )  -4.78E-04  (-11.8504 
I351srvmonth  -3.98E-03  (-1.04793  )  -3.85E-03  (-1.31027  )  -6.80E-03  (-5.4051
( ) are t-ratios 
<marginal effect> 
parameters  allowance  "other"  scrubber  fuel switch 
constant  0.0021786  -0.2331  -0.085284  0.3162 
0.079601  -0.023185  -0.013202  -0.043214 
y0D0  -0.029056  0.019092  0.20902  -0.19905 
-0.13064  0.065038  0.034854  0.030749 
0.0034503  0.037308  -0.039816  -0.00094249 
hSDhS  0.000090146  0.00050918  -0.00016379  -0.00043553 
3frDfr  -0.0011947  0.00017505  -0.00021271  0.0012324 
I3seDse  0.00098804  0.00058546  -0.000014181  -0.0015593 
Yh5DhS  1.38273  0.056069  0.75419  -2.19299 
Gen  -3.8091 gD-i o  -6.35466D-12  7.44008D-i 1  3.1 2873D-1 0 
Rent  -1.66133  0.02336  -0.79144  2.42941 
wage  1.1311 5D-06  6.23771 D-07  4.901 54D-07  -2.24507D-06 
hcoalpi  0.0038833  -0.00059735  -0.0019835  -0.0013025 
Icoalpi  -0.013974  0.0022889  0.0023019  0.0093836 
emishat  0.000062416  -3.39785D-06  -7.55000D-06  -0.000051468 
5srvmonth  0.00084253  -8.3431 4D-07  0.000038703  -0.0008804 185 
manager generally have lower responsibility for the risky management. So more 
electric generating units will choose allowance strategy under the restructuring 
regime. And most of new entrants in generation sector are Independent Power 
Producers(IPP). So these firms are more likely to choose allowance strategy in 
phase II period. 
The existence of local stringent environmental regulation(D) is significant for 
all kinds of compliance strategy choice at 1% significance level. The relative 
probability and the marginal effect is negative only for allowance strategy, but the 
probability and the marginal effect for all  other strategy is positive. The 
generating units that located in the region where imposed stronger emission 
regulation are less likely chose allowance strategy. Instead, these units are more 
likely to choose "other" strategy considering the coefficient magnitude of positive 
marginal effect of this variable. This fact can be explained by the fact that the 
generating units could not choose the allowance strategy before 1995, since the 
previous regulation was effective before 1995. As a result, the units that were 
regulated by strong local environmental regulation had to pay higher cost since 
these units could not utilize market-based allowance system. That is, these units 
had to use command-and-control options. So the effort of local governments to 
protect local environment imposed higher cost on the electricity industry and on 
the ratepayers which is consistent with previous study. 186 
The existence of substitutionlcompensation  boilers(D5) is significant for the 
choice of allowance, "other" and scrubber strategy, but insignificant for fuel 
switch strategy at 5% level. The marginal effect on "other" and allowance strategy 
is positive, but negative for scrubber and fuel switch strategy. As expected, the 
units that have substitution boilers more likely to choose "other" strategy and 
allowance strategy, but less likely to choose scrubber and fuel swutch strategy. 
There are less substitutionIcompensation boilers since most of the fossil fuel-fired 
generating units are applied by the phase II regulation. So more units will choose 
scrubber and fuel switch strategy in phase II period holding other variable 
constant. 
The restriction of allowance trade(DTR) significantly and positively affected the 
choice of fuel switch strategy, but is insignificant for scrubber and "other". The 
marginal effect is negative for the allowance and scrubber strategy, but positive 
for the fuel switch and "other" strategy. That is, more units that are located in 
states that restricted allowance trade chose fuel switch and "other" strategy and 
less units chose allowance strategy and scrubber strategy. If there is no restriction 
of allowance trade, more units will choose allowance strategy and scrubber 
strategy. But the negative marginal effect on the increased choice of allowance 
strategy is 50 times the marginal effect of scrubber strategy under no restriction of 
allowance trade. The positive marginal effect of fuel switch is greater than the 
marginal effect of "other" strategy. So many units with fuel switch will change 187 
their strategy to allowance strategy when the restriction of allowance trade is 
eliminated. 
The restriction of allowance  sale(DSE) negatively and significantly affected for 
the choice of fuel switch strategy, and positively and significantly affected "other" 
strategy. The marginal effect of this variable is negative for the fuel switch and 
scrubber strategy and positive for allowance and "other" strategy. The generating 
units with scrubber and fuel switch generally sell the surplus allowances, and the 
units with allowance strategy buy the allowances. So the effect of allowance sale 
restriction will affect the units with scrubber and fuel switch that have surplus 
allowances negatively. 
The combined marginal effect of allowance trade and allowance  sale(DTR +DSE) 
that is, the effect of shadow allowance price, is negative for three kinds of 
compliance strategies of allowance, scrubber and fuel switch strategy, but positive 
for "other" strategy. The combined effect is negative not only for these units with 
scrubber and fuel switch that can sell surplus allowances, but also for the units 
with allowance strategy that have to buy allowances in the market. This means 
that the negative direct effect(increase of MAC) of the allowance transaction is 
dominant over the positive indirect effect(increase of allowance price). The 
combined effect for the allowance strategy is also negative since the negative 
marginal effect from allowance trade restriction is bigger than the positive 
marginal effect from allowance sale restriction. 188 
The capital price effect of the high-sulfur coal states(DHS0  is significant and
k) 
positive for the scrubber strategy choice, and significant and negative for the 
choice of fuel switch strategy choice, but insignificant and negative for "other" 
strategy choice. The marginal effect on the scrubber, allowance and "other" 
strategy is positive, but is negative for the fuel switch strategy. This finding is 
consistent with expectation that the high-sulfur coal states will give the benefit to 
the electric plants to use in-state high-sulfur coal through by lower capital price. 
So the electric units that are located in high-sulfur coal states more likely to 
choose scrubber and allowance strategy, and less likely to choose fuel switch 
strategy. 
The  price  effect  that  high-sulfur  states  affected  the  high-sulfur  coal 
price(DHS0  is low since the variable has weak in statistical terms, that is weak
fh) 
positive for "other" strategy, but the insignificant negative for scrubber and fuel 
switch strategy. As expected, the marginal effect of this variable is positive for 
allowance strategy, but negative for fuel switch strategy. As a result, the high-
sulfur states' encouragement of high-sulfur coal usage was effective for the choice 
of allowance strategy through the lower high-sulfur coal price. So the generating 
units that located in the high-sulfur coal states more likely to choose allowance 
strategy and enjoyed the lower high-sulfur coal price even though the probability 
is low. 189 
The combined marginal effect of high-sulfur coal price and capital price that 
high-sulfur coal states affected the compliance strategy  o P,,  P,) +DHS0 
is positive for allowance, "other" and scrubber strategy, but negative for the fuel 
switch strategy. The marginal effects of both high-sulfur coal price and capital 
price are positive for allowance and "other" strategy, and the marginal effect of 
both effect is negative for fuel switch. However, the marginal positive effect of 
capital price is greater than the negative marginal effect of high-sulfur coal price. 
As a result, the electric units that located in high-sulfur coal states more likely to 
choose scrubber strategy through by lower capital price effect rather than through 
by the lower high-sulfur coal price. 
The cost recovery of capital expenditure(D0o  is significant and positive for
k) 
scrubber strategy at 5% significance level, but insignificant for other strategies. 
The marginal effect is positive for scrubber and "other" strategy, but is negative 
for the choice of allowance and fuel switch strategy. That is, the generating units 
more likely chose the scrubber and "other" strategy because of the cost recovery 
effect, but less likely to choose allowance and fuel switch strategy. 
The electricity production level, capital price, low-sulfur and high-sulfur coal 
price, emission level have significant explanatory power for strategy choices. 
Vintage is negatively significant only for fuel switch strategy choice. Wage rate is 
insignificant for "other", scrubber and fuel switch strategy. 190 
The electricity production level(gen) positively affects for scrubber and fuel 
switch, and negatively for allowance and "other" strategy. That is, the bigger 
generating units in terms of electricity generation more likely chose the scrubber 
and fuel switch to comply with the  SO2 emission reduction. Considering a 
positive marginal effect on scrubber and fuel switch, but negative on allowance 
and "other" strategy and the relative degree of this marginal effect, units will more 
likely change their compliance strategy from allowance strategy and "other" 
strategy to fuel switch and scrubber strategy when the electricity generation 
increases. 
The actual capital  price(rent) is a significant variable to explain the relative 
probability for the choice of scrubber and fuel switch at 5% and 1% significance 
level respectively, but insignificant for "other" strategy. The marginal effect of 
capital price on the probability of the scrubber strategy is negative that is 
consistent with the expectation. 
The high-sulfur coal price(hcoalp 1) has negative and significant effect on 
scrubber, fuel switch and "other", but positive for allowance strategy. As 
expected, the high-sulfur coal price has negative marginal effect on scrubber, but 
positive effect on allowance strategy, which is contrary to expectation. This may 
be explained by the fact that the units with allowance strategy used more low-
sulfur coal since the low-sulfur coal price was low compared to expected price. 191 
The marginal effect of low-sulfur coal price(Icoalp 1) is negative for the choice 
of allowance strategy, but positive for fuel switch, which is contrary to the 
expectation. One interesting finding is that the marginal effect of low-sulfur coal 
price for the choice of allowance strategy is negative, but the marginal effect of 
high-sulfur coal is positive for the allowance strategy. This marginal effect can be 
explained by the fact that the units with allowance strategy use more low-sulfur 
coal than high-sulfur coal. So these units are more sensitive with low-sulfur coal 
price than high-sulfur coal price. 
The estimated SO2 emission level(emishat) is significant for all kinds of 
compliance strategy, and the marginal effects are negative for scrubber, "other" 
and fuel switch in terms of magnitude of effect. Especially, the negative marginal 
effect on fuel switch is the greatest comparing with the negative effect on the 
scrubber and "other" strategy. This finding means that many generating units will 
change their compliance strategies from allowance strategy mainly to fuel switch 
strategy when the stronger SO2 emission rate standard is introduced in phase II 
period. 
The vintage variable of the generating boilers(srvmonth) is significant and 
negative probability for fuel switch strategy, but insignificant and negative for 
"other" and scrubber strategy. We expected that the units will not install capital 
intensive strategy like scrubber, "other" and fuel switch strategy if the units are 
old. The marginal effect of the vintage on fuel switch and "other" strategy is 192 
negative, but the marginal effect on the allowance and scrubber strategy is 
positive. This finding can be explained in terms of capital intensity of each 
compliance strategy. That is, the fuel switch and "other" strategy are capital 
intensive, and the allowance strategy is not capital intensive strategy. So the 
capital intensive strategy will be affected by the vintage variable. The marginal 
effect is negative for fuel switch and "other" strategy, but positive for allowance 
and scrubber strategy. One unexpected result is that the marginal effect on 
scrubber is positive, which is contrary to expectation. 193 
4.6 Discussion 
The CAAA of 1990 introduced the tradable permits to regulate the SO2 emission 
from electricity industry in phase I period. This is the market-based environmental 
policy. Environmental economists are interesting in the success of this policy. 
This paper finds the major factors affecting the choice of compliance strategy and 
the regulatory effect on the choice of compliance strategy in 1995-1999. If the 
generating units chose the compliance strategy based on cost minimization 
principle, then we expect that thisenvironmental policy can save lots of cost 
comparing with the command-and-control environmental policy. 
Even though the Phase I is the test of economic theory on the environmental 
policy, only one study that estimated the regulatory effect of state PUC regulation 
and high-sulfur coal usage encouragement on the choice of compliance strategy. 
However, this study focused only two regulatory variables, moreover, focused on 
the choice of two strategies of allowance strategy and fuel switch strategy. 
Since the SO2 emission regulation in Phase I penod(1995-1999) is applied to 
each generating unit, we used 257 phase I generating unit's level data which only 
4 retired units are excluded in the sample out of 261 whole units. We assumed the 
cost minimization and behavioral cost is a function of shadow input prices, 
output, actual SO2 emission, regulatory variables and other relevant variable. We 
figured out the main factors and regulatory effect that affected the choice of 
compliance strategy using multinomial logit model. Multinomial logit model is 194 
appropriate since each unit chose only one compliance strategy out of several 
strategies based on the characteristics of each generating unit. 
The regulation of state government was significantly effective on the choice of 
compliance strategy. Because of the uncertainty of state PUC's regulation, the 
privately owned units are less likely choose challenging allowance strategy, 
instead chose the technically confirmed compliance strategy like scrubber and 
fuel switch. The non-private units are more chosed the challenging allowance 
strategy and got benefits of market-based SO2 emission system. 
Because of strong local government's emission regulation, more units chose 
"other", scrubber and fuel switch strategies, and less chose the allowance strategy. 
The effort to protect local environment imposes higher cost on society. The units 
that have substitutionlcompensation boilers more chose allowance and "other" 
strategies. The combined effect of the restriction of allowance trade and 
allowance sale negatively affected for the choice of allowance, scrubber and fuel 
switch strategy. So the restriction of allowance trade and sale significantly 
affected the shadow allowance  price. The generating units that are located in 
high-sulfur coal states more chose scrubber, allowance and "other" strategy 
mainly through by the effect of capital price, rather than through by the effect of 
high-sulfur coal price. 
The cost recovery positively affected the choice of scrubber strategy and "other" 
strategy, but this variable is insignificant for the choice of fuel switch strategy. 195 
The allowance strategy will compete with the fuel strategy in terms of regulatory 
variabled. As a result, we can predict that many generating units that used 
allowance strategy will change their strategy to fuel switch strategy in Phase II 
period(from 2000) if the low-sulfur coal price keeps the current low level. 
Most of the traditional variables can significantly explain the probability for 
choosing compliance strategies. The electricity production level is the important 
variable to explain the probabilistic relationship with the strategy choice for all 
strategies. The capital price is especially important for the choice of capital 
intensive strategies like scrubber and fuel switch strategy. The high-sulfur coal 
price is especially important variables for the scrubber strategy. Contrary to 
expectation, low-sulfur coal price will negative effect for allowance strategy, but 
positive for fuel switch strategy. SO2 emission rate is the significant variable for 
the choice of all strategies, and the vintage is significant variables for the choice 
of fuel switch strategy. Under the stronger SO2 emission regulation, less units will 
likely choose allowance strategy. Wage rate has weak probabilistic relationship. 196 
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Appendix 
Table Regulatory Variables and States 
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* the numbers are numbers of corresponding generating units 201 
5. CONCLUSION
 
This thesis addresses three topics on applied microeconomics. First, we 
investigate issues of market power and tax incidence in the U.S brewing industry. 
Since alcohol consumption can be addictive, we derive a structural econometric 
model of addiction from a dynamic oligopoly game. This model is capable of 
identifying the degree of market power in a dynamic setting and allows us to test 
the hypothesis that the tax incidence differs for federal and state excise tax. Our 
empirical results indicate that beer producers have a modest amount of market 
power. Being consistent with the results of Barnett et al.(1995) for cigarettes, we 
find that an increase in federal excise tax causes a greater increase in price and a 
greater decrease in consumption than the same increase in average state excise 
taxes. So the policy should focus on the raise of federal excise tax to mitigate the 
impact of negative externalities derived from excessive beer consumption. 
We analyzed the productivity growth in the second essay. The Clean Air Act 
Amendment(CAAA) of 1990 required phase I generating units to reduce sulfur 
dioxide(S02) emissions to 2.5 pounds of SO2 emission per million BTU of fuel 
input during the period between 1995 and 1999. We use directional technology 
distance function to estimate the Luenberger productivity indicator, opportunity 
cost of SO2 emission regulation, and the effect of SO2 emission regulation on 
productivity growth potential before and during the phase I period using a 
symmetric directional vector(g=1,gb=-1,g=-1) for 209 phase I units. 202 
There is a more potential to increase efficiency through pure technical efficiency 
improvement than scale efficiency improvement since the main source of 
inefficiency is pure technical inefficiency. The generating units with allowance 
and scrubber strategy show high efficiency during the phase I period. Productivity 
improved in pre-phase I period, and the main source of productivity growth is 
technological improvement. Productivity declined in phase I period, but it is not 
significantly different from the productivity growth in the pre-phase I period. 
Efficiency improvement contributes to the productivity growth in phase I period. 
In the phase I period, all the strategies except for the scrubber strategy show 
productivity growth. So the productivity decline in phase I period comes from 
scrubber strategy's productivity deterioration. 
The opportunity cost of SO2 emission regulation in the phase I period is smaller 
than the opportunity cost in pre-phase  I  period because of the stronger 
environmental regulations. The main source of opportunity cost decline was pure 
technical efficiency both in the pre- and phase I periods. So the potential that 
generating units can improve efficiency through pure technical  efficiency 
improvement  is  greater than through  scale  efficiency improvement. The 
opportunity cost of the units with scrubber and "other" strategies showed high 
opportunity cost in the phase I period. So the units with scrubber and "other" 
strategy could increase efficiency more than any other strategies. 203 
The potential of productivity growth derived from SO2 emission regulation in 
phase I period can be increased mainly through technological development since 
the main source of potential is technological change. The effect of SO2 emission 
regulation on productivity growth potential is biggest for the units with scrubber 
strategy through the effect on the technological change. So the policy should 
focus on the introduction of more productive production technology to achieve 
the productivity growth in Phase II period. In a conclusion, the U.S environmental 
policy is successful to reduce SO2 emission without sacrificing productivity 
growth. The appropriate policy to improve productivity in the Phase II period will 
be to introduce more productive production technology in the electricity industry. 
We estimate the regulatory effect on the choice of compliance strategy of phase I 
generating units in phase I period in the third essay. Since the CAAA of 1990 
introduced the tradable permits to regulate the SO2 emission from electricity 
industry in phase I period, generating unit can achieve least-cost compliance 
strategy. The third essay figures the factors affecting the compliance strategy 
choice and the regulatory effect on strategy choice. Since the SO2 emission 
regulation in Phase I penod(1995-1999) is applied to each generating unit, we use 
257 phase I generating unit's level data which only 4 retired units are excluded 
from 261 whole phase I units. We assume cost minimization for the electric units 
instead of profit maximization and assume that cost is a function of shadow input 
prices, output, actual SO2 emission, regulatory variables. Multinomial logit model 204 
is used since each unit chose only one compliance strategy out of several 
strategies based on the characteristics of each generating unit. 
Most of the variables except for wage, that is, electricity production level, capital 
price, high-sulfur and low-sulfur coal prices,  SO2 emission rate and vintage 
variable significantly explain the probability for choosing compliance strategy 
based on cost minimization assumption. Wage rate has weak explanatory power 
for choice probability. 
The regulation of state government significantly affected the choice of 
compliance strategy. While the privately owned units are less likely choose 
allowance strategy because of the uncertainty of state PUC's regulation, the non-
private units are more likely to choose the challenging allowance strategy. 
Because of stringent local government's emission regulation, less units are more 
likely to choose allowance strategy.  So this regulatory variable will impose 
higher MAC for the units that are regulated by local government's effort to protect 
the local environment. The units that have substitutionlcompensation boilers are 
more likely to choose allowance and "other" strategies. The combined effect of 
the allowance trade restriction and the allowance sale restriction negatively affect 
the choice of allowance, scrubber and fuel switch strategy. So the restriction of 
allowance trade and sale significantly affect the shadow allowance  price. The 
generating units that are located in high-sulfur coal states are more likely to 
choose scrubber, allowance and "other" strategy mainly through by the effect of 205 
shadow capital price, rather than through by the effect of shadow high-sulfur coal 
price. The cost recovery positively affects the choice of scrubber strategy and 
"other" strategy, but this variable is insignificant for the choice of strategy. 
The allowance strategy will compete with the fuel strategy in terms of regulatory 
variable. As a result, we can predict that many generating units that use allowance 
strategy will change their strategy to fuel switch strategy in Phase II period(from 
2000) if the low-sulfur coal price keeps the current low level. 206 
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